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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the European criminal intelligence 
agency known as Europol, both within the context of its genesis 
and development to date, and against the background of police 
cooperation in Europe generally. In doing this, the research asks 
the question, is the centralised mode of information exchange 
upon which Europol is grounded, the most appropriate? 
This model, termed the centralised state model, postulates a 
system in which a single national or supranational body controls 
the exchange of information/intelligence. The application of this 
model to Europol indicates that a strategic intelligence approach 
that maintains national sovereignty and autonomy has been given 
preference. This thesis examines the application of this model 
to the information/intelligence exchange process between Europol 
and selected member states since its inception. The data gathered 
will be analysed to show whether or not, in the light of the 
organisation's experiences and evolution over it's first four 
years, the centralised model is the most appropriate, or whether 
either another model should have been adopted, or another one has 
evolved over a period of time. 
The relevance of this answer is that it will have significant 
implications for the concept of state sovereignty in Europe. A 
Europol based on the centralised model does not threaten the 
nation state's traditional monopoly on the powers of coercion. 
A Europol however that has evolved into another model which 
includes increasing tactical and operational involvement, could 
indicate the transfer of some policing competence from the 
national to the European level. Such a development will have an 
enormous impact upon the concept of the nation state in Europe. 
1) 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1: AIMS OF THESIS 
This thesis asks the question, is the centralised mode of 
information exchange upon which Europol is based, the most 
appropriate? In addressing this question, the research for this 
thesis will look specifically at the liaison process between 
Europol and selected member states since the inception of the 
organisation. From the data collected and analysed, it will 
indicate whether or not the centralised model was the most 
appropriate, another model should have been chosen instead, or 
that Europol has evolved into something other than what was 
intended. 
In policing terms the significance of the research findings 
will be the utility and extra value that Europol can add to the 
process of combating serious transnational crime in Europe. 
However the most significant impact is likely to be in terms of 
the socio-political significance of the research findings. A 
Europol which is limited to the analysis and exchange of 
strategic intelligence can be a tool of national governments, 
without any commensurate threat to state sovereignty and 
autonomy. However, a Europol which is becoming increasingly 
involved with operational and executive matters can herald the 
possible future transfer of some policing competence to the 
European level. This can have a dramatic impact on the future of 
the European Union as an entity. 
2) 
1 .2: THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
While the evolutionary process of Europol will be explored in 
chapters 4 and 5 against the backdrop of the police cooperation 
process in Europe generally, and the Trevi network specifically, 
the main political impetus for the formation of Europol came from 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty on European 
Union, or the Maastricht Treaty as it is better known, was signed 
on 7 February 1992 in the Dutch city of Maastricht. It brought 
into being a European Union, that on the one hand, built on the 
previous EC treaties, but on the other, brought under an 
intergovernmental umbrella such diverse areas as the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy, and 
justice and home affairs issues. As such, the treaty consists of 
three pillars. "The first (Titles II, III and IV) amends the 
EEC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties (as revised most recently by the 
Single Act), formally naming them the European Community. The 
second pillar (Title V) concerns foreign and security policy, and 
is built upon the existing intergovernmental procedures of 
European Political Cooperation. The third (Title VI) covers 
justice and home affairs" (Duff 1994: 19). 
Professor Malcolm Anderson has quoted Shonfield (1973) by 
calling the process of European union/integration a journey to 
an unknown destination (Anderson 1992: 22), and the separation 
of the new Union's architecture into three distinct pillars, has 
done little to clarify the situation. While in one sense the 
Union is served by a 'single institutional framework' presided 
over by the European Council, which is made up of heads of state 
3) 
or government, and the Presidency of the EC Commission, (Duff 
1994: 26) there is still an institutional imbalance between the 
different pillars. While the first pillar is overseen by the main 
institutions of the Community: the Commission; the Council of 
Ministers; the European Court of Justice and the European 
Parliament, the other two pillars are purely intergovernmental 
in character. This means that the main supranational institutions 
of the Community have minimal input into the decision making 
processes of the second and third pillars. An example of this 
imbalance can be found in the fact that the decision making 
process in many first pillar issues is governed by qualified 
maj ority voting, whereas the decision making process of the 
second and third pillars, being intergovernmental, requires 
unanimity. 
1.3: TIm THIRD PILLAR 
The third pillar has been described as an exercise in crisis 
management, (Chalk 1994: 11) whereby disparate ad hoc elements 
of police cooperation have been brought under a single 
intergovernmental umbrella. The third pillar is headed by the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council that consists of the interior 
and/or justice ministers of the 15 member states. The main work 
however is conducted by the K4 Committee, which consists of 
senior interior ministry officials. Below the level of the K4 
Committee are three Steering Groups, which consist of senior 
police officers, and high/middle ranking interior ministry 
officials. Each Steering Group deals with a different area of 
4) 
internal security. Steering Group I deals with immigration and 
asylum matters; Steering Group II with police and customs 
cooperation; and Steering Group III with judicial cooperation in 
the criminal and civil spheres. 
Article K. 3 of the TEU listed among its areas of common 
concern; 'police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and 
combatting terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious 
forms of international crime, including if necessary certain 
aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the 
organisation of a Union-wide system for exchanging information 
within a European Police Office (Europol)'. 
This Union wide information exchange system came into being in 
February 1994, and comes under the umbrella of Steering Group II. 
In keeping with the tensions between those member states wishing 
to pursue a gradualist line towards further integration, and 
those wishing for a quantum leap, the Europol that h~s emerged, 
is a centralised intelligence exchange organisation based in the 
Hague, which has no operational or executive functions or powers. 
The Ministerial Agreement and Convention that gives Europol its 
legal validity, both state that each member state is required to 
designate a Single national agency as a national unit, and that 
these national units are the only agencies allowed to liaise with 
Europol. The rationale for these restrictions, are based 
primarily on the lack of desire among the EU member states for 
a supranational investigative authority with executive powers. 
The emphasis on a centralised mode of information exchange is 
therefore consistent with the ideal that Europol will deal with 
strategic intelligence only, as this approach mandates that, in 
5) 
the interests of efficiency and preventing duplication, all 
information is routed through/to one agency. The research 
question therefore asks the question: is the centralised mode of 
information exchange as encapsulated in the current Europol remit 
the optimum one. As such the research includes a major element 
of policy evaluation, although such evaluation is necessarily 
based on the relatively short period of Europol's operation to 
date. 
1.4: THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 
The police's concept of intelligence has come some way from the 
traditional view of intelligence as information collection. 
Throughout the course of this research, a standard question put 
to all persons interviewed has been, "how would you define 
intelligence within the context of the work you do?" In virtually 
every instance , the response has been to see intelligence as the 
product of information that has been analytically refined into 
a package that is operationally actionable. This concept is in 
keeping with the views of most commentators on the intelligence 
function. 
For example, Godson states that intelligence cannot be viewed 
simply in terms of a specific purpose or aim, but in terms of a 
process or cycle which involves the elements of collection, 
analysis, counter-intelligence and covert action." (Godson 1987: 
4, Robertson in Anderson 1994: 107) Robertson further develops 
this point by stating, "In this view (i.e. that of Godson) it is 
the integration of the many parts into a whole which defines 
6) 
intelligence. Raw information is not intelligence, it is only 
when information has been processed that it becomes intelligence. 
Intelligence is information which enables decisions to be taken. " 
(Robertson in Anderson 1994: 107) 
In developing a normative model of the criminal intelligence 
function, Schneider gives a definition of the two components of 
criminal intelligence as follows: 
"The intelligence unit must have both a tactical and strategic 
analytical capacity. Tactical intelligence contributes directly 
to the success of an immediate law enforcement objective. A 
tactical analyst dissects and reassembles the pieces of data 
gathered through the collection effort, recreating a story, 
scenario, or description of the inter-relationship of a criminal 
network. The analysis is guided by the objectives of the 
investigation. . . . .. A police agency must also incorporate a 
strategic intelligence function which acts in support of 
management's policy-making function, strategic planning, and 
enforcement goals. Unlike tactical intelligence, strategic 
analysis is proactive in nature. It must look beyond the 
immediate period, detect patterns of criminal activity and use 
these patterns to predict where future criminal activity will 
occur." (Schneider 1997: 8) 
There is therefore a close relationship between tactical and 
strategic intelligence, and police criminal intelligence units 
are required to provide both, in the interests of short term 
operational as well as long term planning considerations. 
However, there invariably tends to be an over-emphasis on the 
7) 
tactical at the expense of the strategic. Pressures for a quick 
return on resources invested, coupled with the universal desire 
of police officers to maintain control of information and 
investigations, means that time and resources tends to be 
frequently lavished on the short term gains of tactical 
intelligence, rather than the nebulous long term benefits of 
strategic intelligence. This will be a particular area of 
emphasis in this research, so as to ascertain the extent to which 
Europol has been affected by these tensions. 
In developing an analytical basis for the increasing process 
of police cooperation in Europe, Anderson has developed a three-
fold model of information exchange. 
a) The Centralised State Model: In this model, a single national 
body controls all communication with other parties, including 
the exchange of information; 
b) The Decentralised State Model: In this scenario, all levels 
are allowed to communicate with all other parties, the flow 
of information being unregulated except by the judgment of 
individual officers; 
c) The Qualified (De) Centralised Model: This model represents 
an intermediate form in which the communication is normally 
controlled by a central body but with independent 
communication being allowed in special circumstances. 
8) 
In assessing the three-fold model, Robertson argues that a 
purely strategic intelligence approach mandates that all 
communications and exchanges of information take place through 
a central body, as to perform this function, the central body 
will require access to all information. On the other hand, a 
purely tactical or investigative approach will require the 
ability to freely and independently communicate with all other 
policing agencies. In other words, a purely strategic 
intelligence function requires a centralised mode of information 
exchange, whereas a tactical approach requires a decentralised 
mode. 
In reality, policing in most states involves a combination of 
the two. Within most European states, such as the UK, police 
officers are free, in the normal course of their duties, to 
contact and exchange tactical information with their counterparts 
in any part of the country. However in developing a strategic 
intelligence function, either in terms of the exchange of 
intelligence from force to force via force intelligence bureaus, 
or internationally via national criminal intelligence agencies, 
police forces have been obliged to impose a centralised mode of 
strategic information, collection, collation, analysis and 
exchange. This is in recognition of and in response to the fact 
that different crimes require differing approaches, (Robertson 
1994: 111) and varying proportions of tactical and strategic 
planning. 
In the absence of a general desire for an FBI style 
supranational policing facility in Europe, Europol was fashioned 
as a purely (strategic) intelligence exchange agency. 
9) 
Consequently a requirement was imposed upon each member state of 
the European Union, to designate a national unit that would be 
the only agency in each state allowed to liaise with Europol. 
This stipulation clearly identifies Europol as being based upon 
a centralised mode of information exchange, in the interests of 
providing it with all the information it requires with which to 
fulfil its strategic remit. In line with the research question 
therefore, this thesis attempts to evaluate how appropriate this 
mode of operation is, in relation to the policing function and 
priorities of certain targeted states within the European Union. 
1.5: ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
The research for this thesis is based on case studies of the 
international police cooperation function of 4 northern European 
states, particularly as it pertains to Europol. Although Europol 
involves the posting of some customs liaison officers to the 
agency, the research has concentrated almost exclusively on 
police officers. The layout of the thesis therefore includes a 
review of the rather sparse literature on the topic of police 
cooperation in Europe, as well as a chapter outlining the main 
forms of inter-police as well as intergovernmental police 
cooperation. Chapter 5 deals with Europol from inception to its 
current status. Chapters 6 through 9 will consist of the case 
studies of the 4 targeted states, these being: the UK, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. The reasons for choosing these 
particular states will be dealt with in the Methodology chapter. 
10) 
Finally Chapter 10 will concentrate on an analysis of the data 
presented in the preceding 4 chapters, as well as the development 
of a grounded theory showing the effects of the research findings 
on both the evolutionary progress of justice and home affairs, 
as well as the integration process generally in Europe. 
Although the research concentrates on northern European states, 
where applicable, it will provide some evidence and perspectives 
from certain southern European states, specifically Italy, Spain 
and Portugal. This is of particular use in measuring the effects 
of the decentralised approach of policing in northern European 
states to the more centralised and inflexible method of southern 
European states. The usage however of a southern European 
perspective in this thesis is very limited, and inasmuch as it 
is outside the purview of this research, represents a fruitful 
source of further investigation. 
11) 
CHAPTER 2; LITBRATURB REVIEW 
2.1: Chapter Introduction 
The field of police cooperation in Europe is still a 
comparatively new area of study, which partly reflects the fact 
that it has only recently acquired significance within the 
context of the integration process in Europe. Much of the work 
done to date has been purely descriptive, and has concentrated 
on institutions and processes. Only with the signing of the 
Treaty on European Union in the past four years, has any serious 
academic effort been put into developing a conceptual framework 
for the process of police cooperation in Europe. The difficulties 
that have been encountered thus far are factors of, at one level, 
the plethora of formal and informal police cooperation networks 
that have developed over the past twenty years, and at another 
level, the ambiguity surrounding the final destination of the 
European integration process. 
The literature presented in this chapter will therefore attempt 
to show the current state of progress in conceptual ising police 
cooperation in Europe, particularly as it applies to the research 
parameters of this thesis, as well as delineating the theoretical 
grounds of the debate. 
2 .2: NBOFUNCTIONALISM 
The theory of functionalism, as a conceptual means of 
explaining progress towards integration, was initially developed 
by David Mitrany during the inter-war years. He described the 
12) 
functional approach as emphasizing the common index of need. He 
states: "There are many such needs that cut across national 
boundaries, and an effective beginning could be made by providing 
j oint government of them. This approach is not a matter of 
surrendering sovereignty, but merely of pooling so much of it as 
may be needed for the joint performance of the particular task" 
(Mitrany: 72-73). 
Central to functionalism's contribution to the understanding 
of the process of integration in Europe has been what Taylor 
describes as the twin ideas of: "its expansive logic of 
enmeshment or interdependencies and its emphasis on attitudinal 
change" (Taylor 1990: 133). Martin Holland further elaborates on 
this point by stating: "This first aspect of functionalism, the 
assumption of its expansive logic, suggests that once the process 
of functional organisation began, the power of nation states to 
act independently would be, it argued, progressively reduced as 
a web of functional interdependent relations developed. This 
logic held true whether there were several independent or just 
one joint functional authority" (Holland: 15-16). 
The second strand of thought on attitudinal change, posited 
that the collective experience of transnational cooperation, 
would eventually translate into a change in popular attitudes 
towards the institutions and ideas of integration. Both of these 
ideas have been refuted, the first on the grounds that tensions 
between nation states in Europe still exist despite the existence 
of systems of interdependence, and the second on the grounds that 
there is little empirical evidence to show that international 
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institutions are capable of becoming the focus of loyalties at 
the expense of the state (Taylor: 133). 
It was in response to these weaknesses in functionalism, as it 
pertains to integration in Europe, that the theory of 
neofunctionalism was developed by Ernst Haas. In commenting on 
the basic tenets of neofunctionalism Harrison states: 
"Neofunctionalism contains a normative objective - a European 
federation; central institutions with supranational authority are 
to provide the mechanism for achieving this; the process of 
integration is to begin with the economic sector and is dependent 
on interest group involvement; and the incremental creation of 
de facto solidarity would lead automatically, if by stealth, to 
integration" (Harrison 1990: 139 - 141). 
Central to the success of the integration process was the idea 
of what Haas termed spillover. Pentland describes this by 
emphasising that: "integration by sector cannot be achieved in 
isolation; as one sector is integrated there will be 
consequences, both advantageous as well as disadvantageous, for 
related sectors and a spillover effect will occur, suggesting a 
kind of inevitability to the process" (Pentland 1973: 119). 
Holland further takes up this point and argues that even the 
original objective can only be realized through such spillover. 
"Spillover is also reflected in the typical Community bargaining 
process whereby agreements across disparate areas are tied 
together. Decision making does not take place in sectoral 
isolation, but rather concessions or agreements in one policy 
area will have implications and often direct consequences for 
other policy areas. Thus the logic of neofunctionalism was 
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relevant to both the general integration across functional 
sectors and to the functional and political aspects of Community 
decision making" (Holland: 17). 
In the evolutionary history of the European Community it is 
possible to see both the incremental nature of neofunctionalism 
and the workings of spillover. These processes have produced a 
progression from a coal and steel treaty, to a wider economic 
treaty, which first included the formation of a customs union, 
aimed at the removal of internal tariffs, and culminated in the 
realisation of a single market that allows the free movement of 
goods and services. In like manner, this same logic of 
progression drives further incremental movement towards the 
realisation of monetary union, via a convergence of economic 
policies and the introduction of a single European currency and 
central bank. 
Professor Malcolm Anderson in applying neofunctionalism to the 
process of police cooperation in Europe stated: "The events 
preceding the Maastricht conference and its outcome have given 
a new relevance to the 1960s debate between the functionalist, 
neofunctionalist, pluralist and federalist perspectives ..... this 
author finds neofunctionalism the most plausible of them. Within 
the neofunctionalist framework the "intermediaries" 
governments, ministries, agencies, political parties, interest 
groups, international organisations - playa crucial role in the 
integration process. They articulate the various functional 
requirements of the system but it is their interaction, in 
certain conditions and circumstances, which results in political 
integration" (Anderson 1992: 36-37). Anderson identified within 
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this system a process of decision making based upon compromise 
and bargaining whereby competencies were transferred from the 
national to the European level. The basis for this 
authority/legitimacy transfer from the national to the 
supranational level, was the functional requirement for increased 
police cooperation to combat a perceived security deficit, 
associated with the completion of the internal market, and the 
abolition of some frontier controls. 
In practically analysing Anderson's application of 
neofunctionalism to police cooperation in general and Europol 
specifically, it is first informative to list the main attributes 
of neofunctionalism as elaborated by Holland. These are as 
follows: 
a) That neofunctionalism contains a normative function, a 
European federation; 
b) Central institutions with supranational authority are to 
provide the mechanism for achieving this; 
c) The process of integration will begin with the economic 
sector and is dependent on interest group (elite) 
involvement; 
d) Incrementalism; 
e) The incremental creation of de facto solidarity would lead 
automatically, if by stealth, to integration; 
f) The process will be dependent on the idea of spillover. 
(Holland 1994: 16 - 17) 
In addition to these basic aspects of neofunctionalism, other 
salient points can be included. These are: 
a) Egrenage. This concept has been posited by Groom, (Nelson and 
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Stubb 1994: 116-117) and consists of a locking in 
process by which incremental gains are consolidated in 
preparation for the next incremental step; 
b) Forward Linkage. This represents a process model, theorized 
by Nina Heathcote, (Groom and Taylor (eds) 1975: 44) which 
implies a growth in integration (i.e. in scope and capacity) 
through an expansion of the common task; 
c) Spillback. This is one facet of a general retraction process 
model again posited by Heathcote, which also draws on Output 
Failure. They both represent a withdrawal from a previously 
agreed area of activity and a decline in the levels of scope 
and capacity even to the point of complete disintegration 
(Groom and Taylor 1975: 44). 
It is possible to examine the relevance of neofunctionalism to 
the process of police cooperation in broad terms. The emergence 
of a perceived security deficit out of the internal market with 
its attendant four freedoms of movements (of goods, services, 
money and persons), can in theory be considered a classic example 
of spillover in action. Integration in an economic sector has 
quite literally spilt over into another unrelated sector, causing 
a wide range of compensatory cooperative and integrative 
measures. 
The process of cooperation under the third pillar has been 
driven by political elites. There has been a marked lack of 
transparency with regards to the deliberations of the K4 
Coordinating Committee and the three Steering Groups. They are 
all composed exclusively of senior civil servants and police 
officers, and very little information is disseminated to the 
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public about the content or results of the decision making 
process. The third pillar has also been based on a process of 
incrementalism, which reflects Malcolm Anderson's opinion on the 
ambiguity of the final destination of the European unification 
journey. For example, the current Europol Drugs Unit is only the 
first stage of Europol proper, which has the potential for 
dealing with a wide range of transnational offences. Schengen is 
the first stage of a more comprehensive External Frontiers Treaty 
that will include a European Information System. At the time of 
writing, the Schengen System has already been incorporated into 
the general EU architecture, with the signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997. This treaty has also moved immigration and 
asylum issues to the first pillar, and while justice and home 
affairs remain for the time being within the intergovernmental 
third pillar, it is possible that in the forseeable future, 
justice and home affairs may also be transferred to the first 
pillar. This would give the supranational institutions of the 
Community competence over third pillar issues, and could pave the 
way for such initiatives as: an operational Europol (bearing in 
mind that Europol has already been granted quasi-operational 
powers under the Treaty of Amsterdam); the implementation of 
European criminal legislation; moves to harmonise criminal 
justice systems and procedures in the Union etc. This would in 
effect take the Union a substantial step closer to some form of 
federal or political union, which is the normative 
function/objective of neofunctionalism in the first place. 
However, having at first promoted the application of 
neofunctionalism to police cooperation, Anderson has now 
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critically re-evaluated its complete relevance. His reservations 
about neofunctionalism include the following: 
1) Neofunctionalism has struggled to account for the period of 
stagnation in the integration process in the 1970s up to the 
signing of the Single European Act in the mid 1980s. 
2) Neofunctionalism has tended, by concentrating almost 
exclusively on the European level as a closed system, to exclude 
external socio-economic and political factors. 
3) Neofunctionalist discourse has failed to take into account 
fully the uniqueness of the European Union. 
In support of this Anderson argues: "The search for theoretical 
innovation can, paradoxically encourage a negative form of 
analysis, an emphasis upon what the Union is not, rather than an 
explanation of its uniqueness. A rigid dichotomy between the 
state and the European Union, risks failing to do justice to the 
uniqueness of the new Europe, in blending some of the qualities 
of the conventional state into a supranational organisation with 
a novel structure and a distinctive dynamic" (Anderson 1995: 96) 
These criticisms are part of a general re-evaluation of 
neofunctionalism in the light of the failure of its forecast that 
the integration process in Europe would be one of uniform 
progress. The automatic process of spillover from sector to 
sector has not as yet lead towards political union. Instead 
national self interest and intergovernmentalism has persisted. 
The European Commission, as a result of an institutional 
imbalance that has left the Council of Ministers as the supreme 
decision and law making body, has been unable to adequately 
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fulfil its predicted role as instigator of spillover. Moreover 
it has yet to be proved that the attitudinal change predicted by 
neofunctionalists such as Pentland, whereby international 
institutions are capable of becoming the focus of loyalties at 
the expense of the state (Holland 1994: 6) has occurred. These 
criticisms are evident when examining police cooperation in 
Europe despite the linkages that exist between it and the basic 
principles of neofunctionalism. 
The Maastricht Treaty is an intergovernmental agreement and the 
negotiations and deliberations for the setting up of the various 
third pillar initiatives such as Europol were overseen and agreed 
by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council. The K4 
Coordinating Committee and the three steering groups are 
ul timately accountable to the JHA Council, and even their 
decision making abilities are affected, and often circumscribed 
by, the exigences of national self interest. The experience of 
Europol provides a prime example. Despite the much trumpeted need 
to fight transnational crime, the signing of the Europol 
Convention was held up for almost two years due to infighting 
among member states. The Commission only has observer status, the 
role of the European Parliament has been emasculated, and to date 
a system of variable geometry exists with regard to the European 
Court of Justice's jurisdiction over the Convention, in that one 
state has negotiated an opt out for itself. Furthermore, the 
decision making requirement of unanimity gives even more power 
to the member states. 
In light of these deficiencies, Keohane and Hoffman have put 
forward a re-formulation of neofunctionalism that eliminates the 
20) 
automaticity of the spillover effect, and which places greater 
emphasis on the intergovernmental aspect of the European 
integration process. In this re-working, spillover is no longer 
an autonomous process, like the workings of the market, which is 
self sufficient within itself to bring about or stimulate 
integration. Instead spillover is dependant on and is the product 
of successful intergovernmental bargaining based on compromise 
and common interests. To illustrate this point, Holland states: 
"To guide research, Keohane and Hoffman provide a working 
hypothesis that successful spillover requires prior programmatic 
agreement among governments, expressed in an intergovernmental 
bargain (Holland 1994: 287). Thus the process they outline 
specifies external catalysts leading to an intergovernmental 
bargain which in turn will result in task expansion for the 
Community and sectoral (political or economic) spillover internal 
to the EC. Spillover is stripped of its previously implied causal 
role and becomes a secondary, conditional consequence" (Holland 
1994: 19). 
The application of this reformulation to an organisation such 
as Europol therefore indicates that instead of being driven by 
an original normative and mandatory requirement to establish an 
FBI for Europe, the process will be based on intergovernmental 
compromising, so as to meet the functional requirement of 
combatting transnational crime. This will result in Europol's 
remit being incrementally increased when and where necessary by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council (task expansion), with the 
subsequent spillover consequences into areas such as extradition, 
data protection, harmonisation/approximation of police practices 
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etc likewise being controlled by the JHA Council. 
In time functional requirements may mandate the evolution of 
an even more supranational style of decision making, whereby 
member states cede some/more of their sovereignty to Europol, in 
what Haas terms a cumulative pattern of accommodation, in which 
participants refrained from unconditionally vetoing proposals, 
and instead seek to attain agreements by means of compromises 
upgrading common interests (Haas 1964: 280). This would of 
necessity involve an extension of the practice of qualified 
majority voting from first to third pillar issues. Such an 
extension would enhance the decision making process and eliminate 
the current stagnatory system, that allows one member state to 
block progress that has been endorsed by the other fourteen. 
It can be argued therefore that the progress of Europol to 
date, like other areas of European cooperation and integration, 
has been based not on a general sense of federal idealism, but 
rather on a pragmatic convergence of national interests. Despite 
its failure in the past, a reformulated neofunctionalism, that 
takes into account the importance of intergovernmental 
considerations, stands a better chance, than either functionalism 
or the original concept of neofunctionalism, of analysing the 
uniqueness of a European integrative process that is part 
federal, part confederal. 
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2.3: The Macro, Meso and Micro Levels of Police Cooperation 
Professor Benyon, in his seminal work, Police Cooperation In 
Europe: An Investigation, was one of the first to develop a 
conceptual framework for the developing process of police 
cooperation in Europe. The framework centred around the division 
of police cooperation into three overlapping and non mutually 
exclusive levels, which he termed the macro, meso and micro 
levels. The macro level is concerned with the intergovernmental 
arena in which important decisions such as constitutional and 
international legal agreements, extradition procedures, asylum 
policy and harmonisation of national laws are made. The meso 
level deals with "structural and procedural frameworks within 
which operational policing occurs" (Benyon 1995: 8). Included 
within this level would be: the establishment of new cooperative 
policing structures, such as Europol; the development of cross 
national communication systems for the purpose of facilitating 
the exchange of information and intelligence i and the cuI ti vation 
of direct contacts between police officers in different countries 
in the form of the exchange of liaison officers. Finally the 
micro level covers "the investigation of specific offences and 
the prevention and control of particular sorts of crime" (Benyon 
1995: 9). 
professor Benyon himself has acknowledged the obvious 
interrelatedness of these different levels. For example while the 
micro level can be said to include the mosaic of formal and 
informal police networks that exist across Europe, it is also 
true to state that the establishment of these networks is a 
function of the meso level, to the extent that many micro level 
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instances of cooperation depend on effective meso level 
arrangements (Benyon 1995: 9-10). Also, while meso level 
structures and processes do not always require intergovernmental 
sanction, it is sometimes the case, as with Europol, that they 
are the direct result of political initiatives. 
This tripartite division therefore has served a useful function 
in terms of establishing an early framework for analysing the 
various emerging police cooperation structures and processes in 
Europe. However its very interrelatedness now tends to highlight 
the current inadequacy of this concept as a continuing analytical 
tool. The three levels are in effect three hierarchical drawers 
in which one can place particular processes and structures, 
taking into account the potential for overlap from one level to 
the next. What this model fails to do on its own however, is to 
articulate how the levels relate to each other. What is the 
significance of any relationship that may exist between the 
intergovernmental decision making procedure of the macro level, 
the cooperative policing structures of the meso level, and the 
tactical investigation and prosecution of offences at the micro 
level? And of even more significance, what relevance do the three 
levels hold for the general process of integration in Europe? 
While this model has utility in terms of categorising the process 
of police cooperation in Europe, it can only be seen as a seminal 
framework that needs further analytical development. 
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2.4: The Internationalisation of Police Cooperation 
Piet van Reenen as Director of the Netherlands Police Academy 
has conceptualised police cooperation from the perspective of 
internationalisation which he describes as: "the process of 
extension of police systems (police organisations and political 
and bureaucratic steering arrangements) across national borders, 
as a consequence of changes in work or of political formations" 
(van Reenen 1992: 48). He goes on to list a variety of facets of 
internationalisation which are as follows: 
- the gathering and exchange of information 
- personnel or material assistance 
- standardisation 
- coordination of activities 
- border crossing authority 
- border crossing organisations 
- granting of powers over the police to foreign authorities 
- supranational organisations 
- supranational authority over the police 
These forms of internationalisation are then grouped into three 
main categories which are as follows: 
A) Cooperation: This grouping consists of any type of police 
cooperation which does not affect existing police systems and 
powers, as well as state sovereignty. Of the main list given 
therefore, areas such as the gathering and exchange of 
information, coordination of activities, and personnel and 
material assistance would all constitute forms of cooperation 
within the context of van Reenen's grouping. 
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B) Horizontal Integration: This form of police integration occurs 
where the police obtain the authority to operate in the territory 
of another state, or where government officials of one state are 
granted authority over the police of another state. Within the 
context of this grouping, aspects of the Schengen Agreement which 
allows the right of hot pursuit and cross border observations and 
surveillance, can be considered as forms of horizontal 
integration. However, despite the element of sharing authority, 
state sovereignty remains as important in this grouping as it 
does with the area of cooperation. 
C) Vertical Integration: Finally van Reenen describes this form 
of integration as "where an authority of a higher order than the 
national authority develops over the police (and eventually 
provides a police organisation that operates under a higher 
authority than that of the national states) .... This exists when 
a police organisation is being created that can operate within 
the area of the Ee. Such an organisation presupposes a central 
authority on which it depends, probably a central political power 
at the EC level" (van Reenen 1992: 48-49). 
While he admits that there is little likelihood of vertical 
integration coming into existence within the foreseeable future, 
his use of incrementalism as the preferred explanation for the 
future development of police cooperation shows how the above 
mentioned groupings are tied together. As applied to 
internationalisation, incrementalism refers to a step by step 
growth in police cooperation/integration in a practical way, 
according to need and possibility (van Reenen 1992: 49). Whereas 
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the functional requirements of police cooperation have initially 
lead to such initiatives as the coordination of activities, 
particularly via bilateral contacts and agreements, and the 
exchange of information/intelligence via organisations such as 
Interpol and the TREVI Group, the increasing need for closer ties 
has lead police cooperation to spillover into horizontal 
integration. Apart from the above mentioned Schengen Agreement, 
other forms of horizontal integration (some of which pre date 
Schengen) include the right of pursuit within the Benelux states, 
and also between Norway and Sweden, and the Channel Tunnel 
policing initiative between the United Kingdom and France. The 
evolution of Europol, and the current moves towards giving the 
supranational institutions of the European Union direct 
jurisdiction over Europol, can be construed as a further 
incremental movement towards vertical integration one day. 
Finally, van Reenen emphasises the salience of competition as 
opposed to just cooperation and integration. Areas of conflict 
that he identifies include the encroachment of the market on 
policing systems with respect to examples such as different 
national training strategies and facilities, competition over the 
sale of computer systems, weaponry, accessories, armoured 
vehicles etc. Other internal examples of conflict (in terms of 
resources, influence etc) that impact on the internationalisation 
of police cooperation include: "competition in Germany between 
the Bundeskriminalamt and the polizein der Lander; in France 
between the police Nationale and the Gendarmerie; in Spain 
between the Guardia Civil and the municipal and regional forces; 
in the Netherlands competition between the Ministries of Internal 
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Affairs and Justice; in Belgium between the Judicial Police and 
the Gendarmerie" (van Reenen 1992: 51). 
Within the context of the research for this thesis, the unique 
emphasis on competition as opposed to the more conventional area 
of cooperation is of particular relevance, especially in relation 
to the tensions that exist between strategic and tactical 
considerations, as well as the attempts to impose a centralised 
form of intelligence exchange (via Europol) that does not take 
sufficiently into account the tactical requirements of the 
varying policing tiers that will be responsible for providing the 
bulk of information/intelligence. 
2 .5: STRUCTURAL FATALISM V NAIVE SEPARATISM 
Professor Walker has used the dichotomy between what he calls 
I structural fatalism I and I naive separatism I to analyse the 
relationship between police cooperation development and political 
development in Europe. He describes structural fatalism as: "A 
perspective which rests upon an inference that the final shape 
of policing in the Community depends upon the final shape of the 
Community itself as a political entity, and that since this wider 
vision remains hazy and contested it would be pointless to 
advocate new policing practices and mechanisms on anything other 
than a provisional, flexible and modest basis" (Walker 1994: 23) . 
This perspective therefore can be used to explain the ad hoc and 
incremental nature of many developments in police cooperation 
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such as the TREVI arrangements and the Schengen Agreement. It 
posits that horizontal and vertical integration in the area of 
police cooperation will be difficult, if not impossible to 
aChieve in a coordinated manner until the final destination of 
the European project is decided on. 
On the other hand in describing naive separatism he states: 
"From this perspective, models of police cooperation are assessed 
and evaluated independently of wider political forces. The 
requirements of international law enforcement are seen as 
paramount, and little attention is given to the realpolitik of 
international relations, and how this might impede the 
development of optimal systems of cooperation" (Walker 1994: 23) . 
This tendency is often reflected in the unrealistically 
optimistic initiatives that are started, and which quickly run 
into difficulties, because the political realities were not 
sufficiently taken into account. Examples of naive separatism 
that have been noted are Europol, which has been held up due to 
political and national self interests, and the Schengen 
Agreement, which has been delayed due to the security needs of 
certain states, particularly France. 
Despite the fact that these two concepts appear to be 
diametrically opposed to each other, Professor Walker has also 
identified a sense in which they are interrelated. The 
marginalisation of certain initiatives, which because of naive 
separatism, fail to take into account political realities, may 
in fact lead to structural fatalism. The Schengen Agreement, 
which aimed to remove border checks at the internal borders of 
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the European Union, failed to achieve Union wide membership due 
to the reality of political opposition in the United Kingdom. 
This failure has in effect reinforced the applicability of 
structural fatalism, in the sense that the differing British view 
on the end product of European integration has influenced the 
final, variable nature of the Schengen system, despite the 
benefits that accrue to the police under this system. 
These two concepts are useful therefore once their 
interrelatedness is fully taken into account. Using them as 
isolated either/or scenarios can be deceptive, in that certain 
police cooperation initiatives such as Schengen can sit just as 
easily within either camp. 
2 .6 : THE POST - HOBBESIAN STATE 
By adopting the concept of the post - Hobbesian state, Walker 
has highlighted the uniqueness of the European Union as a novel 
political form. The original Hobbesian concept of the nation 
state was grounded in the need to secure authority and 
sovereignty over a specific territorial area (Hobbes: Leviathan) . 
Walker cites the evolution of the post - integration Europe as 
"lying somewhere between sovereign units, each with an 
unambiguous monopoly on violence .... and diffuse networks, based 
upon multiple voluntary exchanges" (Walker 1994: 34; also quoted 
by Schmitter in Bryant 1991: 204). What emerges in this scenario 
is what Schmitter depicts as a prototype 'post Hobbesian state', 
or European supranational nonstate (Walker 1994: 34). 
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Walker uses this scenario of a supranational nonstate, to pose 
the twin future possibilities of Europe, either developing into 
a state without a police force, or developing a European police 
force without any corresponding supranational state apparatus. 
These hypotheses have specific resonance within the context of 
this research as it asks the questions, will Europe be able to 
achieve political integration one day without the corresponding 
requirement for a supranational policing presence? Or conversely 
is it practicable to theorise on the possibility of Europol one 
day acquiring executive powers, without the necessity of 
corresponding supranational initiatives, such as harmonisation 
of criminal justice systems, the implementation of European 
criminal legislation etc? The latter is of particular interest 
to this research, as one of the main obstacles to Europol 
developing executive capabilities, has been the fear that such 
a development would inevitably lead one step closer to a federal 
European state. The possibility of achieving a supranational 
policing capacity, without the attendant baggage of political 
integration, would aid the functional need for Europol to grow 
to meet the threat of transnational crime in Europe. It is one 
area that the research findings of this thesis will seek to 
address. 
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2.7: PUSH - PULL FACTORS 
In considering the authority/legitimacy transfer of competence 
from the nation state to the supranational level, Walker has 
posed the question, "Are there any social and political 
developments which make the state a less authoritative site for 
policing institutions than before, and are there any developments 
which make the EU an increasingly attractive site"? (Anderson 
1995: 113) In other words, what factors are involved in the 
nation state pushing policing competence towards the European 
level, and likewise, what factors are pulling the policing 
function from above, towards the European level? 
Walker identifies the push factor as emanating from a shift in 
the concept of political power being centred exclusively at the 
nation state level in Western Europe. The pooling of sovereignty 
at a European level, 
institutions within 
and the supremacy of European law and 
defined parameters, has weakened the 
historical authority of the nation state. The monopoly of 
policing functions, which accompanied the development of the 
nation state in consolidating the notions of national identity 
and unity, can now be construed as not necessarily being in the 
exclusive domain of nation statehood. While Walker acknowledges 
that at present there is only the mildest of pushes away from the 
state towards the European level, he also emphasises that there 
is "no insurmountable obstacle to the disassociation of the 
policing function from the nation state." (Anderson 1995: 115) 
The pull factor on the other hand is dependant on the ability 
of the post Hobbesian state to reproduce the circumstances, which 
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encouraged in the first place, a close association between the 
Hobbesian state and an exclusive policing function. While Walker 
readily admits that for the post Hobbesian state, there is not 
a direct link between the integrity of the political entity and 
the policing function, he locates the need for the EU to go 
beyond the argument for the necessity of a supranational policing 
function to protect economic prosperity. Instead he argues that 
the European public would be more likely to endorse an authority / 
legitimacy transfer of policing functions to the European level, 
if the EU becomes seen as a legitimate means for the protection 
and enforcement of citizenship rights. The positioning of EU 
institutions as the guarantor of rights and obligations, could 
act as a powerful magnet attracting enforcement powers to the 
supranational level. 
From a purely policing perspective, the four case studies 
presented in this research will attempt to show whether or not 
the police of the targeted states bypass their national units in 
order to deal directly with Europol, and if they do, the push 
factors which impel these actions. The research will also attempt 
to delineate the pull factors with respect to Europol (if any) 
which encourage police officers to bypass their state level 
national units. 
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2.8: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC ORDER 
Walker also draws a distinction between specific and general 
order. Specific order he describes as the interests of dominant 
political and social elites, whereas general order consists of 
public tranquillity, or in English terms, the keeping of the 
peace. (Anderson 1996: 90) Connected with the maintenance of 
these two types of order, are the concepts of high and low 
policing. 
With respect to the former, Walker states: "High policing is 
about the preservation of the specific forms of order upon which 
the security of the state most immediately rests - combating 
terrorist organisations and activities or gathering comprehensive 
information on political dissidence, or laying contingency plans 
in the event of the widespread breakdown of public order" 
(Anderson 1996: 90) . Low policing on the other hand he associates 
wi th the maintenance of general order and describes as: "the 
preservation of those minimum standards of private security and 
public peace necessary for the working of all societies and from 
which all social actors benefit." (Anderson 1994: 25) 
This differentiation may however in some respects be incorrect, 
as criminal offences and activities do not always fall neatly 
into one category or another. For example terrorism invariably 
poses a distinct threat to the state, while at the same time 
impinging upon social order. In this respect, terrorism can be 
a threat to both specific and general order. Several other 
categories of offences such as organised crime, drug trafficking 
34) 
and the trafficking in nuclear materials can all straddle the 
boundary between the two forms of order. 
Where the distinction between specific and general order does 
have implications for this research, is the paradox that exists 
in police cooperation whereby, "many areas in which demand for 
collaboration on functional grounds is most persuasive are also 
those which bear most intimately upon state-specific interests". 
(Anderson 1996: 100) Once again terrorism provides a prime 
example of this. The negotiation of the Europol Convention 
witnessed strong objections by several EU states to the proposal 
for the inclusion of terrorism into Europol's remit. The Spanish 
however questioned how an offence such as trafficking in stolen 
vehicles, which does not threaten the security of the state, 
could be included, while terrorism was excluded. 
The logical implication of this example is that while states 
may find it easier to cede authority in areas that distinctly 
comprise general order, there will always be a problem in sharing 
sovereignty in areas of specific order, where arguably a 
supranational response is most needed. The eventual and reluctant 
inclusion of terrorism in Europol's remit, two years after full 
ratification of the Convention, indicates that states may be 
persuaded to cede authority in areas of specific order, subject 
to a convincing demonstration of tangible benefits or added 
value. 
The question therefore of the future potential of Europol 
acquiring executive powers, may lie in its ability to add 
operational value to what is already available at the national 
and regional levels. Only in this way may states be persuaded to 
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accept a supranational tier of police coordination, be it in the 
realms of general and/or specific order. 
2.9: CONCLUSION 
In relation to the central research question of the 
applicability of the centralised mode of coordination, the areas 
highlighted in this chapter are not intended to be an exhaustive 
analysis of the literature on the topic. It is however meant to 
be a review of the main theoretical positions that have some 
bearing on the data, analysis and conclusions presented in this 
thesis. Consequently, many of the ideas expressed in the 
literature review will be incorporated into the thesis where 
relevant. However it should be emphasized again that the study 
of police cooperation in Europe is still a comparatively new 
field. The struggle to find an analytical framework to explain 
the process of cooperation/integration, mirrors the problems that 
beset the wider field of European integration generally. The fact 
that the eventual destination of the European project is still 
unknown, ensures that cooperation and integration theory are 
fields, that for the foreseeable future, will easier be 
accomplished with hindsight than with foresight. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
When this research was started in October 1994, the Europol 
Drugs Unit had only been in existence for seven months. 
Consequently there was little in the way of specific research on 
the topic. The lack of transparency surrounding the TREVI forum, 
out of which Europol was conceived, also meant that there was 
little or no dissemination or availability of official 
documentary sources. This dearth of information therefore ensured 
that the initial phases of the research would have to be 
exploratory in nature, and that a significant amount of time 
would have to be devoted, not just to the literature survey, but 
also to establishing my credentials and trustworthiness to the 
police officers and agencies on whom I was depending to provide 
the data for this research. In this, my position as an ex police 
officer was vital, in that I was accorded access to individuals 
and sources that would not have otherwise been forthcoming. 
Because of the major focus of Europol's activity being 
centred on the national unit of each European Union member state, 
it was therefore decided at an early stage to base the research 
around case studies of selected national units. The methodology 
would be predominantly qualitative, but would also include an 
element of quantitative data collection and analysis in the form 
of the dissemination of questionnaires to police officers at 
varying levels in the selected states. 
As originally conceived, the case studies would be based on 
five national units across the European Union. These would be 
firstly the United Kingdom and Germany. These two were chosen 
because of the juxtaposition of the UK as a unitary state with 
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Eurosceptic credentials, with Germany which is a federal state 
that is the prime European mover for a federal European Union, 
as well as the evolution of Europol into an operational European 
FBI. The Netherlands was chosen as a representative of the 
Benelux states, as well as for its proactive approach to criminal 
intelligence. Sweden was selected as both a representative of the 
Scandinavian countries and for its position on the periphery of 
the European Union. Finally Italy was also originally chosen as 
a representative of southern European states, although time 
constraints and insufficient resources meant that this state had 
to be eventually excluded. 
By making these choices it was intended that there would be a 
balanced representation of views and perspectives from across the 
Union, although the eventual exclusion of Italy resulted in the 
research producing a uniquely northern European perspective. With 
hindsight it is possible to see from the results of the data 
collected that it would have been advisable to have included 
France as well. This is based on research indications that a 
different response may have been elicited from strongly 
centralized states as opposed to the four fairly decentralised 
states that comprised this research. It should be noted however 
that the lines of distinction between states with centralised and 
decentralised policing systems are becoming increasingly blurred, 
with some southern states such as Spain adopting greater levels 
of decentralisation. Consequently the views of representatives 
of some southern European states have been gathered in certain 
key areas, and where relevant these considerations will be 
emphasised in the case study analyses. 
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3.2: CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The case studies were to be based on the following iterative 
approach: 
1) Make an initial theoretical statement or an initial 
proposition about policy, social behaviour etc 
In keeping with the general research question on the adequacy 
of the centralised mode on information exchange for Europol, the 
following initial proposition was formulated: 
Because of the interconnectedness between tactical and 
strategic considerations re combating (transnational) crime, a 
centralised mode of information flow, that indicates a purely 
intelligence lead approach, will prove to be inadequate. 
2) Compare the findings of an initial case study (eg, the BKA in 
Germany) against such a statement or proposition. 
3) Revise the statement or proposition in light of these 
findings. 
4) Compare other details of the case against the revision: 
- data protection 
- compatibility of computer systems 
- criteria for type of crime dealt with 
- whether the national unit is operational or not 
- ability to task other units 
- restrictions on information exchange 
- reluctance to share information by other policing levels 
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5) Compare this revision against the findings of the other cases 
(i.e. the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden) . 
3 .3: RESEARCH QUALITY TESTS 
3 .3 .1: CONSTRUCT AND INTERNAL VALIDITY 
The establishment of the correct operational measures would 
involve the following data collection methods: 
a) Use multiple sources of evidence. These would include the 
following: 
i) Interviews 
The early stages of the data collection process consisted of 
a series of open interviews in which the interviewees were 
invited to discuss in broad terms, their respective involvement 
in the European police cooperation process. The main thrust of 
these questions revolved around the following: 
a) Personal and official concepts of intelligence within the 
context of work performed; 
b) The functional utility of national borders in combatting 
transnational crime in Europe; 
c) The perceived need for Europol, and whether or not it should 
ever acquire operational powers; 
d) Personal and agency relationships with Interpol; 
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e) Perceptions or empirical evidence of the extent and nature 
of transnational crime in Europe; 
f) Personal considerations of what drives police cooperation in 
Europe: whether it is driven by political determinism or by 
the need to combat transnational crime; 
Once a sufficient body of background data was assembled, the 
interview process became more focused on individuals involved 
with the intelligence exchange process in the targeted states. 
These interviewees were generally situated either within the 
national units of each state, or were regional intelligence 
officers. Samples of the questions asked are as follows: 
1) The extent and nature of the particular unit's analysis 
capacity; 
2) Whether or not the analysts were civilian, police officers, 
or a mixture of the two; 
3) The rules which govern the exchange of information between 
different policing levels within each state: i.e. between the 
national unit and Europol; between the regional and national 
levels; and between the local and force/regional levels; 
4) The perceived balance between strategic and tactical matters, 
and whether or not one outweighs the other; 
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5) The techniques used for the acquisition of information and/or 
intelligence; 
6) The relationship with the Drug Liaison Officer (DLO) network 
and Interpol; 
7) The means used to avoid information overload; 
8) The nature and extent of direct contacts with external police 
officers and agencies, particularly with Europol; 
9) The perceived levels of duplication between different agencies 
such as Europol, Interpol and the DLO network; 
10) The compatibility of computer systems at varying policing 
levels throughout the country. 
Eventually seventy interviews were conducted. 
ii} Observation: 
Observation was a prime source of evidence used throughout the 
data collection process. The first use of observation was a visit 
to Kent Constabulary's European Liaison Unit at Folkestone which 
is primarily responsible for policing the Channel Tunnel. This 
proved to be an important practical example of active bilateral 
cooperation between the English and French police, and helped to 
raise questions that would subsequently be asked at other 
interview sessions. 
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The other main areas of observation were the four field visits 
to the Europol Drugs Unit Headquarters in the Hague, and the 
field visits to the national units of the four targeted states, 
these being: the National Criminal Intelligence Unit in the UK; 
the CRI in the Hague, the Netherlands, the Bundeskriminalamt in 
Wiesbaden, Germany, and the RKP in Stockholm, Sweden. The 
observation aspect of each trips was extremely useful in 
emphasising certain areas that were not revealed by interviews. 
For example the sight of Europol's Assistant Coordinator having 
to take his own calls by continuously rushing into the front room 
of his office, spoke volumes about the lack of adequate resources 
that have been allocated to Europol, despite the grand political 
posturings of some European governments. The after hours 
recreational activities of the various European Liaison Officers 
(ELOs) based at Europol, such as five-a-side football, tennis, 
pub visits etc, illustrated the increasing informality of 
relations between representatives from different EU states. And 
the revelation that computer equipment that had been installed 
at the Swedish national unit for automated liaison with Europol, 
had still not been turned on 9 months after installation, 
emphasised the current state of information exchange between 
Europol and Sweden, despite what had been revealed to the 
contrary during the interview sessions. 
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iii) Legislation 
In the absence of the dissemination of information by the 
organs of the European Union on the official developments in 
police cooperation, and third pillar issues under the Maastricht 
Treaty, legislation proved a rich source of information. The 
areas of legislation that were of special significance to this 
research were the Treaty of Rome 1957 and the Treaty of European 
Union or Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Ministerial Agreement of 
1993 which brought the Europol Drugs Unit into being, and the 
Europol Convention of 1995 which brought Europol proper into 
being. Other areas of legislation that were important in 
providing information on the intelligence exchange process were 
the BKA Law of Germany, and the Data Protection Laws of the four 
targeted states. 
iv) Documentary evidence: 
As mentioned in the section above, this research was hampered 
by the lack of transparency in European Union issues generally 
and third pillar issues specifically. Attempts to sit in on 
Justice and Home Affairs meetings, K4 Committee sittings, 
Steering Group II meetings or Europol Working Group sessions all 
met with failure. The lack of dissemination of information about 
these meetings meant that an inordinate reliance had to be placed 
on the limited Press Briefings as well as the civil rights 
monitoring organisation, Statewatch. 
My status as an ex-police officer meant that I was sometimes 
afforded access to official documents and copies of restricted 
correspondence, while particular reliance was placed upon the 
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Centre for the Study of Public Order at the Uni versi ty of 
Leicester, which was a source of documentary evidence on the now 
defunct TREVI forum. In other respects Germany and the 
Netherlands, with their more open approach to freedom of 
information, were more accessible sources of acquiring 
documentary information that was not forthcoming in the UK. 
v) Questionnaires: 
It was originally intended to disseminate 50 questionnaires to 
regional and local intelligence officers in each of the four 
targeted states so as to acquire a bottom up perspective on the 
information exchange process. However this idea was abandoned due 
to problems in gaining a uniform response across the four states. 
There were serious problems in getting these questionnaires 
distributed in Germany because of the federal system. Despite 
initially going through the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) or federal 
intelligence agency, requests for access would still have to be 
routed through the Interior Ministry of each State or Lander, and 
then to each Landeskriminalamt (LKA), or State intelligence unit. 
Because of the bad relationship that exists between the LKAs and 
the BKA, I was advised that the chances of the LKA complying with 
my requests were slim, especially as the BKA routinely have 
difficulty in getting cooperation from the LKAs with their own 
research questionnaires. While it would have been theoretically 
possible to approach each State Interior Ministry individually, 
time restrictions did not permit this approach. Similar problems 
were also encountered in Sweden, while of the 50 questionnaires 
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disseminated in the Netherlands, too Iowa return was received 
to be of any significance. 
b) Establish a chain of evidence. 
This procedure would firstly attempt to prove the basic 
iteration of Europol being formally based upon a centralised mode 
of information exchange, by testing it against the following list 
of non-equivalent variables: 
i) The premise will be based on legal validity; 
ii) The national supervisory body will have its own legal tools 
for maintaining national control over the flow of 
information; 
iii) The central body will take steps to avoid duplication and 
a lack of coordination; 
iv) Initiatives will be set up to ensure the compatibility of 
computer systems across varying levels; 
v) Officers will be discouraged from creating or developing 
individual means of communication based on personal 
contacts. 
If in examining Europol, these predicted values are found, 
while eliminating any threats to internal validity, then a strong 
inference can be made that Europol conforms to the centralised 
state mode of information exchange. This in turn conforms to the 
general political view in the European Union that Europol should 
be exclusively an intelligence exchange organisation. 
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The next step in establishing a chain of evidence would involve 
extrapolating evidence from the data collected from the various 
national units, that in practice Europol does or does not in fact 
conform to the intended centralised mode of information exchange. 
In achieving this, the chain will look at the passing of 
information and intelligence between different levels: force to 
regional; regional to national; and national to international, 
and ask the question, does the evidence hold true for each level 
to level transfer? In this respect the element known as 'the 
necessity test' from the principle of subsidiarity will be used 
to assess the criteria for passing information from level to 
level. 
c) Have draft case studies reviewed by the key informants (in 
this case each of the relevant national units) . To date only 
one national unit has returned the case study forwarded for 
review. 
3 .3 .2: EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
This quality test deals with the problem of knowing whether or 
not the research's findings are generalizable beyond the 
immediate case studies. In other words, are the results 
applicable to other national units. This problem was addressed 
by interviews with officers and liaison officers from other 
states who are based at Europol. 
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Finally the research findings will be used as a basis for a 
series of recommendations on the future course of police 
cooperation and in the European Union. Developments in this area 
continue to proceed at a fast pace, and this research can be 
used, not just as a basis for future research on the topic, but 
as a means of demonstrating the pivotal role that Europol plays 
in the unfolding process of the EU's acquisition of competence 
in the fields of judicial harmonization and internal security. 
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CHAPTER 4: POLICE COOPERATION IN EUROPE 
4.1: INTRODUCTION 
The field of police cooperation in Europe has been the subject 
of various attempts at classification. Some of the categories 
used have been highlighted in the literature review section, such 
as Professor Benyon's threefold mode of cooperation: macro; meso 
and micro levels, and van Reenen's division into: cooperation; 
horizontal integration and vertical integration. Examples of 
other modes of Classification have been: Anderson's separation 
of old as opposed to new forms of cooperation, and a distinction 
between formal as opposed to informal modes of cooperation. 
For the purposes of this research, this chapter will examine 
the various types of police cooperation prevalent in Europe, from 
the perspective of inter - pol ice as opposed to intergovernmental 
forms of cooperation. An understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of these forms of cooperation, will provide an 
adequate background for analysing the importance and significance 
of the genesis of Europol as a centralised form of information 
and intelligence exchange. 
4.2: INTER-POLICE FORMS OF COOPERATION 
4.2.1: INTERPOL 
While Interpol is not an exclusively European form of police 
cooperation, it is nevertheless particularly important to the 
topic, not least because of the fact that approximately 66% of 
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Interpol's business is specifically European. It has existed as 
an organisation since 1914, when the first International Police 
Congress was held in Monaco, during which legal experts and 
police officers from 14 different countries and territories met 
for the purpose of debating the establishment of an international 
body, that would be specifically concerned with such matters as 
the collation of international criminal records, and the 
harmonizing of extradition procedures. 
With the outbreak of the First World War, any further 
developments were put on hold. However after the war, a Second 
International Criminal Police Congress was held in Vienna in 
1923, at which agreement was reached as to the setting up of the 
International Criminal police Commission. The ICPC's first 
President was Dr Johann Schober, the Austrian chief of police, 
and his assistant, Dr Oskar Dressler was appointed Secretary 
General. 
From the outset, the ICPC was happy to deal with general 
criminal offences such as counterfeiting, forgery, drug 
trafficking, murder, theft etc. Its position on political 
offences however was much more ambiguous. The post World War Two 
statutory prohibition on Interpol becoming involved in offences 
of a political, religious or racial nature has lead, in the past 
two decades, to serious criticisms of the organisation. However 
the position during the inter war years was far from 
straightforward, and the Interpol historian Fenton Bressler 
concurs that this vagueness was deliberate. He quotes Schober as 
saying, "The objective that we are pursuing [in setting up the 
Commission] is devoid of all political aims". (Bressler 1992: 39) 
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However he goes on to give examples of Interpol expediently 
involving itself in political offences, arguably the most 
notorious being the organisation's part in 1934, in warning the 
German police of a plot against Adolf Hitler's life. (Bressler 
1992: 43) This episode served as a prelude to the experiences of 
the Second World War when the ICPC and its records fell into the 
hands of the Nazis. The organisation's headquarters was moved to 
Berlin, under the Presidency of Reinhard Heydrich, and there is 
an enduring suspicion that its files were appropriated by the 
Nazis in their campaign of extermination against Europe's Jews. 
The ICPC was re-constituted after the war at a conference held 
in Brussels in 1946, at which new statutes and a new headquarters 
based in Paris were adopted. The organisation's name changed in 
1956 to the International Criminal Police Organisation - Interpol, 
or ICPO - Interpol. The General Secretariat moved location again 
to Saint-Cloud, outside Paris in 1966. According to Article 2 of 
Interpol's Constitution, 
organisation are: 
the purposes and aims of the 
a) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance 
between all criminal police authorities, within the limits 
of the laws existing in the different countries and in the 
spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
b) To establish and develop all institutions likely to 
contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of 
ordinary law crimes. 
Article 3 however lays down the limits of Interpol's competence 
by stating: lilt is strictly forbidden for the Organisation to 
undertake any intervention or activities of a political, 
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military, religious or racial character." This stipulation 
effectively prohibits Interpol from becoming involved in 
terrorist offences, and was a prime contributor to Interpol 
losing out in the seventies, in terms of progressive police 
cooperation initiatives in Europe. The threat of terrorism in 
this decade meant that alternative structures such as the TREVI 
forum were adopted. However, unfortunately for Interpol, TREVI 
did not stop at terrorism but went on to embrace other facets of 
transnational crime such as drug trafficking and organised crime. 
Other principles of cooperation laid down in the Constitution 
include the following: 
a) Respect for national sovereignty: Cooperation at all times 
must be based on actions taken by police forces in the various 
Member States, operating within their own national boundaries and 
in accordance with their own national laws. 
b) Enforcement of ordinary criminal law: The Organisation I s field 
of activity is limited to crime prevention and law enforcement 
in connection with ordinary criminal offences. This is the only 
basis on which there can be agreement between all Member States. 
c) Universality: Any Member State may cooperate with any other, 
and cooperation must not be impeded by geographic or linguistic 
factors. 
d) Equality of all Member States: All Member States must be 
provided wi th the 
irrespective of 
Organisation. 
same 
their 
services and 
financial 
have the same rights, 
contributions to the 
e) Cooperation with other agencies: Cooperation is extended 
through the National Central Bureaus to any government agency 
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concerned with combating ordinary criminal offences. 
f) Flexibility of working methods: Although governed by 
principles designed to ensure regularity and continuity, working 
methods must remain flexible enough to take account of the wide 
variety of structures and situations in different countries. 
Respect for these principles means that Interpol cannot have 
teams of detectives with supranational powers who travel around 
investigating cases in different countries. Instead, international 
police cooperation must be based upon coordinated action on the 
part of the police forces of the Member States, all of which may 
supply or request information or services on different occasions. 
(ICPO - Interpol 1992: 7) 
The heart of Interpol's operations revolves around the various 
National Central Bureaus (NCBs) in each Member State. The 
government of each Member State is obliged to designate a 
permanent department that acts as the focal point for all 
communications between Interpol and the police forces of the 
respective state. The NCBs are generally staffed by police 
personnel of the respective country and are tasked with such 
activities as: 
a) The collation of all intelligence, documents etc that are 
relevant to international police cooperation; 
b) The communication and transmission of requests for 
information, cooperation etc; 
c) The ensuring that requests for operations requested by the NCB 
of another state are carried out. 
The smooth transmission of information, requests etc is 
facilitated by a communications network that includes different 
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media such as electronic message - handling, facsimile and 
phototelegraphy. The X.400 standard, which is an international 
message-handling standard defined in a series of International 
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) 
recommendations, has been adopted by Interpol. Its adoption has 
enabled the organisation to claim that when added to its 
encryption service and the Automated Search Facility (ASF) (a 
computer based system that allows automatic database searches by 
Interpol NCBs) , it now possesses "the necessary foundations on 
which to develop a comprehensive, world-wide network based on up-
to-the-minute technology, capable of transmitting encrypted 
texts, images etc." (ICPO - Interpol 1992: 20) 
Interpol has been able to justifiably boast that it is the only 
truly global form of police cooperation. The experience it has 
gathered over many years of facilitating the transmission of 
requests, information and intelligence, means that it is the 
staple means by which police forces today communicate with their 
counterparts in other parts of the world. Interpol has become 
particularly proficient in what can be termed low policing (i.e. 
ordinary crime control). An example of this is the colour coded 
notices system that Interpol has operated in the past. Examples 
of these include: red notices which according to Bressler act as 
international arrest warrants; (Bressler 1993: 127) yellow 
notices for missing persons; black notices requesting the 
identification of dead bodies; green notices for information 
about international criminals on the move and blue notices for 
personal information such as aliases. 
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However the organisation has also come in for severe criticism 
on a number of issues. The first of these is with regard to its 
perceived lack of accountability. Anderson sums up this view by 
stating: " .... Interpol has little political influence. This 
derives from its origins as a "policeman's club" whose membership 
was unclear - originally its members seemed to be police officers 
rather than governments. It developed into a recognised inter-
governmental organisation but it remained concerned with "low 
policing" (ordinary crime control) rather than "high policing" 
(policing concerned with security or overtly political issues), 
it had no treaty basis (except the Headquarters Agreement with 
the host country) and governments had no publicly declared 
obligations to support it financially or otherwise." (Anderson 
1992: 25) 
In respect to being governed by a treaty, Interpol has always 
been reluctant to have one, firstly because it believed that the 
organisation should be free of undue political and governmental 
control, but also because of the practical difficulties involved 
in the ratification of a treaty by over one hundred and seventy 
member states. This lack of a treaty base and governmental 
accountability however was one of the prime reasons why the idea 
of Europol being incorporated into Interpol was rejected, and why 
it can well find itself rnarginalised in the areas of high 
policing and the development of a coordinated European strategic 
intelligence system. 
Interpol has also suffered in the past from a reputation for 
lack of speed. In operational terms this problem can have serious 
consequences, and Interpol has gone some way to correcting this 
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deficiency by the adoption and installation of state of the art 
communications equipment over the past ten years. In fairness to 
the organisation, this complaint is often out of its control, as 
it can only be as fast as the state that is dealing with a 
request. This research has revealed that most of the officers 
interviewed were relatively happy with the speed of response from 
Interpol. There was also a sense however that communications via 
Interpol could be a hit or miss scenario. Some states reply 
promptly whereas with others it could take months, and in some 
cases not at all. 
An even more serious criticism however has come in the form of 
a perceived lack of security. Interpol's communications system 
is based on a reciprocal basis. In the interests of equality and 
cooperation it is constrained to freely share information with 
all its members. However the exigencies of high policing 
intelligence and operations, mandate that sensitive information 
is kept secret, and not freely disseminated, particularly to 
states that are involved with transnational crimes, such as those 
that sponsor terrorism. Examples of this problem were given by 
officers of a regional organised crime unit of the Dutch police 
who stated that they were often reluctant to share information 
on drug trafficking with Interpol for fear that it fell into the 
hands of the Moroccan state authorities who, it was believed, 
were cooperating with the transit of drug consignments through 
Morocco. 
Other related criticisms revolve around the misuse of Interpol, 
or the inefficiency of the organisation in communicating vital 
information. An example of the former was reported in Statewatch, 
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whereby the Irmnigration Department of the police (Fremdenpolizei) 
of the Zurich Canton in Switzerland had inappropriately used 
Interpol channels to check the identity of undocumented asylum 
seekers in order to aid deportation. This act was contrary to 
Interpol's statutes which state that requests for identity checks 
should only be used if there is an ongoing criminal 
investigation. (Statewatch Vol 6 No 3 1996: 6-7) An example of 
the latter was again given by Anderson whereby the Head of the 
us National Association of Chiefs of Police (NACOP) asserted 
that, "Interpol knew that George Habash, head of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was planning to enter 
France for medical treatment but that the organisation failed to 
notify the authorities which showed that "it is a liability to 
effective law enforcement." Yves Barbot, the President of 
Interpol described the attack as based on "deep ignorance", 
saying that Interpol was not an intelligence service and not one 
of its 158 members had cormnunicated any information about 
Habash." (Anderson 1992: 25) 
This assertion in the last paragraph by the President of 
Interpol that it is not an intelligence service, leads to the 
final substantial criticism. Whatever the criticisms of Interpol 
in the areas of accountability, speed and security, it has proved 
its worth repeatedly in the day to day business of low level 
police cooperation. Where it has failed to be convincing is in 
the development of high end strategic analysis and intelligence. 
For its part, Interpol has publicized the many initiatives it has 
undertaken in this respect. Some of these include the following: 
a) Operation Paxo: a series of meetings held in 1991 and 1994 on 
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organised vehicle trafficking from Europe to the Middle East 
and Far East; 
b) Project EASTWASH: initiated in 1993, this is a project which 
concentrates on the activities of criminal organisations in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics; 
c) project MALE: which focuses on the money laundering activities 
of Italian criminal organisations 
d) Project Rockers: which deals with outlaw motor cycle gangs 
involved in criminal activities which include extortion, 
intimidation, acts of violence, weapons offences, drug 
trafficking and the theft and distribution of stolen motor 
cycle parts; 
e) The "Probalkan" program which assists European states to 
counter the trafficking of heroin from Turkey primarily by TIR 
trucks along the Balkan Route; 
f) Project Nuclear which is an analytical study regarding the 
traffic in radioactive substances. (IepO - Interpol 1995: 3-
10) 
Despite these and several other similar projects, the image 
still persists of Interpol being incapable of filling a void in 
strategic intelligence at the European level. This can partly be 
due to the difference between descriptive analysis and actionable 
analysis. Several respondents during the course of the research 
commented on this difference by stating that what was not needed, 
was more descriptive reports that outlined what trafficking 
routes existed in Europe etc. What was increasingly being called 
for however was hard intelligence that was actionable, i.e. that 
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would lead directly to specific operations and prosecutions. This 
is in keeping with the customary pressures on police forces for 
tangible short term tactical payoffs, as opposed to nebulous long 
term strategic benefits. 
Interpol will remain unchallenged in the area of its greatest 
strength, that being what Anderson terms "voluntary reciprocal 
mutual aid." (Anderson 1994: 16) It will for the foreseeable 
future continue to be the preferred medium for the bulk of 
international police cooperation. However the growing mosaic of 
policing needs means that no one organisation will be able to be 
all things to all people. As the remainder of this chapter shows, 
there are varying other forms of police cooperation in Europe 
that are all filling various other needs. 
4.2.2: THE DRUG LIAISON OFFICER NE'IWORK 
The Drugs Liaison officer network consists of a network of 
police and customs officers from various European countries, who 
are not only posted to fellow European states, but also to 
strategically important states outside of Europe. These liaison 
officers operate from their horne embassy in the host state, and 
enjoy diplomatic immunity and First Secretary status, so that 
they can not be constrained to testify in the courts of the host 
state. In recent years the UK IS DLO network has been complemented 
by a Counter Terrorism Liaison Officer network (CTLOs), officers 
of which are posted in France, Germany and the Benelux states. 
The CTLO network has emerged out of the Police Working Group on 
Terrorism (PWGOT), which is funded and staffed entirely by 
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officers of the Metropolitan Police, and who are accountable to 
the European Liaison Section (ELS) of this force. (ACPO 1996: 40) 
As from 1996, the role of the UK DLOs has been extended to 
encompass all forms of serious crime. However the definition of 
what constitutes serious crime is not stated, either in the NCIS 
Annual Report of 1995/96 or in the ACPO study on International, 
National and Inter-Force Crime of February 1996. This raises the 
suggestion that the definition of serious crime will be a 
subjective one that is decided on a case by case basis. 
At present the UK has 42 DLOs posted throughout the world, the 
majority of whom are HMCE officers. They are posted in 24 
countries, 8 of which are in Europe. Of those posted in Europe, 
40% of the work undertaken is in providing assistance and advice 
to the operational teams of HMCE and the RCSs, 30% is in 
proactive tactical intelligence gathering, 10% is in the 
gathering of strategic intelligence, 4% is in rendering advice 
and assistance to other government departments, and 16% is in 
giving assistance and advice to the law enforcement agencies of 
host countries. (ACPO 1996: 39) This breakdown clearly shows that 
there is an imbalance between the gathering of tactical and 
strategic intelligence, which highlights the pressures that 
operational as well as intelligence agencies face in acquiring 
intelligence that is geared towards short-term operational 
successes. 
The NCIS 1995/96 annual report emphasises that during a 12 
month period covered by the report, the UK DLO network took part 
in or proposed 60 controlled deliveries of drug consignments. The 
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involvement of the DLO network highlights the current problem of 
duplication in the field of police cooperation. Research evidence 
gathered from the Bundeskriminalamt in Germany emphasises the 
belief that controlled deliveries are easier to facilitate via 
the DLO network due to the experience gathered over the years in 
coordinating such operations. However the Europol Drugs Unit, 
since its inception, has become increasingly involved in 
initiating and coordinating controlled deliveries as well. The 
organisation boasts of its ability to organise a controlled 
delivery in one hour, based on the convenience of having all its 
liaison officers under one roof. 
The ACPO Report on International, National and Inter-Force 
Crime of February 1996 revealed clear evidence of a lack of 
coordination between the work of the DLO network, Interpol and 
Europol leading to significant duplication of effort. The report 
states: "Following the visits to Interpol, Europol, officers in 
the DLO, and to a lesser extent CTLO network, the working group 
believe that there are a number of issues to be addressed. The 
first is clarity of roles. It seems that Interpol, Europol and 
the DLOs are undertaking very similar roles, especially in the 
area of drug trafficking ..... The consequence of this is that a 
British police officer, making enquiries from the UK, is very 
well served by the poliCing networks currently operating in 
Europe. The same enquiry could be made to any of the above 
organisations who would undertake to deal with it. This is of 
course of benefit to the customer but one has to question whether 
in fact the duplication in roles is operationally and financially 
sound. During the course of their visit the working group were 
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told of ongoing operations being undertaken by the ELOs in 
Europol, and the DLOs. These operations were similar in nature 
and could have been facilitated by either or both organisations. 
In addition to the above the working group found little evidence 
of coordination between Europol, the DLOs and CTLOs." (Aero 1996: 
40) 
This was a uniform response in the other states targeted for 
this research, to the question of duplication between the DLOs, 
Europol and Interpol. Persons interviewed in the national units 
of Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands all admitted to varying 
degrees of duplication between the three agencies. The ACPO 
report went on to recommend a review by ACPO of the effectiveness 
of coordination between UK law enforcement representatives 
overseas, without giving any concrete recommendations about how 
this might be achieved. 
The advantage of the DLO network in Europe appears to be its 
experience in gathering intelligence in strategic countries and 
its ability to effectively organise controlled deliveries, while 
its main disadvantage appears to be in the area of duplication 
and lack of coordination with other similar agencies. Also the 
emphasis on purely national concerns and objectives means that 
the DLO network is seldom able to develop a coordinated strategic 
approach to combating serious crime at a European level. 
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4 .2 .3: INFORMAL BILATERAL CONTACTS 
Bilateral contacts represent one of the oldest and most 
ubiquitous forms of police cooperation in Europe. These links are 
frequently formed in the process of operational necessity, and 
then nurtured for the duration of the respective officers' 
service. The advantage of these forms of cooperation are the 
speed they bring to operations, as officers know that the 
cooperation they require is only a phone call away. Informal 
bilateral cooperation also fosters a sense of transnational 
trust, as officers begin to gain an understanding of the problems 
faced by their colleagues in other countries, such as different 
extradition and evidence requirements, different judicial 
practices and police powers etc. 
This mosaic of contacts, while possessing operational 
advantages, can also have its drawbacks. The most obvious 
disadvantage is that carefully cultivated contacts die with the 
transfer, retirement or the death of at least one of the 
contacts. With the breaking of these links invariably goes the 
intelligence and experience that may have been carefully built 
up over a number of years. Also the natural inclination of police 
officers to keep information 'as close to their chests' as 
possible means that informal bilateral contacts can theoretically 
lead to duplication, as the analysis formed by a closed bilateral 
contact may not necessarily be shared with other colleagues. 
Furthermore this form of cooperation invariably is only of any 
functional use in specific tactical operations. It seldom has any 
scope for the production of strategic intelligence or analysis. 
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4.2.4: OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION 
In addition to these main forms of inter-police cooperation, 
there are a series of shadowy unofficial forms of cooperation 
that have only come to light in recent years, through 
commentators such as Professor Benyon and the magazine 
Statewatch. Some of these networks include the following: 
a) The Vienna Group or Club: This group consists of Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland, and is concerned with the 
exchange of information on the combatting of terrorism in the 
participating countries; 
b) The Berne Group or Club: This network is likewise concerned 
with exchange of information on terrorism, but has a wider 
membership which includes the original 12 EU states as well as 
Austria and Switzerland; 
c) Kilowatt: This network comprises an "information alliance 
between the security services of around eighteen states." 
(Benyon 1993: 212) 
While these examples are by no means an exhaustive list of the 
varying interlocking forms of inter police cooperation in Europe, 
they give an idea of the disadvantages and shortcomings that need 
to be addressed. Some organisations such as Interpol fail in the 
areas of speed and security. Others such as informal bilateral 
contacts, fail to provide a coordinated strategic overview, that 
the effective combatting of transnational crime increasingly 
requires. And others, such as shadowy inter police cooperation 
networks, are unaccountable and lack transparency, and by 
extension democratic legitimacy. As a consequence, the second 
section of this chapter will briefly examine the 
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intergovernmental forms of police cooperation that have been the 
first steps in rectifying these deficiencies. 
4. 3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORMS OF POLICE COOPERATION 
4.3 .1: FORMAL BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
Arguably one of the most established and advanced forms of 
formal bilateral cooperation in Europe can be found in the 
policing of the Channel Tunnel. Cross channel cooperation and 
liaison between the Kent Constabulary and its counterparts in 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands can be traced to 1967 when 
in response to a perceived illegal immigration crisis, the then 
Chief Constable Dawney Lemon, made formal applications for 
ongoing regional cooperation with the French and Belgian police. 
This initiative resulted in the formation of the Cross Channel 
Intelligence Conference and the appointment of a Kent 
Constabulary Cross-Channel Liaison Officer. 
However the main impetus for improved cooperation came with the 
advent of the Channel Tunnel project in 1986. Following upon the 
signing of the Channel Tunnel Act in 1987, and the designation 
of the Chief Constable of Kent as the lead police authority in 
conjunction with the British Transport Police, and the 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch, a Channel Tunnel Policing 
Unit became operational in 1989. This new unit was able to build 
on the experience gathered from the Cross Channel Intelligence 
Conference started in 1969, and in 1991 the designation of this 
unit was changed to Kent Constabulary's European Liaison Unit. 
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Today this unit, according to its head Detective Inspector 
Gallagher, "provides an essential point through which information 
of a European nature can flow in and out of the Force. Externally 
it provides a single point of contact and reference for our 
immediate neighbours. Overall their role minimizes the danger of 
duplication of effort by providing the coordinated approach to 
Force inter-departmental European activities, whilst at the same 
time noting the importance of cultural, legal, linguistic and 
protocol requirements likely to ameliorate such police 
cooperation." (Gallagher 1995: research interview) In addition 
to fulfilling the needs of Kent Constabulary, the ELU is 
primarily responsible for the policing and security of the 
Channel Tunnel, and the policing of this vital frontier. 
The exercise of policing functions is governed by the Protocol 
on policing the Channel Tunnel which was signed in November 1991, 
(Article 3) and which requires the two countries to work closely 
together and 'to the fullest possible extent cooperate, assist 
one another and coordinate their activities in discharging their 
duties.' (Hebenton and Thomas 1995: 91) 
In addition to the Protocol, other sources and tools of 
bilateral legitimacy include: 
a} The Anglo French Agreement 1989 concluded between the British 
Home Secretary and the French Minister of the Interior, which 
allows for a joint commitment to 'the struggle against terrorism, 
organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration,' and 
aims to facilitate the exchange of officers at a national level 
as opposed to a regional or local level (Gallagher (undated): 
101) 
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b) An exchange of letters between the Chief Constable of Kent and 
the Prefet of Pas-de-Calais, which has facilitated such areas 
as the exchange of information for operational purposes, 
operational procedures concerning the Channel Tunnel, and police 
exchanges between Kent and Pas-de-Calais; 
c) The signing of Memoranda of Understanding dealing with the 
rendering of mutual assistance between Kent, Western Flanders, 
Le Nord, Zeeland etc; 
d) The development of a 'Euroregion' Memorandum of Understanding 
for local authorities between Kent County Council, and its 
counterparts in Nor/pas-de-Calais, Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels. 
The significance of these developments lies in the fact that 
what began as a formal bilateral intergovernmental agreement 
between the UK and France, has over time evolved into a multi 
lateral Euro policing region. Another contentious outcome of 
these arrangements has been the initiation of a system of 
juxtaposed controls, whereby separate zones are delimited by 
virtual protocols, which allows British officers to operate on 
French soil, and French officers on British soil. Passengers to 
France are therefore checked by French authorities before leaving 
Kent, and British staff act in a similar manner in France. 
(Hebenton and Thomas 1995: 91) 
Consequently every day, uniformed French frontier police known 
as the PAF, arrive on British soil for the performance of normal 
policing and immigration functions. In practice therefore there 
is a daily movement of British and French officers through the 
Channel Tunnel. Travellers are checked at French frontier 
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controls in Britain, and in the event of someone being registered 
as wanted on French computers, the French officers have the power 
to arrest the wanted person on British soil (but only within 
their delimited zone) and transfer the wanted person back to 
France. 
This facility however does not allow the French zone to be 
considered as French territory as in diplomatic cases. In the 
event of a criminal matter arising or a case of public disorder, 
it would still be the responsibility of the British police to 
deal with it. 
Inherent in the system of juxtaposed controls is the further 
contentious issue of French police officers carrying firearms 
while on British soil. While at the time of the observational 
research visit to Kent Constabulary's European Liaison Unit this 
situation had not been resolved, a compromise was in the process 
of being negotiated, that would allow French officers to retain 
their firearms while on British soil subject to certain controls. 
The British for their part, appear to have no intention of 
carrying firearms on French territory. 
Another example of bilateral cooperation leading to a 
multilateral arrangement is the example of the border area 
between Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. The national 
regions involved consist of: the Belgian provinces of Limburg and 
Liege with a population of 1.8 million; the Dutch province of 
Limburg with a population of 0.7 million; and the German region 
of Aachen with a total population of 1.1 million. The police 
cooperation in this area, which had been traditional for much of 
the post war period, was put on a formal basis in 1969 with the 
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creation of NEBEDEAG-Pol, which was an association of the chiefs 
of police of this region. Its aim was the development of 
strategies for cooperation that would be shared and implemented 
by the police officers of the three national regions. 
Cooperation instruments included: a border alert search system; 
the establishment of liaison offices and the exchange of liaison 
officers; direct cross border radio links and links to each 
others police vehicles; seminars on common problems; language 
courses; cross border surveillance; the right of hot pursuit; and 
even consideration of the establishment of bi-national police 
stations. 
This in turn has spawned other localised forms of cooperation. 
For example the Dutch local authority of Kerkrade and the German 
local authority of Herzogenrath joined together under the title 
EURODE as the first "European local authority." An external 
expression of this cooperation was a road running through the 
centre of the district. The unique feature of this road was that 
it was also the former border between German and Dutch sovereign 
territory. The border, initially a wire fence, later a small 
wall, ran right through the middle of the road, separating the 
two carriageways. 
In a spirit of European unity, the border wall was removed and 
the two carriageways joined. The new tarred surface was paid for 
jointly. However problems arose when it came to street signs and 
the validity of traffic regulations, the question of dealing with 
traffic accidents, police jurisdiction, action and the 
prosecution of crimes, and breaches of the regulations on the 
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road. There has proved to be no legal solution to these problems, 
and while the police intervene, as best they can, to date the 
legal position has not been clarified. (Petermann 1996: 19) 
A report on the cross border cooperation in the NEBEDEAG-Pol 
region by the Aachen police, makes the statement that: "Specific 
bilateral agreements are only an interim stage and are no 
substitute for a readiness for European (police) integration." 
As with other forms of police cooperation, this statement draws 
attention to the limitations of formal bilateral cooperation. The 
EURODE case is only a microcosm of the types of routine problems 
that can occur. 
The examples given are arguably the two most advanced forms of 
bilateral cooperation in Europe, both of which have fairly 
rapidly evolved into multilateral police cooperation 
arrangements. However they are both concerned with specific 
localized policing problems. Once again neither is geared towards 
combatting the issues of transnational crime on a European level. 
Furthermore, the potential of isolation in dealing with localized 
or regional issues can cause inefficiency and duplication. For 
example, intelligence gained via bilateral arrangements at the 
Austrian/Slovenian border may have importance for bilateral 
cooperation at the German/French border. However in the absence 
of a more integrated system, this intelligence may not find its 
way to all the parties that it should. 
Likewise, a deficiency in harmonized and integrated policing 
and judicial systems and practices at a European level, can mean 
that the benefits of formal bilateral arrangements are diluted. 
Again a prime example of this problem is the contrast between the 
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'opportunity principle' of the Dutch judicial system and the 
German 'legality principle'. The Dutch 'opportunity principle' 
allows for "proj ect management" even in the prosecution of 
offences. This allows the police to decide on a program of 
priorities with the public prosecutor for a fairly long period, 
and to devote the appropriate financial and staff resources to 
it. Specifically this means that offences not included in the 
program do not have to be prosecuted on practical grounds. It 
also means that there is flexibility in the right to prosecute. 
Oftentimes when dealing with serious criminality, such as 
organised crime, it may be expedient not to act on information 
in hand, in the interests of gathering sufficient information and 
evidence to effect a more substantial prosecution at a later 
date. Under the mandatory prosecution rules of the German system, 
this flexibility is not always possible. Consequently, the Dutch 
police are often reluctant to pass on information about long term 
organised crime measures, for fear that the Germans will be 
constrained to take irmnediate action, and by so doing, jeopardise 
long term objectives. 
Formal bilateral police cooperation therefore, while being 
highly successful in dealing with regional crime, also has 
significant drawbacks in terms of tackling the wider problem of 
transnational crime in Europe. Nevertheless despite these 
drawbacks, bilateral cooperation of both a formal, and 
particularly an informal nature, are generally the backbone of 
police cooperation across national boundaries, and as such, 
limitations notwithstanding, its importance should not be under-
estimated. 
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4.3 .2: THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT 
The Schengen Agreement which established the general goal of 
abolishing all frontier controls, and harmonising cross border 
procedures for goods and persons was signed in 1985. This was 
followed up by the Implementation Convention of 1990. The impetus 
for this agreement came from the political declaration of the EC 
member states, following the adoption of the Single European Act, 
to the effect that the promotion of the free movement of persons, 
should be supported by cooperation in combatting cross border 
offences such as drug trafficking and terrorism, as well as in 
regard to the entry to and movement in the EC of nationals of 
third countries. Schengen therefore represented a compensatory 
measure for the perceived security deficit resulting from the 
lowering of internal borders. 
In terms of cross border cooperation, the Schengen Convention 
allows for the following measures: 
1) MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
a) abolition of checks on persons at the internal borders of the 
signatory states; 
b) intensification of checks on persons at the external borders 
of the signatory countries on the basis of uniform criteria; 
c) uniform regulations on the entry of aliens; 
d) uniform criteria for issuing visas to aliens; 
e) creation of a uniform "forgery proof" visa, valid for all 
Schengen countries; 
f) uniform criteria for refusing aliens entry to Schengen 
countries; 
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g) arrest and deportation of aliens staying in a Schengen 
country and not fulfilling the required conditions; 
h) uniform criteria for dealing with applications for asylum and 
asylum seekers. 
2) SPECIFIC FIELDS OF CRIME 
a) intensification of drug law enforcement; 
b) harmonisation of legal provisions on firearms. 
3) CROSS BORDER COOPERATION 
a) mutual police assistance; 
b) exchange of police liaison officers; 
c) technical cooperation at the border; 
d) cross border surveillance by police; 
e) cross border (hot) pursuit by police. 
4) JUDICIAL COOPERATION 
a) facilitating legal assistance and extradition matters; 
b) facilitating the enforcement of penal sanctions; 
c) facilitating the serving of official documents. 
The implementation of the Schengen Agreement has been 
complemented by the Schengen Information System (SIS), which is 
a computer-assisted system for the entry and retrieval of data 
on wanted persons and property within the signatory countries, 
consisting of a central service computer in Strasbourg (CSIS), 
and National Schengen Information Systems (NSIS) in the signatory 
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states. Since the implementation of Schengen, Big SIS has become 
an everyday tool of police cooperation among the Schengen states. 
At present the membership of Schengen is divided between those 
states that have signed, ratified and implemented the agreement, 
and those states that are in the process of either signing, 
ratifying or implementing the agreement. The breakdown of these 
states are as follows: 
1) States that are already implementing the agreement: Germany, 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. 
2) States in the process of signing and ratifying the agreement: 
- Austria (signed and ratified) 
- Denmark (signed and ratified) 
- Sweden (signed) 
- Finland (signed) 
- Greece (signed) 
- Italy (signed) 
- Norway (non EO associate member status only) (signed) 
- Iceland (non EO associate member status only) (signed) 
(Statewatch Vol 7 No 3 1997) 
The United Kingdom and Ireland have refused to participate 
although the Treaty of Amsterdam contains provisions whereby 
these two states may opt in to certain Schengen procedures under 
specified conditions. 
With respect to Britain's self imposed exclusion from Schengen, 
there is every indication that in operational policing terms, the 
British police have been losing out by not having had access to 
the SIS in the past. One example given by German Federal Border 
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Police operating along Germany's northern seaports, involves the 
routine discovery of suspicious containerised motor vehicles in 
transit to Russia. Whereas vehicles that originate within one of 
the Schengen states can be checked on the SIS, a stolen British 
vehicle would not appear on this database, and therefore, short 
of time consuming formal checks with British counterparts, there 
is no way of ascertaining the legitimacy of containerised British 
vehicles. ~herefore motor vehicles stolen in Britain in transit 
to Russia, are often going unrecovered due to Britain's self 
imposed exclusion from the Schengen system. 
The Schengen system represents the first form of horizontal 
integration on a Europe wide basis, whereby, according to van 
Reenen, police officers obtain the authorization to operate in 
the territory of another country. This is distinct from the mere 
posting of liaison officers in other states. While the right of 
hot pursuit has been a regular feature of police cooperation 
between the Benelux states, this right has now been extended to 
most of the European Union. 
At present a system of variable geometry exists with respect 
to the right of hot pursuit, whereby each state has different 
limits on the right of incursion into their territory. For 
example Germany allows officers from other Schengen states to 
travel any distance within German territory and for any duration, 
and also gives these officers the right to apprehend and detain 
persons, while pursuing offenders for extraditable offences or 
who have escaped from prison. The Netherlands on the other hand 
only allows hot pursuit within a distance of 10 km from the 
border, and persons apprehended may only be detained within the 
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10 km limit. During the course of the research, examples were 
given of Dutch police officers who chased a suspect from Dutch 
soil all the way to Munich, where he was arrested by the Dutch 
officers. In another case, on the initiative of a commanding 
Dutch officer, several hundred Dutch officers crossed the border 
with Germany, and travelled several miles into German territory, 
to help the German police defuse a potentially violent 
confrontation with a large number of Kurdish demonstrators. 
Today the Schengen system has become a routine aspect of 
everyday continental policing, although it still has significant 
drawbacks in terms of fighting cross border crime. While it has 
been described as a horizontal one shot 'hit, no hit' system, it 
has virtually no capacity for the vertical formulation of 
strategic analysis with which to combat transnational crime. 
Furthermore it suffers from being outside the framework of the 
European Union. It is overseen by an Executive Committee 
consisting of the Council of Ministers of the member states, with 
routine management being undertaken by a Central Group consisting 
of senior civil servants and police officers, as well as a 
secretariat based in Brussels. 
However this has not prevented the Schengen system from being 
criticised for a lack of accountability and transparency, 
particularly in respect to parliamentary oversight and judicial 
control. Benyon has highlighted the concerns that have been 
expressed with regard to the human rights implications of the 
rules on refugees, aliens and visas, the data protection issues 
surrounding the SIS, and the complaints of Members of the 
European Parliament with regard to the secrecy surrounding 
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Schengen, and the paucity or inadequacy of replies to questions 
raised. Finally as an agreement, it has suffered from the 
implementation of variable geometry in that there is not 
universal membership across the entire EU. (Benyon 1993; 147-149) 
It is for these and other reasons that moves have been made at 
recent European Council summits to incorporate Schengen into the 
EU system. A special meeting of the European Council held in 
Florence in June 1996 included consideration of this option, with 
a possible first step being the amalgamation of the Schengen 
Secretariat with the EU Secretariat, along with consecutive 
meetings of the Schengen Executive Committee and the EU' s Council 
of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers at the same time and venue. 
Allied to this is the expectation that the SIS will one day 
complement the Europol database in an interconnected 
relationship. (Statewatch Vol 6 No 4 1996; 18, 23) Within the 
context of van Reenen's three-fold form of the 
internationalisation of policing, the achievement of such an 
incorporation presages the evolution of a policing matrix in 
Europe that will eventually encompass all three forms: 
cooperation, horizontal integration and vertical integration. 
4.4: CONCLUSION 
The various forms of cooperation examined in this chapter, both 
of an inter police and an intergovernmental nature, have clearly 
been forms of cooperation as delineated by Van Reenen, with only 
the Schengen system being identified as a form of horizontal 
77) 
integration. It is therefore possible to theorize on the 
likelihood of police cooperation evolving in a progressive and 
incremental manner from a level of pure cooperation to one which 
includes an element of vertical integration. The potential for 
such a scenario will be investigated in the next chapter, through 
an examination of Europol. 
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CHAPTER 5 EQROPOL 
5 .1: BACKGROUND 
5.1.1: Chapter Introduction 
This chapter will look at Europol not only as a natural 
progression from the forms of police cooperation outlined in 
chapter 4, but also as an organisation that potentially differs 
significantly from any that has gone before. Central to this is 
the belief that Europol has the potential to become, as was 
emphasized in the last chapter, a form of vertical integration 
which is located outside of and above the nation state. To 
achieve this, it is necessary to first examine the genesis and 
structure of the organisation, before presenting and analyzing 
the data in later chapters on the national units of the selected 
states, so as to ascertain the validity of this hypothesis, as 
well as the iteration that is the basis of this research. 
5.1.2: TRBVI 
The background of Europol is grounded in the now defunct TREVI 
structure which came into being in the mid 19708 as a response 
to the terrorist threat to Europe. This was necessary because of 
Interpol's practice of not dealing in offences of a political 
nature. Fijnaut elaborates on the genesis of TREVI by stating: 
"The initiative to set up this consultative body, which was 
institutionalised within the European Political Cooperation 
framework of the EC, was taken by the European Council in Rome 
1975. The Council then agreed that the respective Ministers of 
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Internal Affairs would regularly get together to discuss issues 
of order and security. This decision became much more important 
a year later when on 29 June 1976 in Luxembourg, these ministers 
adopted a resolution to the effect that a number of study groups 
were to be established as part of a body which was to be called 
TREVI, a name derived from the famous fountains in Rome." 
(Fijnaut 1991: 108) 
Described as a forum rather than an organisation, TREVI ' s 
principal aim was the promotion of police cooperation, initially 
in the field of terrorism. Its membership consisted of the then 
12 members of the Ee, and it operated on 3 levels. The highest 
level consisted of the interior ministers of the 12 member 
states, who exercised overall political control. Beneath them was 
the TREVI group of senior officials which consisted primarily of 
senior police officers, civil servants and other officials who 
were responsible for the development of policy advice for the 
ministers, as well as the coordination of the work of the working 
groups which formed the third level. 
The working groups also consisted of civil servants and police 
officers, as well as representatives from relevant organisations. 
(Benyon 1993: 152) The remit of Working Group I dealt with the 
exchange of intelligence on terrorism, and the movement and 
discovery of arms and explosives. Working Group I I deal t with the 
exchange of information on police training, police equipment, 
public order and forensic science. The events of the Heysel 
stadium tragedy in 1985 also lead to cooperation on combating 
football hooliganism being added to the remit of this group. 
Working Group III came into being in June 1985, and was 
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concerned with increasing cooperation in the detection and 
prevention of serious organised crime including drug trafficking. 
Areas of crime under this group's remit included environmental 
crime, trafficking in works of art, trafficking in stolen 
vehicles, armed robbery and money laundering. This group was also 
responsible for the introduction of the Drug Liaison Officer 
(DLO) system, the development of a comparative approach to the 
analysis of crime in Europe, and the establishment in each member 
state of a national drugs intelligence unit. 
Other planned working groups either never got off the ground 
or were not fully developed. For example the original Working 
Group IV dealt with fire, and its aim was the exchange of views, 
information and experience on all aspects of measures against 
fire, and the promotion of cooperation in these and related 
matters such as fire protection, organisation and control of fire 
services, firemens' protective clothing etc. This group however 
never reported to the TREVI Senior Officers or Ministers and was 
eventually disbanded. (Undated confidential Home Office memo) 
Finally the fourth TREVI working group became known as Trevi 
1992, and was primarily concerned with the security and crime 
implications of any relaxation of border controls on the 
completion of the Single European Act on 31 December 1992. The 
importance of the Trevi forum lies in the framework for police 
cooperation in Europe that it developed both in terms of 
political commitment, and in the practical mechanisms for the 
sharing of information techniques, best practice etc. Some of its 
achievements include: 
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a) A ministerial agreement in 1986 for the regular analysis and 
assessment of the terrorist threats to EC countries for the 
purpose of assisting the counter-terrorist agencies of all the 
member states. This agreement also included plans for the 
establishment of a new secure communications system between 
European police forces to allow the rapid exchange of Trevi 
information, especially with respect to the targeting of 
terrorist movements, supplies of money, arms and equipment, so 
as to facilitate disruption of these activities. 
b) The institution of Troika meetings at Senior Official and 
Ministerial levels comprising the past, present and future 
Presidencies, in the interests of ensuring continuity. The Troika 
was also given responsibility for briefing third countries such 
as Norway, Canada, the United States, Switzerland, Austria etc 
which often attended Trevi meetings. 
c) An initiative in 1989 for the establishment of a secure Trevi 
facsimile link, a centre in Germany for holding information on 
true and forged Arab documents, and a proforma for transmitting 
intelligence to other member states immediately following a 
terrorist attack. (undated Home Office memo) 
Arguably one of Trevi's most important achievements was the 
Paris Declaration of Trevi Ministers of 15 December 1989. In 
noting the effects of the implementation of the Single European 
Act, the increasing ability of organised crime to exploit the 
limits of competence of national police agencies, the differences 
between legal systems in Europe, and the gaps in cooperation 
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between respective services, the Ministers made a range of 
recommendations. Some of the most significant were the creation 
of a common information system available to member states, 
designed to combat the most serious forms of crime, and the 
institution of structures to centralize and coordinate 
information and to exchange intelligence, with particular 
reference to decisions already made to set up national 
intelligence units on drugs, allied to the requirement for the 
extension of these national units at a European level. 
Despite these developments however, Trevi suffered from 
significant drawbacks. The most often voiced criticism was its 
secrecy and lack of accountability. Hebenton and Thomas highlight 
this problem by stating: "The UK Government has never been 
persuaded that anything more than a written answer to a 
Parliamentary Question was needed to keep the UK Parliament 
informed of TREVI deliberations. In fact, the first such written 
answer concerning a body that had been meeting since 1976 only 
appeared in June 1990. The Government has refused to gi ve 
Parliament the minutes of TREVI meetings or to disclose the cost 
of British participation. Even a Home Office circular to Chief 
Constables advising them of TREVI's structure and issued on 2 
September 1977 remains a classified document to this day." 
(Hebenton and Thomas 1995: 77-78) 
In addition to its secrecy and lack of accountability, Trevi 
never had a permanent headquarters or secretariat. In the absence 
of formal intergovernmental agreements, this was largely due to 
an inability of the member states to agree on a venue. There were 
also frequent disagreements over the choice of languages to be 
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used and the poor provision of translation services. A 
confidential report on a meeting of Trevi Senior Officials gives 
some indication of the extent of these problems. "The irritating 
fly in the ointment was language: both literally and 
symbolically. The Greeks complained that this was the first 
Senior Officials meeting where there was no translation into 
Greek, possibly essential for a delegation which is notoriously 
composed of non-linguists. The Danes suffered the same problem. 
The French, displaying far from good European manners, demanded, 
as a matter of principle, that French and English both be used 
for training courses which nationals of various states are 
invited to attend. This suggestion went down like a lead balloon 
with other delegations. All this was in addition to the usual 
problems of translation, either actual or imagined for the 
purposes of diplomacy." (Home Office Notes of Trevi Senior 
Officials Meeting, The Hague, Nov 21-22 1991) 
Despite these problems however, Trevi served its purpose as 
providing a springboard for the third pillar of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which according to Anderson, "established the beginnings 
of a truly effective EU crisis management structure that brings 
together disparate police, customs and judicial authorities under 
one clearly defined, legally based, authority framework," (Chalk 
1994: 11) and out of which Europol was born. 
5.2: THE GENESIS OF EUROPOL 
5 .2 .1: EARLY DEVELOPMENTS 
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The main impetus for a European wide police agency came at 
the European Council meeting in Luxembourg on 28-29 June 1991, 
when Chancellor Kohl proposed the formation of a single European 
Criminal Police Office, akin to both the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in the USA and the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA). 
According to Woodward, Chancellor Kohl envisaged this body being 
oriented towards tackling international drug trafficking and 
organized crime. It would be established by 31st December 1993 
and would develop in two stages. First a relay station would be 
established for the exchange of information and experience, and 
then secondly, after 31st December 1992 further powers to act 
within the member states would be granted, including jurisdiction 
and executive powers to investigate drug offences and organized 
crime (Woodward 1993: 10). 
While these proposals took some member states by surprise, the 
idea was by no means new, original or undebated. Fijnaut notes 
that as early as 1974 the Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter (German 
CID Officer's Association) discussed possible changes to the role 
of Interpol and the possible development of a European policing 
office (Fijnaut 1987: 37-38). This view was further corroborated 
by the Belgian MEP and rapporteur Lode van Outrive who stated in 
his Working Document on Europol that: 
"Since the early 1970s, the issue of a European criminal 
investigation department has been raised repeatedly in Germany. 
The German Criminal Investigation Department (ie BKA) has 
constantly shown itself willing to provide the main impetus 
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for more extensive police cooperation. Schreiber (the Under-
Secretary of the German Ministry of Home Affairs) argues, "we 
Germans, with our federalist state structure have considerable 
experience with security issues. We should apply the approach 
used in Germany at a European level" (van Outrive 1992: 3). 
However both the British government, and senior British 
police officers took opposing views on the nature of any future 
federal European policing organization. The former Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner Sir Peter Imbert stated in 1989: "The time 
is not right to consider a European Police Force - and those who 
are currently advocating it are perhaps expecting us to run 
before we have shown we can walk" (The Job 21/7/89: 6). This 
position was supported by Roger Birch, the Chief Constable of 
Sussex and Chair of the Association of Chief police Officers' 
International Advisory Conunittee who stated in 1991: "I would 
question the practicality in the immediate foreseeable future of 
any form of European FBI operating across frontiers in an 
executive capacity. I cannot begin to conceive of the 
difficulties which would face such a team called on to operate 
outside their countries where they would need to understand and 
comply with the multitude of legislative and regulatory 
requirements" (quoted in The European 12-14/7/91 and the Guardian 
29/11/91) . 
These British reservations have not abated with the passage of 
time. As late as February 1994, on the eve of the opening of the 
Europol Drugs Unit in the Hague, Anthony Langdon, Britain's 
representative to the K4 Conunittee stated Britain's position 
that Europol should remain an intelligence swapping operation 
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similar to Interpol. "The prospect of federal agents from Germany 
or France being deployed in Britain is likely to cause uproar 
among Tory Eurosceptics" (Daily Telegraph, 3 February 1994). 
Further evidence for this position has been acquired from 
research findings (interviews and NCIS briefing papers) which 
indicate that the British National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) views the main purpose of Europol as to give added value 
to NCIS I S operations. Far therefore from Chancellor Kohl's vision 
of each member state's NCIS being a satellite of Europol, from 
the British nation-state centred view, it is Europol which is the 
satellite of NCIS. Furthermore there is evidence to indicate that 
the British view is mirrored by the Dutch CRI, which in itself 
is quite noteworthy in light of general Dutch Euro-enthusiasm. 
Research evidence supporting this view will be presented in the 
case study on the Netherlands. 
Despite the reservations of the British however, the Council 
decided on the formation of the Ad Hoc working Group on Europol 
(AHWGE) which would work under the existing Trevi umbrella 
towards the establishment, in the first instance, of the Europol 
Drugs Unit. 
The plans for the creation of Europol were given a substantial 
boost by the inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty 1992 of Title VI 
which deals with cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs issues, 
and the annexed Declaration on Police Cooperation (Benyon 1993: 
159). The perceived threat to internal security caused by the 
provisions of the Single European Act, which helped create a 
single market without internal frontiers, was the main 
justification for closer police cooperation. As a consequence 
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Article K.1(9) of the Maastricht Treaty declared police 
cooperation within the European Union to be a matter of cornmon 
interest, thereby reaffirming the agreement on promoting 
practical police cooperation at the Council meeting of June 1991 
(Benyon 1993: 159). 
For the purposes of bringing the EDU into existence, two bodies 
were formed. The first of these was termed Project Team Europol 
and was tasked with the drafting of a plan for the Europol Drugs 
Intelligence Unit (as it was then known) which would constitute 
the first phase of Europol (Woodward 1993: 14). The PTE consisted 
initially of 15 members drawn from 9 of the then 12 member states 
under the directorship of Jurgen Storbeck of the German BKA, and 
was temporarily based in Strasbourg. The remit of the group 
included work on technical coordination, data processing and 
communications systems, intelligence, and material and personnel 
affairs. The PTE reported to the previously mentioned Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Europol (ABWGE) (Woodward 1993: 14). 
The ABWGE on the other hand consisted of between 40 and 60 
middle ranking civil servants under a permanent British Chair who 
was a senior government official in the police Department at the 
Horne Office. It was accountable to the then Trevi group of Senior 
Officials who passed on recommendations to the Trevi ministers 
for agreement. The body was responsible for preparing the 
Convention which would provide the basis for the eventual 
establishment of Europol, and with establishing the areas of 
action which can be undertaken by the EDU before the Convention 
is agreed. It was envisaged that the ABWGE would continue its 
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work until the Convention formally establishing Europol was 
signed (Woodward 1993: 12-13). 
5 .2 .2: THE MINISTERIAL AGREEMENT 
The Ministerial Agreement which brought the Europol Drugs Unit 
(EDU), as the forerunner of Europol, into being, was signed at 
the meeting of the Interior Ministers (including 
Immigration/Trevi Officials) in Copenhagen on 1-2 June 1993. This 
agreement was meant to be an interim measure pending the signing 
of the Convention proper that will give Europol a legitimate 
legal basis on which to commence operating. 
The terms of reference laid out for the EDU specified that it 
was to be a non operational organization tasked with the 
collection, analysis and exchange of intelligence on drug 
trafficking in Europe, along with ancillary offences such as 
money laundering. Other stipulations of the agreement included: 
The future appointment of a Coordinator to head the EDU; the 
setting up or designation of one, or a limited number of national 
central authorities, through which all information to or from the 
EDU must be channelled; the requirement of each country to 
appoint one or more liaison officers who will liaise with their 
home country's central national intelligence authority (in the 
case of the UK, NCIS); and the procedure governing the passing 
of information from one state to another. 
The agreement specifically prohibited the transmission of 
personal information to non member states or to international 
organizations by the liaison officers, as well as the central 
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storage of personal information. The issue of the location of 
Europol's Headquarters was not finalized, with Rome, the Hague 
and Strasbourg all competing as possible venues. Up to this point 
the EDU had been operating provisionally on the same site as the 
Schengen Information System in Strasbourg (between Sept 1992 and 
Dec 1993). However at the summit of the EC Prime Ministers in 
October 1993, it was agreed that the permanent headquarters of 
the organization would be in the Hague on the site previously 
occupied by the Dutch central intelligence service (the CRI) . The 
EDU's offices were eventually opened on 16th February 1994 by the 
Dutch Minister of Justice Mr Ernst Hirsch Ballin, whose inaugural 
speech included reference to the future establishment of a 
European Law Enforcement Network in the longer term, and common 
investigation teams in the short term (Statewatch Vol 4 No 2 
1994: 5). 
5 .3: THE STRUCTURE OF EUROPOL 
5 .3 .1: THE MANAGBMENT BOARD 
Distinct from the Management Team is the Management Board of 
Europol, which will only come into existence once the Convention 
has been ratified and Europol proper starts operating. It will 
consist of one representative from the Interior Ministry of each 
member state. The Board will be chaired by the country currently 
holding the EU presidency and its main responsibilities, in 
conjunction with the Director, will be the drawing up of a three 
year work program for Europol, and a twice annual report for the 
K4 Committee and the Council of Justice and Interior Ministers. 
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The Board will be obliged to meet twice a year and the European 
Commission will only be allowed to attend these meetings as an 
observer. At present the Europol Working Group carries out the 
functions of the future Europol Management Board. 
5.3.2: LIAISON OFFICERS AND NATIONAL UNITS 
The Ministerial Agreement requires each member state to 
designate at least one agency that will act as the national unit 
for that state. The designated national unit is the only conduit 
for the dissemination or reception of information to and/or from 
the EDU/Europol. To date only in the UK has a single function 
national unit been established, with other departments of law 
enforcement agencies in other member states being adapted to 
fulfil the role of national unit. At present the developmental 
status of the various national units varies from country to 
country, and its characteristics differ with regard to: 
a) whether the department concerned is operational or not; 
b) the assignment of liaison officers; 
c) the development status of the database; 
d) regional and local coordination; 
e) whether the Interpol NCBs (National Central Bureaux) are part 
of the department or not (ENFOPOL 58: 4). 
An analysis of these and other differences and similarities 
will be presented in the various case studies. For the present 
however, the general purpose of the various national units is to 
collect, assess, collate, analyze, develop and circulate 
intelligence and information of regional, national and 
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international interest concerning crimes and criminals, so as to 
assist with the coordination of operational activities. 
The objectives assigned to the national units are consequently 
intended to: 
a) Combine at national level intelligence gathering operations, 
data analysis reports etc which today are fragmented or 
scattered; 
b) Create a common national database together with all law 
enforcement agencies and departments involved in combatting 
drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime and/or 
enable effective use of existing databases; 
c) Facilitate the operational activity of the investigation 
agencies and departments by providing them with up to date 
intelligence; 
d) Establish a national central contact for the exchange and 
sharing of information at an international level (ENFOPOL 58 
p. 3) • 
The national unit of each member state is allowed to allocate 
at least one liaison officer to the EDU/Europol, with the 
Management Board deciding by unanimous decision the number of 
liaison officers allowed to each member state. It is the 
responsibility of each liaison officer to represent the interests 
of his or her respective national unit within Europol, and in 
doing this they are subject to the national law of the seconding 
state. Under these provisions therefore, the liaison officers, 
in the current EDU phase, are all under secondment. Jurgen 
Storbeck, as the Coordinator/Director of the EDU currently has 
no formal authority over the ELOs, and the flow of information 
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is officially strictly on a bilateral basis, vertically between 
liaison officer and national unit, or horizontally between 
liaison officers. 
The principal duties of the liaison officers or European 
Liaison Officers (ELOs) as they are officially known are: 
a) to provide Europol with information and intelligence from the 
seconding unit; 
b) forwarding information from Europol to the seconding national 
unit; 
c) the provision of information and advice in the analysis of 
information concerning the seconding state. 
In addition to these main duties, the terms of reference of the 
ELOs has been expanded to encompass a system of clustering 
whereby groups of ELOs are tasked to work together on various 
aspects of Europol's remit. The EDU's official response to the 
system of clustering has been in the past that it is merely an 
informal ad hoc meeting of ELOs with similar interests. When 
asked about this initiative Mr Valls Russell's (one of Europol's 
Assistant Coordinators) response was as follows: "there's no 
formal clustering in that sense. I think there are two aspects. 
One is, in taking some subjects it's been more on the basis of 
volunteers. If we're going to study stolen vehicles, we say, 
let's get in 2 or 3 ELOs with an interest from different 
countries, as you don't want 15 people round a table as a sub 
group. We just get a small group of people to take an interest. 
But it is not a formal thing. So it is not that France has been 
designated to be the king of the nuclear or something like that, 
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although that might be appropriate just now." (Valls Russell 
1995: ) 
Internal documentation however reveals that this is an official 
initiative by the organization itself. Appendix B3 of the 
EDU/Europol Intelligence Business Plan states that "In relation 
to gathering more expertise it is not only for the individual 
ELOs but also for the EDU as a whole and each National Bureau 
(NCIS) will profit from the various specializations of the ELOs" 
(p.14). Each team of specialists is lead by a coordinator who is 
selected by the team, the process of which is overseen by Colonel 
Bruggeman (Deputy Coordinator/Director). Each group coordinator 
is responsible for one specific speciality although they can 
participate in other teams as members. Each coordinator is 
required to present a working program (with time schedule) to 
Colonel Bruggeman. 
Some of the criteria involved in allocating ELOs to specific 
clusters include: 
a) The individual know how (special skills, personal experience 
etc) of the relevant ELO; 
b) The crime situation in the sending state; 
c) Crime risk (prognoses); 
d) Number of ELOs per member state. 
Some of the selected areas of cluster responsibilities are as 
follows: 
A) External Threat (outside EU) Geographical Approach: 
i) Traffic by sea 
ii) Traffic by air 
iii) Balkan route 
iv) Eastern Europe 
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v) South American routes and Colombian cartels (cocaine) 
vi) Far East, Middle East and South East 
B) Internal European Thematic Drugs and Money Laundering Related 
Criminal Activities (product oriented, geographical or 
criminal organizational oriented approach) : 
i) Precursors/essential chemicals 
ii) Money laundering 
iii) Cannabis 
iv) Cocaine 
v) Heroin 
vi) Synthetic drugs 
vii) Hells Angels (involved in mobile criminality) 
viii) Internal EU drug routes 
ix) Chinese groups 
x) Turkish groups 
xi) African groups (eg Nigerian groups) . 
C) Specific Police Relevant Items: 
i) Witness protection 
ii) Calculations concerning the relation of drugs being seized 
world wide per year by drug enforcement agencies to the 
amount available on the illicit market 
iii) Undercover operations 
iv) Prices of drugs in the EU on the free market 
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D) Legal and Tactical Problems 
i) Competencies of law enforcement agencies 
ii} Methodology and working practices in both the fields of 
intelligence and operational activities 
iii) Effectiveness of intelligence recourses plus 
recommendations for improvement 
iv) Other points of the planned general situation report. 
E) Internal EDU Organization Related Items 
i) Coordination of training 
ii) Management of documentation and general information 
iii) File management 
iv) Intelligence 
v) Crime analysis 
For each of the above listed categories the ELOs concerned are 
required to perform the following EU-internal police related 
duties: 
a) Study, summarize and update themselves on the area of special 
responsibility; 
b) Know exactly who and what other organizations are currently 
active in that area of responsibility; 
c) Make an inventory of police project teams, special units or 
special groups of activities for that purpose in the member 
states; 
d) Study national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives (eg 
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium are setting up anti drugs 
tourism strategies) ; 
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e) Participate at relevant meetings (by an ELO of the member 
state where the meeting is located, or by one for that item 
specialized ELO, or by a member of the directory board); 
f) The gathered information on each relevant item (continuously 
updating of the list and the content is necessary) must be of 
direct use to study and to solve internal EU problems. 
(ENFOPOL 58: 14-18) 
It is uncertain, given the detailed development of ELO 
clustering, why members of the EDU management interviewed in the 
past have felt constrained to describe the process as nothing 
more than a loose talking shop for ELOs with similar interests. 
There are however two speculative reasons why this may be so. The 
first centres around the original constraints against the 
EDU/Europol having any form of operational capacity. It may have 
been feared that clusters coordinating intelligence with respect 
to specific groups (Chinese, Turkish, Nigerian), undercover 
operations, drug routes etc may cross the line between 
intelligence gathering/disseminating and coordinating operations. 
In light of Europol' s increasing role as a coordinator of 
transnational operations, this constraint is now no longer valid. 
Secondly, in its EDU phase, the organization is specifically 
prohibited from holding personal information centrally. However 
it may be feared that the pooling of personal data within ELO 
clusters may be construed as infringing this restriction. 
Nevertheless, the existence and practice of ELO clustering, or 
project based work as it is more popularly termed, has been 
readily referred to and explained by ELOs throughout the 
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research, despite the reluctance of members of management to 
acknowledge its existence. In fact it has become a cornerstone 
of Buropol's intelligence procedure, and is steadily increasing 
in importance as the organisation's remit grows. 
5 .3 .3: WORKING LANGUAGES 
In its current BDU phase, the organization has no official 
language. Inasmuch as the BDU has been described as a clearing 
house for the bilateral exchange of information (Valls Russell 
1995), each ELO uses his/her native tongue when communicating 
with his/her national unit. When communicating with each other, 
the appropriate common language is used in each particular 
situation. Inevitably this is usually English but could just as 
easily be Dutch or French. 
The designated working languages for Europol proper however 
are: English, French and German. This has been a source of 
controversy with the Spanish, during the deliberations leading 
up to the signing of the Convention, entering a reservation on 
Spanish being excluded from the internal working languages. While 
there has been no official complaints from the Dutch, there must 
also be a question mark over Dutch being excluded as a working 
language given that Europol is based in the Netherlands. It would 
have been unthinkable for French not to have been included as one 
of Interpol's working languages, given that it is based in Lyon, 
and the same consideration should surely be applicable to 
Europol. 
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Finally the French have, in the past, also entered a 
reservation on English being the sole language used in the 
storage of data and for information requests. 
5.3.4: BUDGET AND FINANCING 
The EDU/Europol is financed by contributions from member states 
based on the gross national product of each state for the year 
preceding the one in which the budget is drawn up, as well as any 
other revenue accruing to the organization. The Coordinator / 
Director is obliged to draw up a draft budget by the 31st March 
each year, and to submit it first to the Europol Finance 
Committee, which consists of one budgetary representative from 
each state, and then to the Management Board for approval. For 
its part, the Management Board requires a majority of two-thirds 
for the draft budget to be recommended. Once approved, it is then 
forwarded to the Council which also requires a two-thirds 
majority for the budget to be finally approved. The EDU's first 
budget for 1995 was 3.7 million Ecus. 
It is also the duty of the Coordinator/Director to submit a 
report on the EDU's annual accounts by 31st May of the following 
year at the latest for an audit, which it is planned will be 
performed free of charge by the Court of Auditors of the European 
Communities. 
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5.3.5: OBJECTIVES AND TASKS 
As laid out in the draft Convention the objectives of the 
EDU/Europol are to help improve the effectiveness of the member 
states in preventing and combatting terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and organized crime where there is evidence that two 
or more member states are affected, and where the scale of the 
offence is sufficient to warrant a common approach. In addition 
to this, the EDU's Business Plan states the following: 
A) Mission Statement: To make a significant contribution to the 
EU's law enforcement action in: 
i) combatting serious crime and 
ii) dismantling international criminal organizations. 
B) Business Plan Objectives (1): To become the leading EU law 
enforcement centre by: 
i) achieving the most effective law enforcement cooperation; 
ii) being the focal point for information and intelligence 
exchange; 
iii) being the lead agency for crime analysis and intelligence 
analysis; 
iv) being the centre of excellence for law enforcement 
practices; 
v) being the centre of research and development of new law 
enforcement competencies and methodologies. 
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C) Business Plan Objectives (2): To achieve and maintain a 
dynamic common European spirit and a climate in which 
personnel are: 
i) well informed; 
ii) motivated; 
iii) responsible; 
iv) know that they are valued. 
D) Business Plan Objectives (3) 
i) to maximize value for money; 
ii) to make the best use of available resources. 
(Valls Russell presentation to the Bramshill police Staff College 
6th February 1995) . 
Article 3 of the Convention lists the organization's primary 
tasks as follows: 
A) To facilitate the exchange of information between the member 
states; 
B) To collect, collate and analyze information between the member 
states; 
C) To notify the competent authorities of the member states 
without delay via the respective national units of information 
concerning them and of connections between criminal offences 
detected; 
D} To support national investigations by forwarding all relevant 
information to the national units; 
E) To maintain computerized collections of information; 
F) To develop expertise in the investigative procedures of the 
competent authorities in the member states and to provide 
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advice on investigations; 
G) To provide strategic intelligence to assist and promote 
efficient and effective use of national operational resources; 
H) To prepare general situation reports. 
Finally within the constraints of staffing and budgetary 
limitations, the EDU/Europol may also assist member states 
through advice and research in the following areas: training; 
organization and equipment; crime prevention methods; technical 
and forensic police methods and investigative procedures. 
5.3.6: THE EDU/EUROPOL'S REMIT 
As it's name implies, the primary remit of the Europol Drugs 
Unit is the combatting of drug trafficking and related money 
laundering activities. Because of the close relationship that 
generally exists between drug trafficking and organized crime, 
the latter has also been tacked on to the organization's remit 
despite the fact that no definition of organized crime is given 
in the Convention. 
The vagueness of this term is emphasized by Tony Bunyan in 
Statewatch's publication on the Europol Convention: "The UK Home 
Office said in evidence to the House of Lords inquiry that: as 
in other European countries, our knowledge of the nature and 
scale of organized crime ....... is at present largely descriptive. 
Criminal statistics in the UK, like in a number of other EU 
countries, are collected by offence and as there is no offence 
of committing an act of organized criminal activity ... it is not 
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possible to identify amongst recorded offences those which result 
from organized crime. What appears to be happening is that 
recorded crimes are being re-assigned to this category on an ad 
hoc basis by EU police forces" (The Europol Convention, 
Statewatch 1995: 1-2). 
At the Essen European Council summit in December 1994, the 
failure to ratify the Europol Convention was compensated for by 
the inclusion of the following offences in the EDU's remit: the 
prevention and combatting of crime connected with nuclear and 
radioactive substances; illegal immigration smuggling; motor 
vehicle crime (in particular trafficking to other states and 
theft of goods in transit), and once again illegal money 
laundering activities connected with these forms of crime. 
Following protracted lobbying by Spain it was also decided that 
terrorism would be included, but only two years after the 
complete ratification of the Convention by all 15 member states. 
In the face of opposition from some member states, particularly 
the UK, Spain had long insisted that terrorism should be included 
in Europol' s remit. How, asked Spain, could car crime be included 
while terrorism was excluded? Britain for its part has rigorously 
objected to the inclusion of terrorism in the EDU's remit. In 
evidence given to a House of Lords Select Committee on Europol, 
Mr Peter Wrench, head of the Home Office's F3 Division (Police 
Department), outlined the government's thinking in wanting 
terrorism excluded. Firstly in response to a question by Lord 
Slynn of Hadley on why terrorist offences were excluded he 
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replied:" Certainly the United Kingdom's approach in negotiating 
this Article has been firstly to concentrate on having a clear 
and effective way of expanding Europol's remit progressively so 
that we do not give it too much to do from day one so that it is 
overwhelmed, but we build up from the initial concentration on 
drugs and associated money laundering that the Europol Drugs Unit 
has started with. Terrorism raises particular problems, because 
Member States tend to have very specific domestic arrangements 
for dealing with it, that are not necessarily plugged into the 
same communication networks that deal with the other matters of 
drugs and organized crime that will be the initial focus. Europol 
will be essentially a police and customs organisation and, 
certainly looking at the way we are structured in the United 
Kingdom, dealing with terrorism in those sort of channels is by 
no means straight forward, so we have argued strongly that 
terrorism should not be one of the initial tasks of Europol" 
(House of Lords Minutes of Evidence 1994: 11-12). 
Then in response to further probing by Viscount Colville of 
Culross as to why the transnational cooperation in fighting 
terrorism in the past could not be applied to Europol, he 
elaborated: "There are two points to that. Firstly, as you said, 
the communication between European agencies on terrorism is 
already very good and that is one of the reasons why we are 
saying it is not an initial priority for Europol. We have got the 
mechanisms there in place and they are working well, so why 
disturb them by making it an initial task of Europol. We have got 
the structure in the Convention that, having started on those 
activities described in the first sentence of Article 2 (2) I there 
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is then the mechanism described in the rest of that paragraph for 
the Council to decide to focus Europol's attention on the other 
forms of crime that are listed in the annexe to the Convention 
and, as you will see, the first on the list in that annexe is 
indeed terrorism, so the capacity is there for the Council to 
decide subsequently that either terrorism or specific 
manifestations of it should be assigned to Europol" (House of 
Lords Minutes of Evidence 1994: 12-13). 
The inclusion of terrorism therefore represents a compromise 
between the concerns of Spain and the UK. On the one hand it 
opens the way for the organisation to deal with terrorism, but 
on the other, by bringing in this provision two years after 
complete ratification, it has effectively postponed this, 
possibly for several years. 
Finally Europol's remit was again extended in a Joint Action 
that was formally adopted by the General Affairs Council on 24 
February 1997 to include, the international trafficking in human 
beings, and the sexual exploitation of children (Statewatch Vol 
7 No 2 1997: 3). In the intervening year since the EDU's remit 
was first expanded at the Essen summit, the organisation has been 
formulating procedures by which it may begin carrying out its 
responsibilities in the new areas of motor crime, illegal 
immigration networks, nuclear crime, and now international 
prostitution and paedophilia. The UK contingent of the Management 
Team has in the past taken the sceptical view that the extension 
of Europol's remit is nothing more than a convenient political 
tool. Where a clear criminal threat exists, it is politically 
expedient to be able to say: "we recognise the threat and we have 
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passed it on to Europol," irrespecti ve of the fact that the 
organisation hasn't to date been given adequate resources or 
powers with which to deal with the added responsibilities" (Valls 
Russell 1995) . 
There has also been concern over the fact that the EDU's role 
can be drastically extended at a stroke without any reference to 
the European Parliament or national parliaments; a move which 
Jurgen Storbeck, in a talk given in Bonn in early December 1994, 
described as, "a legally and politically relatively simple 
extension of the Ministerial Agreement" (The Europol Convention, 
Statewatch 1995: 4). 
The Convention also provides scope for substantial further 
extensions. Article 43.3 states: 
However, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union, may decide, on the initiative of a Member State and after 
the Management Board has discussed the matter, to 
amplify, amend, or supplement the definitions of forms of crime 
contained in the Annex. It may in addition decide to introduce 
new definitions of the forms of crime listed in the Annex. 
The Annex to the Convention lists these additional crimes as 
being: 
A) Against life, limb or personal freedom: 
- murder 
- grievous bodily harm 
- illicit trade in human organs and tissue 
106) 
- kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage taking 
- racism and xenophobia 
B) Against property or public goods including fraud: 
- organised robbery 
illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques 
and works of art 
- swindling and fraud 
- racketeering and extortion 
counterfeiting and product piracy 
- forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein 
- forgery of money and means of payment 
- computer crime 
- corruption 
C) Illegal trading and harm to the environment 
- illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition and explosives 
illicit trafficking in endangered animal species 
- illicit trafficking in endangered plant species and varieties 
- environmental crime 
illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth 
promoters. 
Furthermore, Statewatch highlights the sheer breadth of 
offences that Europol can one day be empowered to deal with: 
"If the forms of crime to be tackled are, in the main, obvious 
ones it is the breadth of "suspicion" allowed which must be a 
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cause for concern. It empowers Europol to gather, hold and 
distribute intelligence on what Article 3.2 defines as "related 
criminal offences": 
- criminal offences committed in order to procure the means for 
perpetrating acts within the sphere of competence of Europol: 
- criminal offences committed in order to facilitate or carry 
out acts within the sphere of competence of Europol; 
- criminal offences committed to ensure the impunity [to exempt 
from punishment] of acts within the sphere of competence of 
Europol. 
Whether or not a crime can be defined as a "related criminal 
offence" will depend on the varying definitions of the different 
police forces. For example, the UK could include conspiracy 
charges where there only has to be a belief that a person has 
conspired with persons unknown. The breadth of each "crime" is 
further extended in later Articles (Arts. 8 and 10)" (The Europol 
Convention, Statewatch 1995: 5-6). 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the inclusion of such a 
range of offences is a further means of political expediency (in 
that areas of threat can be conveniently passed across to 
Europol), or a means of delineating a list of future 
transnational 'European' crimes, that a future operational 
Europol will be responsible for. The recent development of common 
European definitions for racist offences and organised crime 
suggests that this may be the case. What is certain is that the 
option of Europol moving into even some of the areas listed in 
the Annex would require a far greater investment in resources 
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than is now apparent. The juxtaposition of these grandiose ideas 
with the current reality of the Coordinator having to publicly 
call for greater resources, shows the need for Europol to be 
properly funded, resourced and empowered before any further 
incremental responsibilities are added to its remit. 
5.4: ACCOUNTABILITY 
5.4.1: CURRENT SITUATION 
The Coordinator/Director is directly accountable firstly to the 
Europol Working Group, then to the K4 Committee, and ultimately 
to the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA). In reality there 
is currently a multifaceted system of accountability in that each 
ELO is accountable to his or her own national unit and ultimately 
to the Interior Ministry. Since its inception, there has been 
considerable controversy over the perceived lack of 
accountability and transparency of Europol. There has been little 
or no public debate or information about the organisation, and 
the British public generally know nothing of its existence. This 
stands in direct contrast to the highly politicised levels of 
debate on police accountability generally during the 1980s. Lord 
Morris, during a House of Lords debate on Europol quite aptly 
noted that, "I suspect that the average British citizen, if 
asked, "What is Europol?" would probably tell us that Europol is 
some kind of French parrot!" (House of Lords Select Committee 
Minutes 1993: 1352) 
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Europol has been conceived, debated, initiated and developed 
in some secrecy. The organisation has in the past been restricted 
from disseminating any information about itself, even when that 
information may be acquired elsewhere, and members of staff have 
in the past been in the ludicrous position of having to await 
Statewatch publications and Internet files to acquire information 
re the EDU's development. Paradoxically, the organisation is, in 
one sense, happy with the prevailing level of secrecy, as they 
see it as an advantage in combatting organised crime. The less 
that is generally known about the organisation's existence, the 
better the surprise factor in acquiring strategic intelligence 
and turning it into tactically viable operations. 
5 .4 .2: TIlE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
As early as 1992, the Belgian Member of the European Parliament 
(MEP) and rapporteur, L. van Outrive, in a motion for a 
resolution on the setting up of Europol called for, "The European 
Parliament and national parliaments to be intensively involved 
in deciding the objectives, powers and instruments of Europol and 
of the European Information System." (European Parliament 
Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs 
on the setting up of Europol, 26 November 1992: 6) Unfortunately 
the EP has been denied any substantial role or powers in 
monitoring the EDU/Europol. 
Early drafts of the Convention gave the EP the right to be 
informed of Europol's activities via the President of the (JHA) 
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Council, who is in turn obliged to forward an annual report to 
the EP. The EP, for its part, had the prerogative to raise 
questions and to express its opinion, and the Director (of 
Europol) in turn was obliged to make a statement within one month 
to the Presidency of the Council on questions by the EP to the 
Council regarding Europol's work. 
These minimalist provisions ensured that the EP, as the only 
directly elected European body, was effectively excluded from 
exerting any control over Europol. This fact was emphasized in 
the Memorandum by Liberty (The National Council For Civil 
Liberties) to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities: "We would only note that the provisions in Article 
31 for keeping the European Parliament informed represent the 
bare minimum that the Council could offer without being in 
breach of its obligations under Article K.6 of the Treaty on 
European Union; such indeed was the advice given by the 
Council's Legal Service in 1993. Despite that, press reports 
have indicated that attempts were made in the latest 
negotiations to erode even this nominal involvement. As an 
indication of the scant regard paid to the views already 
expressed by the European Parliament, few of the 26 
recommendations made in the 1992 report on the subject were 
incorporated into the draft Convention. Since Article K.6 TEU 
makes no mention of consulting national parliaments, they are 
simply assured in Article 31(6) of the draft that the rights 
of the European Parliament are without prejudice to the rights 
of national parliaments. This is clearly grossly 
unsatisfactory, since no elected body will have effective power 
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to control Europol. The Home Office suggestion of an annual 
report would in our opinion be quite inadequate." (Liberty 
1995: 14-15) 
Despite these nominal provisions, Liberty's suspicion of 
attempts to further erode the involvement of the EP proved to be 
well founded. The Convention that was eventually signed in 1995 
merely requires the Council Presidency to forward to the EP each 
year, a special report on the work of Europol. The right of the 
EP to be consulted is now limited to any future amendments to the 
Convention. In terms of accountability therefore, the EP is 
obliged to fall back on the provisions of Article K.6 of the TEU. 
Inasmuch as this article was effectively ignored during the 
negotiation stages of the Convention (with the EP not being 
consulted but merely sent a copy of the drafts for its view - The 
Europol Convention, Statewatch 1995: 9) and in light of a general 
failure to adopt most of the EP's recommendations, it is unlikely 
that the TEU on its own will rectify the accountability deficit 
that exists with Europol. 
5 .4 .3: ACCOUNTABILITY AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
The Europol Convention will enter into force 3 months after 
being completely ratified by all 15 member states. While it is 
expected that the remaining 14 states will ratify by the end of 
1998, ultimately the only choice facing national parliaments will 
be either to ratify or not to ratify. They will have no power to 
amend it in any way. 
112) 
As for the UK, it was the first state to ratify the Convention. 
The reason for this dispatch however was that there was very 
little parliamentary debate on the issue. This lack of 
parliamentary scrutiny was foretold by Tony Bunyan, the editor 
of Statewatch who stated: 
"Under the archaic "Ponsonby rules" the Convention will be 
"laid" before Parliament by listing it in the daily Order Paper 
and if no MP objects it can be formally ratified by the UK state 
21 days later. Arthur Ponsonby, an Under - Secretary of State at 
the Foreign Office in the Labour Government of 1924 gave an 
undertaking during the second reading of the Treaty of Peace 
(Turkey) Bill on 1st April 1924, that the House of Commons would 
in future be informed of all treaties and agreements and that 
they would be "laid" before the House for 21 days. This minor 
concession to parliamentary accountability - in an area where the 
government exercises the royal prerogative on behalf of the 
monarch - remains the constitutional position to this day. Most 
other national legislatures have written constitutions giving 
parliaments formal powers to ratify treaties and agreements. 
Parliament will only discuss the issue if enough MPs are able to 
get a debate inserted in the agreed parliamentary timetables of 
the front benches." (The Europol Convention, Statewatch 1995: 2) 
This lack of parliamentary accountability is further 
exacerbated by the fact that whereas Article K.6 TEU at least 
gives the European Parliament the right to be consulted, no 
mention is made of this right being applicable to national 
parliaments. Parliamentary accountability is therefore left to 
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the constitutional requirements (or lack thereof) of each 
individual state. 
In keeping with Tony Bunyan's prediction, the UK was the first 
state to ratify the Convention in December 1996 (Statewatch Vol 
6 No 6 1996: 16-17). While this has been held up by the Home 
Office as an example of the UK's 'good European' credentials, it 
is in reality only vindication of the relative lack of 
accountability of the British parliamentary system. 
5 .4 .4: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
Throughout the deliberations and negotiations for the signing 
of the Europol Convention, it has been the adamant view of all 
member states, with the exception of the UK, that the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) should have a prominent role in 
interpreting the Convention. The UK, for its part, has favoured 
the collective responsibility of national parliaments, a 
dedicated arbitral tribunal for dealing with grievances against 
Europol and the Joint Supervisory Body (dealt with in the section 
on data protection) . 
The true reasoning behind this opposition has been the UK's 
determination to keep all organizations and processes under Title 
VI of the Maastricht Treaty completely intergovernmental. 
Consequently it has campaigned to squeeze out all Conununity 
institutions with supranational qualities and characteristics. 
The European Commission has been granted observer status only, 
the role of the European Parliament, as mentioned earlier has 
been emasculated, and ECJ involvement has been successfully 
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hampered until a compromise was reached allowing the UK to 
effectively opt out of ECJ jurisdiction. Under this compromise, 
"any member state can make a declaration to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Europol 
Convention," (Statewatch Vol 6 No 4 1996: 21-22) thereby leaving 
the UK free to avoid usage of the ECJ. 
This point was emphasized by a top Home Office official, who 
in highlighting the UK's obj ection to involvement by another 
Community institution, this time the Court of Auditors stated: 
"The United Kingdom favours the second option (i.e the setting 
up of a special joint committee to carry out auditing functions) 
really on the same general basis of not wanting to import a role 
for a Community institution into Title VI activity unless there 
is particular reason for doing so." (Evidence taken before the 
Select Committee on the European Communities, 23 November 1994: 
36) 
As with the Court of Auditors, the UK put forward what it 
called other options, and what the other member states referred 
to as ploys to exclude the ECJ. These included the granting of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg the 
responsibility for deciding disputes and the use of Article 182 
of the Treaty of Rome 1957 likewise for the solving of disputes. 
Both options were rejected for varying legal reasons. 
In response to British intransigence, and despite the signing 
of the Convention, several states such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany indicated that the Convention 
would not be laid before their respective parliaments for 
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ratification until such time as the outstanding issue of the 
ECJ's role was resolved. Eventually a compromise was reached 
whereby each state was allowed the right to decide whether or not 
to use the ECJ. This was in effect a fudge that allowed the UK 
to retain its opt out, but which leaves unanswered the arbitral 
procedure for cases that involves disputes between the UK and 
other member states, or UK and Europol. 
5 .4 .5: THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT 
Article 37 of the Convention lays down the requirement for a 
Headquarters Agreement to be signed between the EDUjEuropol and 
the Netherlands which will cover the accommodation and facilities 
to be provided for Europol in the Netherlands. The Headquarters 
Agreement will require the unanimous approval of the Management 
Board and although negotiations are currently nearing a 
conclusion, to date the agreement has still not been signed. 
One aspect that has now entered the negotiating equation is the 
perceived need for the organisation as well as the liaison 
officers to be afforded diplomatic status. This has arisen 
because of the differential in status between the ELOS and the 
DLOs who are attached to their home embassies in the country in 
which they are posted, and all have First Secretary status. This 
has the twofold advantage of giving the DLOs immunity from 
prosecution as well as added authority when requesting the 
allocation of resources. 
5.5: DATA PROTECTION 
5.5.1: CURRENT SITUATION 
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At present I because the EDU is not allowed to own central 
databases or to hold personal data, as with accountability, there 
is a multifaceted system of data protection. In essence, the data 
protection legislation and provisions of each member state 
applies to their respective liaison officers. Because the EDU 
management describes the organisation as nothing more than a 
clearing house for bilateral cooperation, these arrangements have 
been adequate for the first few years of the EDU's existence. 
However the Convention lays down very specific data protection 
provisions and since its signing, the EDU has been engaged in 
preparatory measures in anticipation of the future ratification 
of the Convention when its data protection measures will take 
effect. In the interim however, the EDU is once again having to 
operate in an ad hoc manner. 
5.5.2: THE JOINT SUPERVISORY BOARD 
The Joint Supervisory Board (JSB) will be an independent body 
consisting of no more than 2 representatives of each national 
supervisory body (in the case of the UK, the Data Protection 
Agency) who will be responsible for ensuring that the processing 
of personal data by Europol does not infringe upon the rights of 
the subject. It will also be tasked with supervising the 
retrieval of data by liaison officers and the general supervision 
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of the operation of Europol with regard to the processing of data 
so as to ensure that the provisions of the Convention are 
complied with. 
For its part, Europol will be obliged to assist the JSB in 
carrying out its remit and in accordance with this it must if 
requested: 
a) supply the information that the JSB requests; 
b) give it access to all documents and paper files as well as 
access to the data stored in the system; 
c) allow it free access at any time to all of Europol's 
premises; 
d) carry out the JSB's decisions on appeals. 
The JSB will have the right to make complaints to the Director 
of Europol on any violations it detects of the Convention's data 
protection provisions, and the Director, on receipt of a 
complaint, must both reply within a time limit decided by the 
JSB, and keep the Management Board fully informed of the entire 
process. 
The JSB will however be substantially limited in its power to 
effectively control Europol in terms of data protection. While 
the Director will be obliged to answer complaints against the 
organisation, the JSB will have no power of enforcement. It will 
not be able to order Europol to correct its files or ensure non-
violation of the Convention's provisions. Nor will it be able to 
place restrictions on the transfer of data to third states or 
third bodies (The Europol Convention, Statewatch 1995: 8). 
Finally the JSB will be required to draft regular activity 
118) 
reports. While the Management Board will be entitled to give an 
opinion, the decision as to whether or not to publish these 
activity reports will reside with the JSB. The JSB will also be 
entitled to be consulted on the part of the Europol budget which 
affects it, and its opinion must be annexed to the relevant draft 
budget. 
5.5.3: NATIONAL SUPERVISORY BODIES 
Each member state is required by the Convention to designate 
a national supervisory body whose task it is to monitor, 
independently and in accordance with its respective national law, 
the permissibility of input and retrieval of data and any other 
communication of personal data to Europol by the member state 
concerned, and to examine whether this violates the rights of the 
data subject. This supervisory body will have access via the 
national central unit (eg NCIS) to the data bank of the (Europol) 
information system for this purpose. In this respect, the 
national supervisory body also supervises the activities of its 
respective liaison officers, and for this purpose will have 
access to the offices and documents of the respective liaison 
officers. 
Each individual has the right to request his/her respective 
national supervisory body to examine the permissibility of input 
of data into the information system and of any other 
communication of his personal data to Europol, as well as the 
retrieval of data by the member state concerned. This right must 
be exercised in accordance with the national law of the member 
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state to the national supervisory body of which the request is 
made. The national supervisory body is obliged to inform the 
person making the request in general terms of his right to appeal 
to further supervisory bodies. 
5.5.4: INFORMATION EXCHANGE TECHNIQUE 
The EDU/Europol's information exchange system is based on the 
following network: 
a) ELOs in the Hague (working places linked in a LAN) ; 
b) External mail facility through the server; 
c) Access control/encryption and modem equipment; 
d) public telephone network; 
e) member state access control/encryption and modem equipment; 
f) national mail working station within the NCIS. 
(Valls Russel Presentation, 6 February 1995) 
5.5.5: EUROPOL'S DATA SYSTEM 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention stipulate Europol's 
requirement to establish and maintain a computerised information 
system into which member states and Europol can directly input 
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and from which they directly extract data. The system will 
consist of 3 tiers, these being: 
a} An information system which will contain data put in by each 
national unit and their ELOs, and accessible to the ELOs and 
Europol's staff; 
b) A system of work files which contain the product of analysis 
carried out by Europol which can be disseminated in the form 
of intelligence packages; 
c) An index system which will allow an enquiring party to 
ascertain whether or not an item of information is stored, 
and what files are of concern to him/her. The enquirer will 
not however be able to determine from the index, connections 
or any further conclusions. 
Under the Convention, Europol's computerised system is 
prohibited from being linked to any other computerised system 
other than the automated processing systems of the various 
national units, although there are already moves to remove this 
restriction, and link the system, when it comes on line, to the 
Schengen Information System, Interpol, and the World Customs 
Organisation. 
Access to the second tier of work or analysis files is to be 
restricted, and it was on the thorny issue of access to this tier 
that the Convention was prevented from being signed at least a 
year earlier than it was. France, in opposition to virtually 
every other member state, wanted national units to have ready 
access to both tiers of data including the contents of analysis 
files. This point was spearheaded by the then French Interior 
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Minister Charles Pasqua, who held up the signing of the 
Convention for several months on this point. In connection with 
these demands 'The European' quoted one source as saying, "If 
France gets its way, Europol files would be circulated in more 
than a dozen countries. That invites trouble through tip offs to 
criminals or simply through careless talk. It is an elementary 
rule of police work that when you are planning a 'bust' which 
could put officers' lives at risk, nobody - not even a senior 
officer - is told anything except on a need to know basis." (The 
European, 'France In Isolation On Europol' 28 October 3 
November 1994) 
In any event France did not get its way and the work files tier 
of the Europol computer system will remain restricted in 
accordance both with the historical complaint about Interpol's 
lack of security, and the EDU's stated wish, in the interests of 
operational efficiency, to remain as secret as possible. 
5.6: THE BDU I S TRACK RECORD 
5. 6 . 1: USE MADE OF THE BDU TO DATE 
Despite a slow start, the EDU was increasingly used by national 
units of the EU during its first year (1994). The number of 
requests for information rose from 146 in the first half of 1994 
to 449 in the second, totalling 595 requests for the year. An 
example of the number of requests made by certain states in the 
first half of the year as opposed to the second are as follows: 
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- Germany was up from 16 to 104 
- Belgium from 5 to 103 
- France from 49 to 66 
- the UK from 3 to 62 
- Portugal from 3 to 22. 
These figures increased dramatically in 1995 with the EDU 
processing 660 requests in the first six months of that year 
alone. (Statewatch, The Europol Convention 1995: 4) 
5.6.2: OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES 
Apart from the routine processing of requests, and information 
exchange, Buropol fairly quickly moved into the coordination of 
operations and investigations across Europe. Because it houses 
liaison officers from all 15 EU states under one roof, it was 
ideally placed to develop into a facilitator of transnational 
operations and investigations that involved more than 2 member 
states. It therefore became an ideal central meeting point for 
police officers and investigators from across the EU. 
By the end of 1995, the BDU had coordinated approximately 44 
operations across Burope which included several controlled 
deliveries of drug consignments. The Director/Coordinator of the 
BDU, Jurgen Storbeck, believes that the organisation can 
effectively fill a vacuum in the fight against international 
gangs, which runs rings around national police forces whose 
powers stop at their territorial borders. Bxamples of the EDU's 
operational successes are as follows: 
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1) In a typical case, German customs officials called the EDU 
after they found 100 kg (220 pounds) of marijuana stashed in a 
lorry crossing from the Czech Republic to France and the 
Netherlands. The driver did not know he had been discovered, but 
the German police could delay him for only two hours before his 
suspicions would have been aroused. Within that time, the EDU was 
able to win permission from German authorities for the drugs to 
be brought into the country, and it lined up eight surveillance 
teams from three different countries to trail the lorry to its 
destination. 
2) Belgian police were conducting observations on a drugs 
laboratory and were on the point of raiding it when they noticed 
a car with Italian number plates in the vicinity. Checks on the 
conventional databases in Italy, Belgium and Interpol revealed 
nothing. However, still harbouring suspicions, the Belgian 
officers, as a last resort, asked the EDU for assistance. A rapid 
conference was organised by the Belgian ELO and his counterparts 
at the EDU in the Hague. As the Belgian police were constrained 
to raid the laboratory within two to three hours, speed was of 
the essence. Within an hour a German ELO was able to reveal that 
the car was connected to an Italian mafia gang in Munich. Armed 
with this information the Belgian police were able to hold off 
long enough to make the eventual raid more productive in terms 
of the quality of persons arrested and evidence gathered. 
3) In 2 similar drug surveillance operations, one in Marseilles 
and the other in Denmark, the local police quickly found 
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themselves out of their depths with enquiries streaming off in 
about 5 other member states in both cases. In both instances, the 
ELOs of France and Denmark first called a meeting of the ELOs of 
the countries concerned. This was immediately followed up by a 
meeting of the investigators from the various other countries, 
which was chaired by the ELO of the lead country. Out of these 
meetings came a coordinated plan of action for simultaneous 
operations in all the countries concerned, as well as provisions 
for feedback and follow up meetings. The important aspect of 
these cases however was that it involved not just the respective 
liaison officers of the EDU, but investigators as well which 
further blurred the distinction between intelligence gathering 
and operational intervention. 
4) Finally in another instance, a consignment of drugs was found 
on board a Greek ship in a Greek harbour. As per usual, no member 
of the crew had any knowledge of the consignment, and as it was 
impractical to arrest the entire crew, the Greek national unit 
asked the EDU for assistance. The EDU was able to furnish 
information that 3 members of the crew, apart from having 
previous convictions for drug dealing offences, were of 
particular interest due to their connections with certain 
associations. This information gave the Greek authorities a base 
from which to start their investigations. 
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5.7: CURRENT SITUATION 
To date (March 1998) the member states which have ratified the 
Europol Convention are the UK, Denmark, France, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and Sweden. Germany, Austria and 
Ireland have completed the parliamentary ratification process, 
but have not as yet delivered the ratification instruments to the 
Secretariat General of the Council in Brussels. The remaining 
states, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and Greece have yet to 
complete their parliamentary ratification processes. (Statewatch 
Vol 8 No 1 1998: 21) Inasmuch as there must be a time period of 
three months between the deposition of the ratification 
instruments of the last ratifying state, and the coming into 
being of Europol proper, it now seems unlikely that Europol will 
become operational before the end of 1998. 
However there is the suspicion that the information system will 
not be ready for use when Europol becomes functional. Stage 1 of 
the development, which dealt with the framework of the system, 
has been completed, and stage 2, which deals with the software 
requirements was conducted throughout 1997. A questionnaire was 
disseminated to all the member states in the early part of 1997, 
following which, Europol personnel along with representatives of 
the supplier Unisys, were due to visit each member state in 
summer 1997 to help agree a common framework of user needs. In 
the interim a number of specialised groups were set up including: 
a} Group Europol: which is in charge of the "strategic 
direction" and includes experts from the member states; 
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b) Project Committee: this is headed by the Coordinator/Director 
of Europol and consists of "police and information technology 
experts" from the 15 member states as well as the Commission; 
c) Project units: these consist of a "project coordination" 
unit, a "quality assurance" unit, and a "project support" 
unit; 
d) A series of permanent committees and ad hoc sub groups: these 
cover areas such as data protection, user needs, data 
security, training etc. (Statewatch Vol 6 No 2 1996: 21) 
However at the current pace of developments, it seems highly 
unlikely that the information system will be ready for a 
projected start in late 1998. In fact a report prepared for the 
General Affairs Council on 26-27 February 1996 estimated that the 
Europol computer system would not be ready until mid 1999! This 
has been followed up by a report given by Jurgen Storbeck to the 
European Voice in which he stated that the Europol computer 
system will now not be ready until the year 2000. (Statewatch 
Vol8 Nol 1998: 21) This means that even after ratification, 
Europol may be obliged to continue operating on its current 
bilateral system of information exchange for quite some time. 
Nevertheless it is the area of the macro level that the most 
challenging developments to Europol are taking place. A number 
of proposals emerged from the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, 
as well as subsequent summits which included the following: 
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1) Proposals to incorporate the Schengen Treaty into the Treaty 
on European Union. At present only the UK and Ireland have not 
signed up to the Schengen Treaty, and the proposals suggest that 
as a preliminary move, the Schengen Secretariat should be 
incorporated into the EU Secretariat, and the Schengen decision 
making powers, which do not require national ratification, should 
be co opted into the third pillar. 
Such a development would mean that in addition to a vertical 
intelligence system in the Europol information system, Europol 
would also have access to a horizontal information system in the 
form of the Schengen Information System. 
2) Proposals to incorporate the third pillar into the first. Such 
a move would mean that the supranational institutions of the 
European Union would, for the first time, have a direct input 
into the workings of justice and home affairs. The Commission 
would have the power to initiate legislation or to draft 
directives, and the European Parliament would have much closer 
powers of scrutiny of the workings of justice and home affairs. 
It would also have the power of co-decision on the passing of any 
legislation in this area. Finally the European Court of Justice 
would have the power of jurisdiction over such legal instruments 
as the Europol Convention. 
3) The EU-US Summit of 3 December 1995 laid the foundation for 
a new global role in combating transnational crime for the EU and 
by extension Europol. The Joint EU-US Action Plan was signed by 
President Clinton and the then President of the European Council 
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Felipe Gonzalez (Spanish Prime Minister) . One of the main planks 
of the plan termed "Responding to global challenges" stated: 
"We are determined to take new steps in our connnon battle 
against the scourges of international crime, drug trafficking and 
terrorism. We connnit ourselves to active, practical cooperation 
between the US and the future European Police Office, Europol. 
We will jointly support and contribute to ongoing training 
progrannnes and institutions for crimefighting officials in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, other new 
independent states and other parts of the globe." (Statewatch Vol 
6 No 1 1996: 21) 
This initiative 1S complemented by others such as the Barcelona 
Declaration which came out of the Euro-Med Conference of 27-28 
November 1995, which among other things, aims to strengthen 
cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean, Maghreb and Middle 
Eastern states on illegal innnigration, drug trafficking and 
terrorism, the Interregional Cooperation Agreement (Mercusor) of 
15 December 1995 between the EU and the countries of Latin 
America, which is also aimed at increasing cooperation in the 
fight against drug trafficking and money laundering, and the P8 
Declaration of 12 December 1995 which sets out a raft of measures 
aimed at increasing the effectiveness of cooperation against 
terrorism (the P8 states are: the USA, the UK, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia). (Statewatch Vol 6 No 1 1996: 
20-22) 
4) The remit of the EDU was extended again at a Council of 
Ministers meeting on 16 December 1996 to include trafficking in 
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human beings. This mandate includes not just international 
prostitution but paedophile rings as well. Within 3 years of its 
coming into existence therefore, the EDU's remit has increased 
from drug trafficking and associated money laundering activities 
to include the following crimes: 
a) organised crime 
b) trafficking in stolen vehicles; 
c) trafficking in nuclear substances; 
d) illegal immigration networks; 
e) international prostitution; 
f) paedophile networks; 
g) money laundering activities connected with any of the above; 
h) terrorism: to come into effect 2 years after the Convention 
is ratified and Europol proper comes into existence (although 
moves are currently afoot to have it incorporated immediately 
upon ratification) . 
5) A decision was reached at the Dublin Summit of 13-14 December 
1996 to the effect that: "Europol should have operative powers 
working in conjunction with the national authorities to this 
end." (Statewatch Vol 6 No 6 1996: 16) This statement was further 
clarified in an action plan that was adopted at Justice and Home 
Affairs Council meeting on 28 April 1997, and was agreed at the 
European Council Summit in Amsterdam in June 1997. The new Treaty 
allows that: 
a) Europol be enabled to facilitate and support the 
preparation, coordination and carrying out of specific 
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investigations .... including operational actions of joint 
teams (with Member States) comprising representatives of 
Europol in a support capacity. However the precise meaning 
of these provisions in terms of executive powers was not 
specified. 
b) Europol be allowed to ask Member States to conduct 
investigations in specific cases. 
c) "One or more suitable legal instruments be drawn up to enable 
Europol to "entertain" cooperation and liaison with 
"third countries and international organisations" 
including the Commission, Interpol and the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO)." (Statewatch Vol 7 No 2 1997: 2) 
6) The new Treaty has also laid out plans for the following: 
a) the creation of new bodies to coordinate judicial and 
prosecution policies as well as the formulation of a working 
European guideline towards defining the offence of organised 
crime; 
b) authority for "competent authorities" to operate in another 
member state; 
c) the harmonisation of laws on arrest, charging and sentencing. 
As with other provisions, the precise nature and workings of 
these new powers were not elaborated. 
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7) Finally the EU and the FBI have jointly introduced a plan for 
the development of a global system for the surveillance of 
telecommunications. The proposed system deals specifically with 
the powers of law enforcement agencies to intercept 
communications such as phone calls, e-mail and faxes. A list of 
"requirements" of both the FBI and the EU include the following: 
a) Law enforcement agencies require access to the entire 
telecommunications transmitted, or caused to be transmitted, 
to and from the number or other identifier of the target 
service used by the interception subject; 
b) Law enforcement agencies require a realtime, full time 
monitoring capability for the interception of 
telecommunications. (Statewatch Vol 7 No 1 1997: 1-3) 
This raft of initiatives suggests that within the space of 
three years, the initial concept of Europol as purely an 
intelligence exchange agency re drug trafficking offences has 
changed almost out of all recognition. What is instead emerging 
is the framework for an extensive supranational internal security 
network, that will also have the power to deal outside the limits 
of the EU with other states and international agencies. It is a 
development that has as much resonance for the future of the 
nation state and its sovereignty as the single currency, with the 
exception that these developments have not attracted the 
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attention that the single currency has. 
These ini tiati ves however are macro level developments that are 
being imposed from the top down. The same can also be said of 
Europol's centralised mode of information/intelligence exchange 
which forms the basis of this thesis's research question. The 
data collection and analysis aspect of this research however will 
concentrate on the bottom up response to the centralised mode of 
information exchange so as to ascertain whether the priorities 
of police agencies at the national and regional levels of the 
targeted states are in congruity with what has been imposed from 
the top down. The results of the following four case studies will 
then be used to gauge whether there is a functional need at the 
meso and micro level of the policing of transnational criminality 
to justify the developments that are taking place at the macro 
level. 
133) 
CHAPTER 6: GERMAN CASE SnIDY 
6.1: BACKGROUND 
The German case study, as well as the other case studies of 
this thesis, will seek to establish how closely each unit 
conforms to the centralised mode of information exchange upon 
which Europol is based. In doing this, each case study will 
examine the criteria governing the exchange of information from 
the regional to the national levels as well as from the national 
to the international levels. In addition to this, each study will 
also examine other areas which impinge upon the national unit's 
ability to conform to the centralised mode of information 
exchange. In each case study these will consist of data 
protection as well as operational considerations. 
6.1.1: The German Federal System: 
Federalism has been described as "a system of government in 
which central, regional and local authorities are linked in a 
mutually interdependent political relationship; in this system 
a balance is maintained so that neither level of government 
becomes dominant to the extent that it can dictate the decisions 
of the others, but each can influence, bargain with, and persuade 
the others" (Wistrich 1994, p.99). The roots of the current 
system of federalism in Germany are grounded in the previous 
policies of the Nazi government which concentrated on the 
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suppression of regional and local autonomy, and the promotion of 
strong centralism as facilitated by the Reich Reconstruction Law 
of 30 January 1934, which transferred all sovereign powers still 
held by the Lander (states) to the Reich. Allied post-war policy 
became a reaction against the centralising tendencies of the 
Nazis, and was aimed at the drafting of a democratic federal 
constitution which would give rise to a form of government which 
protected the rights of the Lander, through administrative 
decentralisation and dispersal of power. 
The German system of federalism revolves around the existence 
of two levels of government - national and regional - with 
constitutionally protected divisions of power between either 
level. The federal state consists of member states which each has 
its own constitution and government, which must adhere to the 
general principles laid down in the Basic Law. The relationship 
between the Bund or Federation and the member states or Lander 
is one of equality, whereby the Lander voluntarily surrender a 
measure of power and autonomy to the Bund. The Bund for its part 
cannot disestablish the system or institute changes without the 
consent of the Lander, and is obliged to exercise restraint in 
any tendency towards a greater centralisation of power, so as not 
to undermine the status and authority of the Lander. 
A rough consensus appears to exist by most commentators (such 
as: Wistrich, Vile, Lijphart, Elazar, Burgess and Zimmerman) on 
the basic characteristics and principles of federalism. These 
include, apart from a written constitution, decentralised 
government and devolution of powers, and a division of 
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legislative competence between central and regional governments. 
This division of competencies raises the issue of compatibility 
with the current institutional tendencies within European police 
cooperation towards greater centralisation. The intelligence led 
centralised mode of information exchange as encompassed in 
Europol, mandates that each state's national unit maintains a 
monopoly on contacts with the supranational organisation. Yet 
when this system is superimposed on a federal state in which the 
constituent states all have theoretical autonomy and equality 
with the federal state, there is the potential for greater 
decentralisation than is allowed for in the Europol Convention. 
6.1.2: The German Police And Judicial System 
The German judicial system is based on the federal structure, 
and while the Constitution (Grundgesetz, GG) provides a guiding 
and correcting function with respect to criminal procedure, the 
central Sources are the Code of Criminal Procedure and the 
Judicature Act (van den Wyngaert 1993: 137-138). The judicial 
system is an inquisitorial one in that less emphasis is placed 
on the rules of evidence and more importance is placed on 
acquiring and determining the facts. Consequently, the judge 
plays a more active part than in cornmon law jurisdictions and 
possesses wide powers so as to ensure that all the facts of the 
case are acquired. After the judge the most pivotal judicial 
actor is the public prosecutor, whose roles include the launching 
of prosecutions and conducting the process of investigation. 
While there is a federal prosecutor who is accountable to the 
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Ministry of Justice, each Lander also has its own prosecutor's 
office, which is hierarchically organised from the "prosecutor 
general", who acts directly under the authority of the minister 
and has competence in the area of a high court, down to the 
district prosecutors who are locally attached to the district 
court and are subordinate to the prosecutor general (van den 
Wyngaert 1993: 141). 
The police are also aligned with the federal structure. The 
following police services operate at the federal level: 
- The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) ie the Federal Criminal police 
- The Federal Border Guard (B.G.S) 
- The Transport Police 
- Police Officers attached to the Federal Parliament for 
protection/security purposes 
Each Lander also has its own police structure that includes 
forces, regulations and codes. Each Land force is divided into 
four branches as follows: 
a) The Schutzpolizei or 'Schupo' which comprises the uniformed 
constabulary. 
b) The Kriminalpolizei or 'Kripo' which comprises the criminal 
investigation units but also includes a central criminal 
intelligence agency known as the Landeskriminalamt (LKA) and 
is the state counterpart of the BKA. 
c) The Bereitschaftspolizei or 'Bepo' the remit of which 
includes specialist public order support functions. 
d) The wasserschutzpolizei or river police (Benyon 1994: 
27) 
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Both the federal police and the state police forces are 
accountable to the Federal and State Ministries of the Interior 
respectively. However as an auxiliary body of the public 
prosecutor, the police often also come under the authority of the 
Ministry of Justice. This situation is in keeping with the habits 
of other continental states such as the Netherlands, whereby, in 
the interests of democratic accountability and to avoid an 
excessive concentration of powers, the policing and judicial 
functions of the state are devolved to more than one ministry, 
a practice which can sometimes have the effect of blurring the 
lines of responsibility. 
6 . 1 . 3: The Bundeskriminalamt 
The German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) came into being with the 
drawing up of the "Law Concerning the Establishment of a Federal 
Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) - BKA Law" in 1951. 
This law was in keeping with the Basic Law of Germany which 
states that as a federal state, while sovereignty in police 
matters rests with the states or Lander, the Federation has 
exclusive legislative competence over "the cooperation of the 
Federation and the States .... in CID matters" as well as over "the 
setting up of a Federal Criminal Police Office and international 
crime control" (Article 73 (No.10». The constitution therefore 
authorises the Federation to set up, by way of federal 
legislation, "central facilities for police information and 
communications for criminal police" (Article 87 (1». 
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The BKA was initially established in Hamburg on the site of the 
previous Criminal Police Office for the British Zone of 
Occupation. However from May 1952 onwards the BKA was gradually 
transferred to its new location in Wiesbaden. With an original 
staff of approximately 395 personnel, of whom 192 were 
detectives, the BKA's principal role was to be the central office 
for the collection and analysis of all information and documents 
of interest to the CID function and, in this respect also for the 
electronic data network jointly operated by the Federal and State 
authorities (Article 2(1) (No.1) BKA Law). It is noteworthy that 
although the BKA was embedded within a federal structure, it did 
not at first possess executive powers, but restricted itself 
instead to the centralised collection and analysis of 
information. It was only on rare occasions that BKA officers 
conducted investigations, and then only on behalf of the Federal 
Minister of the Interior or on request by a State Criminal Police 
Office. 
By the mid 1960s however, the need for the BKA'S expansion 
became obvious. The Law Amending the Law Concerning the 
Establishment of 
(Bundeskriminalamt) 
a Federal Criminal police Office 
of 19 September 1969, and the Second Law 
Amending the Law Concerning the Establishment of a Federal 
Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) of 28 June 1973 
clarified and solidified the BKA's remit in the 1951 BKA Law of 
fighting against criminal elements who are, or may be expected 
to become active beyond State or national borders. The effect of 
the 1969 and 1971 amendments was to extend the BKA's 
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responsibility for the police side of prosecuting criminal 
offences where: 
- an appropriate State authority so requests, or 
- the Federal Minister of the Interior so orders 
Furthermore the 1969 amendment also enabled the BKA, on request 
or at its own discretion, to send officers in individual cases 
to support the State detective forces or to assign, in agreement 
with the judiciary and the appropriate State authorities, the 
investigation to one particular State where the ramifications of 
a given case extend beyond the territory of a single State. 
In addition, the 1973 amendment conferred the following 
responsibilities upon the BKA for prosecution of cases involving: 
internationally organised trafficking in arms and ammunition 
internationally organised trafficking in explosives 
internationally organised trafficking in narcotics 
- internationally organised production or distribution of 
counterfeit money 
- offences against the life or freedom of the Federal President, 
members of the Federal Government, the Bundestag, the Federal 
Constitutional Court or of guests of the constitutional 
institutions. 
6.1.4: The Landeskriminalamt 
In accordance with the sovereignty of the Lander in police 
matters, and also to ensure cooperation between the Federation 
and the Lander, each Lander is required by law to maintain its 
own central criminal police department which is tasked, among 
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other things, with providing the BKA with the information and 
documentation necessary for the performance of its functions. It 
is also incumbent upon each State to provide its LKA with the 
appropriate personnel and equipment to enable it to fulfil the 
responsibilities specified in the BKAG. The States are allowed 
autonomy, however in deciding the structure and organisation of 
their respective LKAs, and the definition of responsibilities in 
the BKAG likewise does not preclude the Lander from assigning 
additional responsibilities to the LKA as they see fit. The 
Lander have all taken advantage of this opportunity although 
their main function remains the dissemination of information to 
the BKA and the acting as a conduit between the BKA and local 
police officers. 
6.1.5: Computer Systems 
In 1972, an information and retrieval system was created for 
all the police forces in the Federal RepubliC of Germany. This 
system, called INPOL, was an electronic police information 
system, run on a joint basis by, and with the work divided 
between, the Federation and the States, with the BKA as the 
central office. The input, up-dating, and retrieval of 
information takes place decentrally at the State level as well 
as at the BKA, thereby ensuring that the data is as up-to-date 
as possible. police services have the ability to directly input 
their current information into the INPOL system, thus avoiding 
time-consuming message channelling. Seconds later this 
intelligence is available to all authorised services. According 
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to its working principle, INPOL is therefore a passive retrieval 
system in that what goes in is what comes out. There is no 
capaci ty for analysis and it only offers information as to 
whether a certain person is wanted by the judiciary or police if 
specifically queried to that effect. 
Every police officer can directly access INPOL' s "wanted" 
information, which is subject to parallel storage in the 
computers of the BKA and of the State police forces. Many police 
installations in the Federal States, at border crossings, and in 
airports are equipped with visual display units, on which 
enquiries to the computer are entered via a keyboard, and the 
responses appear within seconds. Besides these screen-type 
terminals, telex machines also hooked up to INPOL computers are 
in operation as further "branches" of the INPOL system. In 
addition, mobile portable radio terminals are in use. These mini 
versions of the stationary terminals permit direct dialogue with 
the COmputer over the air waves. 
Besides pertinent grounds for action, a prerequisite for the 
INPOL system to release any wanted-person information is proper 
user authorisation, which the computer automatically checks 
before it gives the desired response. This constitutes one of the 
many data protection as well as data security measures which are 
features of the INPOL system. 
Where immediate access to the INPOL "wanted" files is not 
possible via direct data telecommunications (police offices 
without terminals, field units on patrol without radio 
terminals), queries are transmitted via telephone, voice radio 
or teletype to local or regional centres equipped with terminals. 
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An important sub-system of INPOL is the PIOS system, which is 
a specially protected database, access to which is only via the 
terminal-computer link. The strict confidentiality requirement 
of the data held on the PIOS system means that it can be 
categorised as embargoed information, which means that 
transmission of the data held on this system to external sources 
is very strictly controlled and as such, there will be very 
strong reservations about the future Europol information system 
having a direct computerised link to it. Within this sub-system 
there are secondary sub-systems such as APOK, APIS and APR. The 
APOK system particularly deals with information on persons, 
objects and institutions relating to organised crime. This system 
is specifically used in conjunction with special State anti-
organised crime units. 
The usage of APOK however can affect the flow of information 
from the local to the State/LKA level due to the fear of the LKA 
taking over the operation. For example if the local police of 
TUbingen, which has approximately 300 thousand inhabitants, is 
dealing with an organised crime case, they are obliged to report 
the relevant information of the case to the APOK system. However 
in reality they don't, as to do so, would mean informing the LKA 
of their operation. with its extra resources, the LKA can hand 
pick the interesting cases to take over, and this leads to a 
dichotomy that research interviews have revealed exists at all 
levels of policing in Germany. While the decentralised computer 
systems such as INPOL, PIOS and APOK allow for access to greater 
resources, there is always a tension between these extra 
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resources on the one hand, and losing operational control on the 
other. The potential effect of this can be that the APOK system 
sometimes does not acquire the information on organised crime 
that it needs to adequately fulfil its remit. 
6.2: INFORMATION FLOWS 
6.2.1: International - National Information Flows 
The national supranational flow of information between 
Germany and Europol is based on a centralised mode, both from the 
top down and from the bottom up. From a top down perspective, 
Article 4 of the Europol Convention obliges each EU state to 
establish or designate a national unit to perform the following 
tasks: 
1) Supply Europol on their own initiative with the information 
and intelligence necessary for it to carry out its tasks; 
2) Respond to Europol's requests for information, intelligence 
and advice; 
3) Keep information and intelligence up to date; 
4) Evaluate information and intelligence in accordance with 
national law for the competent authorities and transmit this 
material to them; 
5) Issue requests for advice, information, intelligence and 
analysis to Europol; 
6) Supply Europol with information for storage in the 
computerised system; 
7) Ensure compliance with the law in every exchange of 
information between themselves and Europol. 
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From a bottom up approach, the designation of the BKA as 
Germany's national unit is in keeping with its sole jurisdiction 
in international cooperation. BKA Law allows the BKA to pass on 
personal details to police and judicial authorities and other 
public departments responsible for the prevention and prosecution 
of offences and to international and supranational organisations 
likewise responsible for the prevention and prosecution of 
offences. The BKA is also allowed, with the permission of the 
Federal Ministry of the 
available for automatic 
Interior, to make non-personal data 
retrieval by the central police 
authorities of other countries for the purpose of tracing 
property (property searches). The BKA is also empowered, at the 
request of a competent authority of a foreign state, to circulate 
details in a wide range of areas such as: 
- missing persons and minors 
- persons wanted for extradition 
- the identification of a particular person 
In all cases, the responsibility for the admissibility of the 
transmission lies with the BKA, and it is obliged to record in 
all cases the transmission and its grounds. Despite the 
sovereignty of the Lander in policing matters, the BKA is under 
no obligation (particularly in relation to the communication of 
data to Europol) to comply with Land Law simply because the data 
was originally collected by the Land. In keeping with the 
emphasis on the centralised control of information flows, data 
is therefore transmitted to Europol exclusively under federal law 
and the applicability of federal law is consequently linked to 
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the BKA' s central headquarters function irrespecti ve of the 
source of the data. 
The BKA therefore has the exclusive right to official liaison 
with foreign police and judicial authorities. The only exception 
to this rule is in connection with the border areas and the 
Federal Border Police, and this exception is governed by 
agreements between the Federal Minister of the Interior and the 
highest Land authorities. Even in this respect however, the 
border police are still constrained, where circumstance permit, 
to liaise through the BKA. In other cases, the BKA must at least 
be notified of any liaison activities. 
Inasmuch as the BKA officially has a near monopoly on the 
transmission of data outside of Germany, it is also its 
responsibility to decide on which channel of communication to 
use. These may include the four main channels of international 
police cooperation, these being: Interpol; the Europol Drugs 
Unit; Schengen and the Drugs Liaison Officer (DLO) network. 
However depending on the case and circumstances, other channels 
may be utilised such as formal bilateral contacts, NATO, foreign 
armed forces etc. This near monopoly on international contacts 
ensures that this complicated field of activity which is 
dependent on a variety of national and international laws and 
agreements, is kept under centralised control. This is also in 
keeping with the BKA's role of maintaining a strategic overall 
control on the development, analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence between the sub-national and the supranational 
levels. 
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Thus it can be seen that the criterion upon which information 
is passed between the national and the supranational levels is 
officially based very firmly on legislation, both from the top 
down in the form of the Europol Convention, and from the bottom 
up in the form of the BKA Law. However the research has revealed 
that this is not the only criterion on which the decision to pass 
(or not to pass) information to the Europol Drugs Unit is made. 
Other criteria affecting the flow of information from the 
national to the supranational level can be categorised as those 
factors which encourage as opposed to those factors which hinder 
the exchange of information. 
Those factors which encourage the flow of information are as 
follows: 
1) Familiarity: Inasmuch as Germany has eight ELOs posted to the 
EDU, and because of the extensi ve contacts that have been 
developed at all policing levels across the country, police 
officers in Germany feel increasingly comfortable in bringing a 
problem that has international characteristics to their ELOs. 
This of course has repercussions on the entire system of 
centralised control that Europol is founded on, but this issue 
will be explored in a subsequent section. 
2) Speed: Europol places much store by its growing reputation for 
speed of response. Because all ELOs are housed under the same 
roof, and always within easy reach through pagers etc, the 
response times to requests for information, assistance etc has 
been impressively quick. This is diametrically opposed to 
Interpol which has suffered in the past due to its lack of speed. 
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Europol claims via its Coordinator, Jurgen Storbeck, and several 
of the ELOs interviewed during this research, to be able to, and 
to have in the past, mounted a controlled delivery operation in 
one hour, and because of this, police officers, faced with 
tactical emergencies, requiring quick responses, are increasingly 
turning to Europol for assistance. 
This speed however may be construed as a function of the 
limited range of requests that the organisation currently 
receives a year. The EOU currently processes approximately 1500 
requests a year, whereas the BKA can receive 1500 requests a day. 
A senior source in the BKA voiced his belief that it would break 
down completely were it to be faced with 15,000 requests a year, 
instead of only 1500. However, for the moment, speed of response 
represents an important criterion affecting the decision to pass 
on information to the EDU. 
3) Language: From a German perspective, a common setback with 
Interpol is the fact that German is not one of the organisation's 
official languages, although this is somewhat offset by the fact 
that Gennan liaison officers are posted to Interpol. This in turn 
tends to have a further effect on the speed of Interpol's 
response as communications have sometimes to be translated. This 
is not a problem faced by the EOU, as German police enquiries can 
be directed to German ELOs. This is therefore another criterion 
that affects the decision-making process as to when to use the 
EOU. 
Conversely, the factors which hinder the exchange of 
information between the BKA and the EDU are as follows: 
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1) No operational status: This was a recurring factor throughout 
the research. A senior source within the BKA voiced what is a 
common opinion that an error was made with Europol from the very 
inception of the idea. From a German perspective, there are other 
agencies that can do, and have been doing the EDU's current job. 
For example the Drug Liaison Officer network was responsible for 
the organisation and coordination of controlled deliveries prior 
to the EDU. There are numerous bilateral arrangements that cover 
cross border operational contingencies. Some of these outlined 
during the research included: the German - Italian working Group 
on Organised Crime; the German Russian Working Group on 
Organised Crime; the German - American Organised Crime Working 
Group etc. Also from an information exchange perspective, most 
of the BKA's international business has historically been 
conducted via Interpol anyway (at present the figure stands at 
in excess of 90%), despite its disadvantages. Within this 
respect, Interpol has a distinct advantage in being global, 
whereas the EDU is only European, and does not include 
Switzerland, which is of significant importance to the German 
police. 
It is therefore felt within German policing circles, that in 
its current state, Europol could have more effectively been a 
European NCB (National Central Bureaux, which is the Interpol 
contact point in each member state) within Interpol. However it 
is felt that this option was rejected because European 
governments wished to put police cooperation increasingly on an 
intergovernmental footing, and this could not be achieved within 
the framework of Interpol which is seen to be a private police 
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organisation. However there is the belief that Europol's ability 
to add value is limited by the fact that there are already 
institutions in Europe performing its function. To truly add 
value, Europol must have the powers and resources to complement 
national initiatives by adding a supranational layer of 
investigative and operational competence. 
2) Allied to the above point, an additional impediment to the 
flow of information to the EDU, is the growing evidence of 
duplication between it and other agencies such as Interpol and 
the DLO network. In the absence of a specific department which 
allocates the appropriate channel for a particular enquiry, 
investigation etc, decisions are invariably the responsibility 
of the respective case officer. This can lead to a deficiency in 
coordination, as one caseworker may not know what another one is 
dOing. 
Another area specifically identified as being particularly 
prone to duplication, is the production and dissemination of 
strategic situation reports. While there have been moves to deal 
with this problem, especially with respect to Interpol and EDU 
representatives having observer status in each others' working 
group meetings, there is still a marked similarity in the content 
of 'sitreps' from the two organisations. In addition, there is 
as yet little evidence of coordination between the DLO network 
and the ELOs so as to avoid duplication. 
Consequently, German officers can feel that the EDU, in its 
current state, is of little use to them, particularly in relation 
to the quality of the 'sitreps' and analysis packages. One source 
150} 
within the BKA who liaises with the EOU made the astonishing 
claim that the flow of analysis packages have mostly been from 
the BKA to the EOU, rather than the other way round as intended. 
The Europol Situation Report on Orugs for 1995 gave very detailed 
explanations of the main drug routes into the European Union, 
facts that are already well known. A common criticism however was 
that the 'sitrep' did not give concrete intelligence that could 
be operationally useful. For example the Balkan route, the Golden 
Crescent, the use of Nigerian couriers and transit countries etc 
are all well known and well documented. What is increasingly 
being called for is viable intelligence and analysis packages 
that allow major operations to be launched. 
One factor that has been constant throughout the examples 
listed of the criteria that encourage or hinder the passing of 
information to the EOU is the emphasis placed on the tactical 
relevance and usefulness of information flows between the 
national and supranational levels. It is virtually an axiom of 
policing at whatever level, that police officers are primarily 
interested in the most direct route to the solving of offences 
and the prosecution of offenders. Examples given of liaison 
between the BKA and the German ELOs would include a routine 
request for information (these routine requests were stated by 
one interviewee as being in the interest of not allowing the 
EOU to starve) concerning a stolen vehicle, stolen property, a 
wanted person or suspect etc. The request would be passed on to 
the relevant liaison officer at EDU headquarters, who would in 
turn contact the relevant ELO from the state that may be able to 
assist in the enquiry. This ELO would then acquire the necessary 
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information from national databases, and then convey this 
information to the requesting ELO, who would in turn relay the 
information back to the BKA. However the number of such cases a 
year averages around one hundred only, compared to the thousands 
of similar cases that are handled annually by the other main 
channels: Interpol i Schengeni the DLO network and bilateral 
contacts. 
While it must always be borne in mind that Europol is currently 
labouring under the handicap of not as yet having a ratified 
Convention that will allow the storage and use of personal data, 
it is questionable whether the removal of this impediment will 
significantly change the over-emphasis on the tactical at the 
expense of the strategic. As stated in chapter 6, the access that 
the ELOs have to the personal data on their national databases, 
and the fact that this information is routinely shared 
horizontally within the organisation, negates the argument that 
the EDU is unable to develop fully a strategic overview in Europe 
due to its not being allowed to store personal data. The 
revealing remark of the need to pass information to Europol in 
the interest of not allowing it to starve, tends to re-emphasise 
the point that within a German context, a non-operational Europol 
is of little use to German policing at the national 
supranational level. 
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6.2.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS 
Section 3 of the BKAG (BKA Law) requires the Lander to set up 
central headquarters (Landeskriminalamter) to act as 
intermediaries between the BKA and the central investigation 
police in the Lander. The Lander are also required by law to 
provide the LKA with the appropriate personnel and equipment to 
enable them to fulfil the responsibilities specified in the BKAG, 
particularly with reference to the flow of information. As no 
conditions are laid down for the structure and organisation of 
these regional offices, the Lander are allowed autonomy in these 
areas. 
The definition of responsibilities in Section 3 does not 
preclude the Lander assigning additional responsibilities to the 
LKA, and as such, all the Lander have taken advantage of this 
possibility and therefore cooperation with the BKA is often only 
part of the LKA' s work. Nevertheless one of the main tasks of the 
LKAs remains the passing on of information to the BKA that is 
necessary for the performance of its functions. 
While the 1951 BKA Law laid down the obligation of the federal 
states to create central offices, the power to decide on the 
necessity and the extent of the information/material to be passed 
on to the BKA was not regulated by law. The 1973 amendment went 
some way towards clarifying the situation by enumerating the 
tasks of the BKA, and by extension the cases in which the 
transmission of information to the BKA would be required. However 
there still exists a shortfall in transmission criteria, with the 
BKA constantly having to stri ve to make up for the missing 
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prerequisites and authorisations, by means of cooperation and 
coordination with the State police authorities, in order to 
discharge the functions assigned to it in the best possible way. 
In this respect, an important role is played by the meetings 
of the "Working Group of the Heads of the State Criminal Police 
Offices with the Federal Criminal Police Office (CID Working 
Group)" under the chairmanship of the BKA President. Through the 
exchange of experience and the forming of opinions which takes 
place there, CID questions and problems affecting the 
relationship of the Federation to the Federal States and the 
States among each other are solved by mutual consent. In this way 
therefore, with respect to important areas of law enforcement, 
binding structures and methods have been developed for the entire 
German system of criminal investigation. Despite the difficulties 
arising from the intricacy and lack of uniformity of the 
structures and responsibilities of police authorities at the 
State level this system has enabled the criminal investigation 
process to achieve a sufficiently high level of proficiency 
without which the smooth interaction of Federal and State 
authorities in crime control matters would be impossible. 
Guidelines serving this aim have been issued for example for the 
entire exchange of police (crime) information, for federal crime 
statistics, the maintenance of central collections and file 
indices, dealing with missing persons, narcotics and counterfeit 
offences as well as in the field of combatting terrorism. 
The criteria therefore for passing information up to the BKA 
is divided between formal legal requirements, and quasi-formal 
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cooperation between the BKA and the LKA. Other crucial factors 
however, revealed during the research, are the play-off between 
the extra resources that become available when a case is taken 
over, either by the LKA or the BKA, and the traditional police 
fear of losing control of a case. Examples were given of areas 
such as Bavaria and Baden Wurttemberg, which are quite wealthy, 
and therefore possess the resources to deal with most large cases 
themselves. In areas such as these there is greater reluctance 
to share competence with the BKA. However, in poor areas such as 
Hamburg, lack of resources means that there is a greater 
likelihood of large, manpower intensive operations being passed 
over to the BKA. Therefore resource variance plays an important 
part across Germany, in deciding when competence is passed over 
to the BKA. 
This tension between gaining extra resources, and losing 
control can be better understood within the context of the 
ambiguity of the law and quasi-official procedure relating to the 
authority of the BKA over the LKA. As already mentioned, the BKAG 
obliges the LKA to pass on information within the confines of the 
BKA's remit. The BKA also has the right to exercise the police 
function in the field of criminal prosecution if: 
a) requested to do so by a competent Land authority or; 
b) ordered to do so by the Federal Minister of the Interior on 
serious grounds or; 
c) requested or ordered to do so by the Federal Public 
Prosecutor. 
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In such circumstances, the BKA may give the competent LKA 
instructions for cooperation. However, in all such circumstances, 
immediate notification must be given to the highest criminal 
justice and police authorities in the Lander that the BKA has 
taken over responsibility for a particular case or cases, and in 
addition either the Federal Public Prosecutor, or the Chief 
Public Prosecutor for the area in question, must be notified 
where he is responsible for the conduct of the investigation.In 
support of these powers, the BKA may also second officers, and 
local police are obliged to provide the BKA, and any officers it 
has seconded, with all necessary information and allow them 
access to all relevant files. 
These powers therefore seem to indicate on the one hand that 
the federation via the BKA has the power to decide the rules for 
criminal police cooperation as it wishes.On the other hand, the 
federalist structure of the Federal Republic essentially 
prohibits intervention by federal authorities in the areas of 
sovereignty reserved for the Lander (such as policing functions) . 
The BKA's right to instruct police authorities in the Lander 
would therefore require the consent of the Land concerned or 
would need to be clearly and unambiguously set out in the Basic 
Law. Inasmuch as this is not the case, it is difficult to set out 
a relationship of seniority or subordination between the BKA and 
the LKA. The BKA is therefore clearly not the "command centre" 
of the German criminal police structure, but judging from the 
major part of its tasks and activities, a "service pool" for 
crime control by the police although due to the socially harmful 
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impact of the crimes concerned, special emphasis is placed on the 
law enforcement functions performed by its own staff. 
Within this context, the BKA can be construed as being more in 
the centre of the field of tension between State sovereignty and 
Federal authority than virtually any other agency. As it has no 
organisational substructure at the State level, it is dependent 
on the support and cooperation of the State forces in fulfilling 
its tasks, to whom as a rule the BKA has no right to give 
directions. The BKA' s specific function, resulting from the 
country's structure as created by the constitution, leaves no 
room for considerations aimed at extending its investigative, or 
other executive powers. This answers the repeated question 
regarding the creation of a centralised detective force for the 
entire federal territory. The BKA is therefore keen to 
demonstrate that it is concealing no ambitions to limit State 
sovereignty over the police. Consequently, Germany's 
decentralised policing system that has the BKA as the central 
office is an example of cooperative federalism in a democratic 
federal system. This in turn has important implications for the 
centralised system of cooperation as represented by Europol. 
6.2 .3: DIRECT CONTACTS BY LKA WITH THE EDU: 
Despite the centralised mode of information exchange upon which 
Europol was founded, the Federal Council petitioned the German 
Federal Government, during the negotiation of the agreement to 
set up Europol in 1993/94, for the senior authorities of the 
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Lander to be allowed to exchange information directly with 
Europol. This request was based primarily on the constitutionally 
guaranteed sovereignty of the Lander in policing matters allied 
to the fact that most of the data passed on to Europol by the BKA 
would have been obtained in the Lander. 
In a letter to the chairman of the IMK dated 5/6.10.94, the 
Federal Minister of the Interior, Mr Kanther, stated that with 
regard to the liaison officers, in his view the draft Convention 
would present no obstacle to the request for direct information 
links between the LKA and the German liaison officers. While it 
was true that the Convention did not provide for direct contact 
between the ELOs and the competent national (i.e. Land) 
authorities, inasmuch as the links between the ELOs, as a kind 
of outpost of the national (Land) department and the authorities 
in the Member State were essentially subject to national law, 
these links would in practice be organised for implementation 
within the country. Thus there would be no objection to the LKA 
contacting the BKA's liaison officers at Europol direct in an 
emergency, for instance to expedite enquiries, as long as the 
BKA, as the national authority, was notified at the same time. 
Mr Kanther also went on to state that he would welcome the 
recruitment of experienced Land officers as ELOs on secondment 
to the BKA. 
This position was followed up by a statement by Mr Lintner, the 
Parliamentary Secretary of State at the 678th meeting of the 
Federal Council on 16.12.94, in which he re-iterated the 
Federation's understanding that German ELOs would be drawn from 
the Lander, and that in emergency cases, the LKA would be 
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empowered to contact German ELOs directly. However these 
concessions were emphasised as being internal German solutions 
only that were not entitled to be incorporated into the Europol 
Convention. 
Out of these and similar statements came a set of basic 
principles which said the following: 
1) The direct exchange of information between the 
Landeskriminalamt and the German Europol liaison officers is 
permitted in order to assist in preliminary investigations and 
transmit supplementary information for analysis, where it is 
necessary to expedite matters or no national coordination 
requirement can be established for the applicant department; 
2) The BKA must at all times be kept informed of any direct 
contacts; 
3) The German liaison officers at Europol are to be recruited 
from national and Land officers in an appropriate ratio. Land 
officers appointed as Europol liaison officers will in principle 
be seconded to the BKA and sent from there as ELOs, making the 
Federation responsible for the costs incurred, since the Land 
officers would in effect be working, via the BKA, on behalf of 
the Federation. 
4} Communication between the ELOS and the higher authorities in 
the Member States (Land) would be mainly via e-mail, as this 
system would have the advantage that the BKA (as the technical 
contact point) can be kept informed through the automated copying 
of the material. However this does not preclude the use of 
conventional channels of communication such as telephone, fax or 
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telex, as long as the usual provisions for notifying the BKA 
apply. 
The provision that allows direct contact by the LKA with the 
EDU has been sanctioned by the Ministry of the Interior, and has 
become known as 'special treatment'. It has had the net effect 
of causing each LKA to be considered as a national unit in its 
own right. Furthermore, inasmuch as Germany in effect has 
seventeen national units, input of information by one LKA to 
Europol becomes binding on all other LKA, in the sense that not 
only is it directly accessible, but each LKA becomes responsible 
for the use and protection of the information. 
However the participation rights of the Lander have not been 
confined to the issue of direct liaison with the EDU. In a letter 
to Mr Kanther, the Federal Minister of the Interior, the chairman 
of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers and Senators for 
the Lander, Mr Alwin Ziel, made the case, based on the 
constitutional guarantee of Land sovereignty over internal 
security matters, for participation rights for the Lander in the 
organisational structure of Europol, with particular reference 
to the Board of Administrators. Mr Ziel's argument was based not 
only on the amendment to the Basic Law allowing incorporation of 
the Maastricht Treaty into German law, which allowed 
participation of the Federal Parliament and the Lander in 
European Union affairs, but also a supplementary agreement 
between the Federal Government and the Governments of the Lander 
that further solidified the Lander's cooperation prerogatives in 
EU affairs. 
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In his reply dated 7 November 1994, Mr Kanther agreed with this 
line of argument that Lander participation rights were both valid 
and necessary. However, the main hindrance lay in the fact that 
the composition of the Board of Administration allowed for only 
one representative from each member state. However, taking into 
account the fact that each member of the Board was also to be 
represented by a deputy, a number of alternatives were 
considered: 
1) The Board could be composed of two voting representatives from 
each of the member countries, in which case the Federation and 
the Lander could each appoint a representative. Since at the 
moment however, Article 24 of the Europol Convention allows for 
only one representative per member country, either the provision 
or the Article would need to be amended accordingly. 
2) As Article 25 no.3 allows members of the Board to be 
represented by deputies, the Federation and the Lander could 
alternate as member and deputy. 
3) The member of the Board could be regularly appointed by the 
Federation and a Land representative could act as deputy. 
It was decided that taking into account the importance of the 
Lander participating in the Board's meeting, the last option 
would be the most appropriate. A way round the requirement for 
each state to only have one representative on the Board could be 
circumvented by allowing the Land representative to accompany the 
representative as an expert, a provision allowed for under 
Article 25 no. 5 of the Europol Convention. In this way therefore 
direct Land participation with Europol has been extended from 
information exchange to include representative functions such as: 
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participation in the extension of Europol's objectives; 
participation in amendments to the agreement; 
participation in the enactment of data file regulations etc. 
6.2.4: DIRECT ACCESS FOR JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES: 
In addition to direct access for the LKA, at an early stage in 
the negotiations of the Europol Convention, the majority of the 
judicial authorities of the Lander, in some Lander by agreement 
with the department of the interior, requested direct access to 
the Europol database for the Public Prosecutors' Offices. This 
request was made by the Ministries/Senators of the Interior of 
the Lander, as part of the general request for direct LKA access 
to the Europol information system. 
The Federal Prosecutor also took the view that such a link was 
necessary. It was argued that, since crime, and in particular 
organised crime, was becoming increasingly international, the 
rapid transmission of relevant information was increasingly 
important for the Public Prosecutor's Office. For that reason it 
did not appear sufficient for only the BKA and the LKA to be 
authorised to retrieve information from Europol. Ultimately the 
Public Prosecutor's authority to control criminal proceedings 
would be undermined to an unacceptable extent if access was 
denied. 
Since it had been established in the Brussels negotiations that 
it would only be practicable for the Europol Convention to 
provide for on-line access to Europol data for one national 
department in each Member State, the federal government offered 
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the LKA an INPOL contact point via the BKA at the request of the 
Lander. 
The judicial authorities in the Lander agreed to this 
arrangement if it could also be used by the Public Prosecutor's 
Offices. The BKA would not be assigned a supervisory role in any 
existing preliminary investigations, in so far as it had to 
decide on its own initiative which information was to be passed 
on and handed over. In existing preliminary investigations only 
the competent Public Prosecutor's Offices would be authorised to 
take charge of the preliminary investigation. 
The judicial authorities explained that the request for access 
by the Public Prosecutors' Offices to the data stored at Europol, 
related only to pending preliminary investigations and therefore 
the data could only be retrieved or passed on by the Public 
Prosecutors' Offices if they were considered locally to be of use 
in furthering the investigation. 
At its 678th meeting on 16.12.94 the Federal Council passed the 
following reSOlution on the Council's draft legal instrument for 
the preparation of the agreement to set up a European Police 
Office (Europol), Council doc. 8074/1/94 - Doc. 909/94, with 
regard to access by the judicial authorities of the Lander to 
Europol information : 
"The national department must also be required to pass on 
requests from central police and judicial authorities in the 
Lander to forward information and requests, and the information 
supplied by Europol for those authorities, immediately and 
without amendment". 
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This in effect reiterated the view that the judicial 
authorities already had access to Europol via the BKA. While the 
Federal Ministry of Justice endorsed the request by the judicial 
authorities of the Lander, the Minister of the Interior, in a 
letter dated 7.11.94, to the chairman of the standing conference 
of Ministers/Senators of the Interior of the Lander, stated that 
he was unable to comply with the request for on-line access to 
the Europol information system. He went on to express the view 
that permission for on-line access to police information systems 
by Public Prosecutors' Offices had always been refused 
unanimously by the Federal and Land internal affairs departments 
because the information system contained prevention as well as 
prosecution data. The authority of the Public Prosecutors' 
Offices to take charge of specific investigations could not imply 
an entitlement to have access to police systems in general, and 
it was precisely for this reason that the Public prosecutors' 
Offices did not have direct access to the INPOL system. The 
general principles would therefore remain intact in that the 
competent judicial authorities would retain access to the Europol 
information system data through the LKA or the national 
department for prosecution purposes. In keeping with Article 3 
para. 1 no.3 of the Europol Convention Europol is likewise 
required to notify the competent authorities in the member states 
(including the judicial authorities) of any information relating 
to them and any connections between offences that come to light 
without delay, via the national departments specified in Article 
4. This together with the provisions of the BKA Law, ensures 
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that information of relevance to the judicial authorities in the 
Lander is passed on via the national department. 
6 .3: RESULTS OF ABOVE DATA: 
This research has been based around two basic premises: 
a) that Europol has been based on a centralised mode of 
information exchange, which for an intelligence lead 
approach, is the most viable option. 
b) that tactical interests increasingly impinge on strategic 
considerations. 
In the first instance, it is possible to theorise that the 
centralised system of information/intelligence exchange 
instituted by the Justice and Home Affairs in the form of the 
Europol Drugs Unit, was and is fundamentally incompatible with 
the German federal system. While this centralisation is on the 
one hand necessary for the central unit to obtain all the 
information necessary to the development of strategic analysis 
packages, on the other, in the context of international 
cooperation in fighting serious crime, the fast and comprehensive 
transmission of relevant data is also vital. The imposition of 
a monopoly on the national unit's right of contact with a 
supranational body, on a federal system in which the constituent 
states have a constitutionally protected autonomy in policing 
matters creates the prospect of tension between Federal necessity 
and state rights. This therefore leads to an incompatibility that 
applies not only to the German brand of federalism, but also to 
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any other political system in which the federal rights of regions 
or states are constitutionally protected. 
Consequently, the Lander were successfully able to petition and 
gain the right to not only have direct contact with the EDU, but 
also the right to be considered on an equal level to the national 
unit, to the extent that Germany is now considered as having 
seventeen national units as opposed to just one. What has emerged 
in a very short space of time, is the replacement of the 
centralised mode by a qualified centralised mode, in which the 
BKA still has a monopoly in terms of international liaison, but 
the Lander also have a qualified right of international liaison 
as well, within specified parameters. 
These parameters chiefly revolve around the requirement upon 
the LKA to keep the BKA abreast of all information flows, 
contacts, intelligence exchanges, investigations, operations etc 
that are being conducted or negotiated directly with the EDU. In 
this way, the BKA can maintain its strategic overview, while the 
LKA can pursue its tactical goals. The wheels of this process are 
continuously smoothed by the decentralised nature of the INPOL 
system, which allows access by officers at all levels. 
The emergence of the qualified centralised model suggests that 
within the context of a vertical system of police 
cooperation/integration as encapsulated by Europol, it is 
impractical to concentrate on strategic matters at the expense 
of tactical considerations. Lander participation demands were 
based, not on behalf of the BKA's remit, but in the interests of 
furthering its own regional and local tactical priorities. The 
initial iteration of the inevitable encroachment of the tactical 
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upon the strategic is in evidence here. Further evidence can be 
surmised from the criteria uncovered which contributed to or 
hindered the exchange of inf orma t ion/ intell igence . The main 
criteria discovered are as follows: 
a) legislation 
b) quasi formal cooperation agreements 
c) familiarity 
d) speed 
e) relevance 
f) language 
g) resource variance 
e) fear of losing control 
In most of these criteria, the over-riding concern is that of 
tactical utility. Inasmuch as it is axiomatic of the police to 
take the most direct route to solving crimes and prosecuting 
offenders, the governing principle in the exchange of information 
from the local and regional perspective is one of reciprocity. 
What do police officers at these levels benefit from sharing 
information with the EDU, in terms of their own policing 
priorities? Most of the criteria listed have some bearing on the 
emphasis on self-interest. Speed of response, relevance, the 
ability to converse in one's own language, which itself increases 
speed,the fear of the LKA, BKA or EDU taking over and enjoying 
the acclaim for a successfully completed operation, all can have 
a drastic impact on the viability of a centralised, hierarchical 
intelligence oriented system. 
Within the context of the area of information flows, it can be 
seen where the original iteration has fairly rapidly evolved into 
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another permutation that can be termed a qualified centralised 
mode of information exchange. However, only the area of 
information flows has been considered up to this point. It is 
therefore necessary to compare other elements of the case against 
this revision, to see what effects they have on it. 
6 .4: DATA PROTECTION 
6.4.1: INTERNATIONAL - NATIONAL LEVELS: 
The BKA is allowed to communicate personal data to 
international databases on the proviso that the recipient state 
has ratified the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data or that similar protection is 
guaranteed, and a supervisory authority exists for the 
independent monitoring of data protection. Personal data 
therefore may not be transmitted if there is reason to believe 
that this transmission would contravene the purpose of German 
law. It may also not be transmitted if it would be prejudicial 
to the interests of the party to be protected, particularly if 
appropriate data protection standards are not guaranteed in the 
recipient country. 
Data protection restrictions such as this, have been one of the 
main causes for the delay in getting Europol proper up and 
running. The ability to hold personal data at a supranational 
level would require adequate data protection regulations that 
would have to take national DP laws into account. The inability 
to hold personal data, pending the ratification of the Europol 
168) 
Convention has meant that the organisation has been labouring 
under a significant handicap in attempting to fulfil its remit 
in terms of producing strategic analysis packages. In the 
interim, the EDU as the forerunner of Europol proper, has been 
exchanging information on a bi-Iateral basis with national laws 
applying in each instance. However, taking into account the fact 
that two EU states have had no DP laws for much of the EDU's 
existence, German ELOs have been exchanging data with ELOs from 
these states on the fairly nebulous grounds that the only 
prohibition lies in not being able to transmit data from the 
German computer system to the computer system of the state with 
no DP regulations. However the passing of information directly 
from ELO to ELO by means other than computer to computer transfer 
is perfectly admissible. 
Despite the means used to circumvent transmission restrictions, 
German data protection law affects the exchange of information 
by proscribing the exchange of data, from computer to computer, 
at the supranational/national level. This differs significantly 
from the Schengen Information System, which allows greater 
freedom of input horizontally between participating states. Even 
within the vertical exchange of information in Germany, 
significant flexibility is permissible via the INPOL system, 
which allows input and access by officers at all levelS. German 
ELOs therefore can access/input information via the INPOL system 
from/to all policing levels in Germany, and also from/to 
different states in Europe via the SIS. However they are 
restricted in making direct terminal to terminal transfers of 
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data by the dictates of German national data protection 
legislation. 
The German Data Protector has also, in the past, displayed his 
ability to affect the transmission of information to the EDU. 
Following a visit to the EDU, he laid down instructions that 
all non-terminal exchanges (i.e. fax, telephone etc) must be 
encrypted, or conducted via closed systems. He periodically 
visits the BKA every two years, inspects all relevant aspects 
concerning data storage and transmission, such as reports, new 
data installations, the APOK system, all project based data etc, 
and makes a subsequent report outlining his findings and any 
applicable recommendations. For example, on one occasion, in 
relation to an INPOL flag on a prominent travelling gypsy 
criminal, the Data Protector ruled that the designation of the 
term 'gypsy' on the INPOL system was illegal and accordingly 
instructed that this designation be removed, which it was. 
Other DP related factors which affect the exchange of 
information inClude the use to which information will be put. The 
police are allowed to transmit data to policing authorities for 
use in the fighting of crime. However, this information is not 
allowed to be used by the judicial authorities of the receiving 
states such as state prosecutors, or as evidence in court. This 
distinction reflects the division of competencies in some 
European states between the Ministry of the Interior's policing 
functions, and the Ministry of Justice's judicial functions. In 
instances such as these, other channels of judicial cooperation 
such as letters of request and Commission Rogatoires must be 
used. The German Constitutional Court has also afforded the 
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German citizen the right to decide, in certain circumstances, if 
personal data about him/her should be passed on. While there are 
exceptions and exemptions for some state institutions such as the 
police, in general, the German police are often still obliged to 
at least inform subjects of data transmissions that information 
about them has been passed on. 
Finally, the BKA is responsible for the admissibility of all 
its data transmissions. It must record the transmission and its 
grounds, and all recipients of personal data must be informed 
that the data may only be used for the purpose for which it was 
provided. They must also be informed of the deletion date 
specified for the data at the BKA. 
The data protection criteria therefore which governs the 
exchange of information between the supranational and national 
levels may be summarised as follows: 
a) The remit of the BKA. Inasmuch as the BKA is only tasked with 
dealing with certain types of serious criminal activity, it 
can only hold data as pertains to its remit. This in effect 
limits the types of data that the BKA is allowed to hold, and 
by extension to pass on to other states; 
b) The existence of data protection legislation in the receiving 
state, although this stipulation only applies to the 
transmission of data from one computer to another; 
c) The use being made of the information. Data may be used for 
policing activities, not judicial; 
d) The physical security of the data; 
e) The inappropriate use of physical characteristics such as 
race. 
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The last two points also hold equal relevance at the regional 
and local levels. 
6.4.2: NATIONAL -REGIONAL LEVELS: 
Every Land has its own data protection law, as well as its own 
Data Protector, so that in effect Germany has 17 data protection 
laws and 17 Data Protectors. In the transmission of information 
from one Lander to another, or from one Lander to the BKA or to 
Europol, the law of the transmitting department is the law 
applicable. While at one level, data that is passed on to Europol 
by the BKA is done so under federal law in keeping with the BKA's 
headquarters function, within the context of Germany's internal 
relationship, data protection responsibility is divided between 
the Federation and the Lander. 
Therefore the data protection responsibility for the data 
passed to Europol, or later stored in the Europol information 
system, lies with the department inputting the data; in 
particular it is responsible for ensuring that the data has been 
lawfully obtained, that its input is admissible, that it is 
accurate or current, and also for determining and checking the 
storage periods and deleting the data. In addition it is 
responsible for the application of the reservations on use and 
the restrictions on disclosure to third parties. Only the 
department which inputs data is entitled to amend, correct or 
delete it, and the decision by the competent department on input 
into the Europol information system is binding on other 
departments of the Federation and Lander. 
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The national federal department is tasked with checking the 
technical accuracy by means of mechanical assessments of 
plausibility and justification, although the LKA may if necessary 
make appropriate checks also. If the national federal department 
considers that other personal data stored by the Lander in INPOL 
or other data files should be input or passed on to Europol, it 
asks the inputting department in the Land to check, and the 
competent Land department then checks, having regard to the legal 
conditions. 
The same data protection conditions apply for the transmission 
of other Europol data files, such as personal data/documents for 
analysis etc. The competent departments in the Lander are again 
responsible for data protection, accuracy, admissibility etc, and 
the national department for its part, must immediately notify the 
competent Land department concerned re any request from Europol 
for the transmission of data/documents for analysis and also of 
the results of any evaluations and analysis. Where it is intended 
to pass on data held by the Lander from data files by data line 
or data copy, this must be agreed wi th the relevant Land 
departments. Personal data is not allowed to be communicated if 
there is reason to assume that it would jeopardise the purpose 
of obtaining the data, in particular the success of current 
enquiries or the safety of a person. Theoretically, all 
restrictions on use must be complied with. Also, the inputting 
department is responsible, where necessary, for informing persons 
concerned or data subjects, of the storage of data. 
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6.4.3: DIRECT LANDER PARTICIPATION IN SUPERVISORY BODIES 
Article 22 of the Europol Convention stipulates that an 
independent joint supervisory body is to be set up (at the 
European level), which will be tasked with reviewing the 
activities of Europol with respect to the use and processing of 
personal data, among other things, to ascertain whether data 
protection rules are being contravened. Article 21, in like 
manner states that each member state is required to designate an 
independent national supervisory body which, subject to national 
law, assesses the admissibility of the input and retrieval of 
data to and from Europol, as well as the compliance of national 
liaison officers with national data protection regulations. This 
national supervisory body also acts as the national contact point 
for enquiries by persons concerned. 
At their 48th meeting on 26/27.9.94 the data protection 
officers for the Federal government and the Lander took the 
fOllowing decision on the data protection responsibility of the 
Lander: 
.... "the agreement must be in line with the constitutional 
allocation of responsibilities for the police in the Federation 
and Lander. The practical responsibility for data processing 
must, in so far as the data is obtained from authorities in the 
Lander, remain with the Lander. This does not detract from the 
BKA's jurisdiction and powers as the national authority for the 
exchange of information with Europol . 
. . . . The data protection officers expect the German side to 
clarify the responsibility of the Lander, for instance by a 
declaration in the form of a protocol to the Europol Convention." 
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In connection with this decision, Land DP officers argued, 
that since the DP responsibility of the Land was affected, 
regulations should be devised which were appropriately binding 
on the data protection officers for the Lander in the joint and 
national supervisory bodies under Articles 21 and 22 of the 
Europol Convention. 
In response to this the Federal government took the decision 
that a representative of the DP officers of the Lander will be 
allowed to participate in the joint supervisory body, although 
without prejudice to the Federal government's voting rights. The 
DP officers of the Lander have therefore been allowed to 
participate in the monitoring of the data processed at Europol. 
They may assess the admissibility of the input and retrieval of 
data into/from the Europol information system in the Lander and 
the transmission of data and documents from the Lander for 
storage at Europol. They may also inspect the relevant INPOL link 
applications. A representative of the DP officers for the Lander 
may participate in the meetings and activities of the joint 
supervisory body, and if the activities or decisions of the JSB 
affect the interests of the Lander, the opinion of the 
representative must be sought at an early stage and taken into 
account. 
6.4.4: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THESB FINDINGS TO REFORMULATION 
The results of these findings reveal another ambiguity of the 
centralised mode as it applies to data protection. At one level 
the BKA communicates data to Europol under federal law, and as 
such, the federal data protection officer is responsible for data 
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protection monitoring of the BICA. To that extent, there is 
theoretically no scope for the direct participation of Lander 
data protection officers in either the joint (i.e. Europol) or 
the national supervisory bodies. However at another level, every 
Lander has its own data protection laws, which in effect means 
that there are seventeen DP laws and Data Protectors operating 
in Germany. The constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the 
states means that these grounds alone are arguably sufficient to 
warrant Lander participation in Europol' s joint supervisory body. 
However when added to the facts that the LKA have already been 
granted the right of direct access to Europol, and the 
decentralised nature of the INPOL system that facilitates police 
officers at all levels having the ability to input and retrieve 
information directly to/from Europol, these add up to a qualified 
negation of the centralised data protection provisions laid out 
in the Europol Convention. 
The application of the qualified centralised model to data 
protection can therefore be considered as being concomitant to 
its application to the area of information flows. It is 
inevitable that if greater flexibility is allowed in 
communicating information/intelligence to/with Europol, that 
these provisions must be backed up by equally flexible data 
protection participation rights. In the application of the 
qualified centralised model to data protection, the rights of the 
federal DP officer to monitor the BICA, and to sit on the Europol 
j oint supervisory body remains intact. The primacy of the Federal 
government's voting rights are also maintained. However the 
Lander are given the right to have a representative on the JSB 
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as well, and their DP officers are empowered to participate in 
the monitoring of the data processed at Europol. In one sense the 
centralised DP functions of the Federal Data Protector will 
remain, but the state DP officers will have a qualified right to 
circumvent the central authorities. 
6.5: OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: STRATEGIC/TACTICAL 
6.5.1: INTERNATIONAL - NATIONAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Throughout the course of the German aspect of the research, the 
same problems about the lack of any executive/operational powers 
for Europol were voiced. It was frequently commented that Germany 
does not need a non-operational Europol, as there are other 
channels which already perform Europol 's current functions. There 
was also a sense of labouring under a political imperative to 
make the organisation work, rather than there being a true sense 
of conviction. One remark about having to pass information to 
Europol so that the organisation would not starve, was 
particularly revealing. 
There was also a belief, however, that Europol may be 
surreptitiously positioning itself for a possible future 
incremental increase in its operational capacity. This, it was 
claimed, is increasingly evident, in its quasi-operational role 
in the coordination of controlled deliveries and cross border 
investigations across Europe. In its own defence, the EDU states 
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quite categorically, that it never takes over an operation, but 
simply provides the forum through which coordination can take 
place. It operates at all times at the behest of member states, 
and only becomes involved to the extent necessary to add value 
to national operations. However, at least one influential source 
within the BKA voiced his belief that the EOU has already gone 
past the purely intelligence related mandate laid down in the 
Ministerial Agreement and the Europol Convention. 
The controlled delivery of drug consignments across national 
borders appears to be the principal form of quasi-operation 
conducted by the EOU. An ELO at the EOU gave a description of how 
a typical controlled delivery might be organised. Intelligence 
on or the discovery of a consignment entering Germany from 
Poland, and bound for the Netherlands or the UK could conceivably 
pass through four or five countries en route to its final 
destination. To acquire the necessary surveillance assistance and 
cooperation, the state organising the operation, in this case 
Germany, would firstly contact and brief its ELOs in the EOU, who 
would in turn liaise with and brief the other relevant ELOs of 
the potential states involved. Each ELO would then arrange for 
the necessary police cooperation in his state, in the form of 
surveillance teams, tracking equipment etc, as well as the 
necessary consent of the public prosecutors, for a drug 
consignment to pass through the area of his authority unmolested. 
The EDU claims to be able to organise an operation such as this 
within one hour. However, from a German perspective this speed 
and flexibility does not appear to be sufficient justification 
for Europol's existence in its current form. The point was made 
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several times during the research that the ability to organise 
and coordinate controlled deliveries is nothing new, and has been 
done by the Drug Liaison Officer system for years prior to 
Europol. The surprising claim was also made, that despite the 
EDU's ability to coordinate everything under one rOOf, controlled 
deliveries via the DLO system is easier. This claim was based on 
the fact that DLOs have had much more experience in the past of 
dealing with these types of operations. Also the point was 
emphasised that many types of transnational crimes such as 
trafficking in stolen vehicles does not stop at the borders of 
the European Union. Fighting these types of offences requires 
liaison officers in Kiev, Moscow, etc, and as such Europol 
channels could not be used as the ELO system only covers the EU. 
Other complaints made with respect to Europol's contribution 
to operational considerations were that the general quality of 
the jobs undertaken was not particularly high, and that there 
were invariably problems of duplication and channel crossover. 
Despite initiatives such as the Interpol special committee called 
the Regionalisation and Coordination of European Law Enforcement 
Initiatives, which generates proposals on how to avoid 
duplication between Interpol and the EDU, as well as the growing 
practice of each organisation having observer status at the 
others working group meetings, there is still considerable 
evidence of duplication of efforts. This does not just apply to 
Interpol and the EDU but includes the DLO network, and in some 
instances bi-lateral arrangements as well. 
In this respect Germany suffers from not having the equivalent 
of NCIS's International Division which decides where to channel 
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information, requests, operations etc. The problem is exacerbated 
by channel crossover in that a case can cross over between 
different agencies. Germany identifies four main channels for 
international police cooperation. These are: Interpol; Schengen; 
Europol, and the OLO network. Of these, the BKA uses Interpol for 
well over 90\ of its international enquiries such as information 
exchange, the dissemination of wanted notices and the exchange 
of evidence. The Schengen Information System is routinely used 
by German police officers, particularly the Federal Border 
Police, for such areas as missing persons, stolen/wanted 
property, aliens, persons subject to arrest and extradition 
warrants etc, and the OLO network is the preferred agency for the 
acquisition of intelligence and the coordination of cross border 
operations such as controlled deliveries. 
As these channels cover virtually the entire range of 
international police cooperation, the question arises as to what 
gap Europol will be able to fill from the perspective of German 
operational policing requirements. In the absence of 
operational/executive 
identified Europol's 
powers, respondents in the research 
main role as the construction of 
intelligence projects. The idea of pro-active project based work 
is one that has wide currency in some northern European states 
such as Germany and the Netherlands. Under the leadership of 
Jurgen Storbeck the EDU has wasted little time in pursuing this 
goal. Despite official denials, the EDU has created a system of 
specialised cluster groupings, whereby ELOs from different states 
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form groups that work on specific projects. Some of these 
clusters are as follows: 
- South American routes and Colombian cartels (cocaine) 
- The Balkan drug route 
- Turkish groups 
- Money laundering 
- Hells Angels 
- Undercover operations 
- Witness protection 
- Precursors/essential chemicals 
The members of these clusters specialise in their respective 
areas, and aim to develop analysis packages that can be 
disseminated to member states for tactical resolution. While 
respondents in Germany admitted that to date the majority of 
analysis packages have been from the BKA to the EDU, instead of 
the other way round, it is clear that the German view of the 
long-term usefulness of EDU project based work is the future 
incremental implementation of an operational arm that will 
complement the intelligence clusters. 
The closeness between the strategic and the tactical here is 
clear. The view expressed many times during the research was that 
Europol as an auxiliary intelligence arm that strove to add value 
to centralised national units was not sufficient on its own. One 
source in the BKA made the point that, inasmuch as it can be 
shown that there is a threat of transnational criminality facing 
Europe that requires a national response, logic would dictate 
that a European response should be even more vital. However this 
Source went on to state, "political sense does not always equate 
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with common sense". The concept of adding value in this case 
entails contributing something to the problem that is not already 
being provided by another agency, and from a German perspective 
that would mean the ability to provide an executive response at 
the European level. 
6.5.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As with the area of information flows, a dichotomy exists 
between federal authority and state autonomy in the field of the 
BKA's centralised operational capacity. The BKA has the power to 
exercise the police functions in the field of criminal 
prosecution if: 
a) it is requested to do so by a competent Land authority; 
b} ordered to do so by the Federal Minister of the Interior on 
serious grounds or; 
c) requested or instructed to do so by the Federal Public 
Prosecutor. 
BKA enforcement officers are responsible only for the 
prosecution of the offences which are specifically referred to 
in the BKAG (BKA Law), or which it has been ordered to prosecute 
by the Federal Minister of the Interior or requested to prosecute 
by the Federal Public Prosecutor. In all other cases BKA officers 
have no material jurisdiction as regards subject matter and no 
local jurisdiction without a request from the competent 
authorities. This means that there are certain circumstances when 
a BKA officer is not a police officer in terms of being able to 
intervene in a situation which does not fall within the BKA's 
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terms of reference. Therefore, a BKA officer who witnesses a 
crime that does not fall within the BKA' s remit cannot intervene, 
but must simply report it to the local police, as long as the 
seriousness of the offence does not seem to necessitate invoking 
national law as an exception. In such a situation, the 
application of emergency assistance rights could also be adopted. 
The decision as to whether a case is one of those specified in 
the BKA Law is taken by the BKA. If it is, the BKA must take over 
the case, unless it waives that requirement in less serious cases 
and refers the case back to the local police by arrangement with 
the Public Prosecutors Office. It also falls to the BKA to 
decide, having considered the basic facts, whether a case is less 
serious. 
The Federal Minister must provide compelling reasons for 
transferring jurisdiction to the BKA. Compelling reasons might 
include the exceptional activity of the criminals involved or the 
effect on the public. The right to prosecute is transferred to 
the BKA by order, request and instruction. If a request is made 
by a Land authority the competence of the police in that Land to 
prosecute is suspended. In the exercise of the responsibilities 
assigned to it, the BKA is empowered to give instructions to the 
local LKA, and the LKA may not refuse the cooperation requested 
unless the BKA is contravening the general rules on official 
assistance. The BKA also has the right to second personnel from 
the LKA. 
In addition, the BKA has the right to coordinate action in 
certain cases. The criterion governing this right of coordination 
is that the offence concerned involves several Lander or 
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indicates links with other offences in other Lander. An offence 
concerns several Lander not only when perpetrators commit or have 
committed crimes in more than one Land, but also when the offence 
has been planned, prepared, executed or aided in more than one 
Land, for example if the proceeds of a robbery in Land A were 
later concealed or disposed of in Land B or if the perpetrators 
live in a different Land from the one in which the crime was 
committed. An offence is also deemed to concern more than one 
Land when several participants are permanently resident in more 
than one Land. 
Connections with crimes in other Lander, however, occur mainly 
with travelling lawbreakers and these crimes can often only be 
dealt with successfully if one police department is in charge of 
the prosecution of all offences in collaboration with one Public 
Prosecutor's Office. When' the prosecution is fragmented and 
parallel investigations are conducted, this not only weakens the 
case but also results in legally unsatisfactory penalties by the 
courts. 
The area of the BKA's coordination role is one that will be 
explored in later chapters, as the experience of coordinating 
investigations and operations within a federal state will have 
important implications for the execution of the German dream of 
an operational Europol one day. Suffice it to say at present that 
the criteria governing the operational competence of the BKA, as 
with the area of information flows, is based on a combination of 
legislation and requests/orders. Other factors that come into 
play include: the trans-regional nature of offences; the 
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resources of specific Lander, as poorer states are more likely 
to hand over competence for lengthy or expensive cases than 
wealthier ones; and the fear of losing operational control. 
6.5.3: SPBCIAL TREATMENT 
As with the area of information flows, the research uncovered 
the fact that the LKA, and even in some instances local forces, 
are allowed special treatment in operational liaison with the 
EDU. The most prominent form of input is via the meetings of the 
Heads of the National Units at the EDU. These meetings prioritize 
project choice decisions for the EDU, with each member state 
suggesting one project. The LKA have the right to petition the 
BKA to propose a project that is of interest to it. This right 
of initiation, apart from allowing decentralised input into the 
EDU's project choice decisions, also ensures that the LKA are 
kept abreast of the specific information/intelligence that the 
EDU requires. From a German perspective, this helps to prevent 
the EDU from being bombarded with information that it does not 
need, while ensuring it is targeted with the relevant information 
necessary for the fulfilment of its remit. 
This however is not the only way in which operational special 
treatment works. Examples were given during the research of 
numerous occasions in which the German ELOs worked with LKA, and 
even local forces on small scale analysis proj ects so as to 
facilitate rapid tactical solutions. German ELOs have also been 
contacted directly for their assistance in setting up and 
coordinating operations and investigations. This process has been 
185) 
greatly encouraged by the Coordinator of Europol, who in 
addresses to German police officers, has invited the use of 
operational special treatment. 
In the absence of operational powers, there is an acceptance 
at the highest policing levels in Germany, that for Europol to 
be accepted at, and acquire the information it needs from, the 
regional and local levels, it will have to prove that it is of 
some practical tactical relevance to these levels. Apart from 
constitutional requirements, it is therefore within this context 
that the concept of special treatment has been introduced. The 
emphasis at the regional and local levels however, has not been 
on Europol' s capacity to provide overall strategic views of 
transnational crime in Europe, but its usefulness in adding value 
to local tactical concerns. In the absence of its own field 
intelligence operatives, if Europol wishes to increase the 
quality and number of the jobs it deals with annually, it will 
have to accept that the price may well be a growing encroachment 
of the tactical over the strategic. 
6.5.4: CONCLUSION 
From the data presented in this case study, it is possible to 
make two observations. The first is that the changes highlighted 
in the case study have been quite obviously a function of the 
German decentralised federal system. The participatory 
concessions that have been gained by the LKA and to a lesser 
extent the local police in the areas of information flows, data 
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protection and operational considerations, have been greatly 
facilitated by the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the 
Lander. However despite this fact, if it wanted to, it would not 
have been impossible for the Federal government to have amended 
the constitution so as to uphold the Europol Convention's 
stipulation that all contacts must be funnelled through the 
centralised national unit. What instead tipped the Minister of 
the Interior in favour of granting special treatment, was the 
realisation of the limitations of a purely centralised mode of 
coordination between the EDU and the BKA. 
Europol cannot fulfil its remit without the cooperation of all 
layers of policing, not just the national level. Police officers 
who are traditionally reluctant to share information anyway, may 
very well be suspicious of passing information into a perceived 
supranational 'black hole' if there are no tangible reciprocal 
benefits. For this reason the initial centralised mode of 
information exchange, as envisaged in the Ministerial Agreement 
and the Convention, very quickly evolved into a qualified 
centralised mode, in which the national unit had formal rights 
of contact, which were supplemented by a qualified right of the 
LKA to circumvent the national unit, within specified parameters. 
The facilitation of special treatment was made all the easier by 
the constitutional autonomy of the Lander. 
Despite the federal characteristics of the German system, which 
helped facilitate the rapid changeover from centralised to 
qualified centralised modes, the tactical imperatives of police 
cooperation are such as to theorise that the same process will 
repeat itself in any policing system, irrespective of the 
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political structure of the state. In the following case studies 
this proposition will be explored, and the findings will be 
compared with the findings of this initial study, so as to verify 
the following analytic iteration that: 
In terms of the vertical (supranational) exchange of 
information/intelligence, the centralised mode will evolve into 
a qualified centralised mode. In such a scenario, an intermediate 
form emerges in which communication is theoretically controlled 
by a central body but with independent communication being 
allowed within specified parameters. This mode presupposes a 
departure from a purely strategic, intelligence lead approach, 
towards a system that mixes tactical with strategic 
considerations'. 
The next case study (the UK) will form a direct contrast with 
Germany particularly as Britain is a unitary as opposed to a 
federal state, but also because of the diametrically opposed view 
of the future of the European Union as a free trading 
confederation of independent nation states instead of a federal 
entity of some description. In one respect however this case 
study will be similar to Germany. Like Germany, Britain has a 
highly decentralised system of policing, although not within the 
same framework of constitutionally separated powers. It will 
therefore be interesting to discover whether or not the 
juxtaposition of a flexible decentralised policing system, within 
the confines of a highly centralised government structure, will 
yield the same results as the German model. 
188) 
CHAPTRR 7: UK CASE STUDy 
7 .1: BACKGROUND 
7.1.1: THE POLICE AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
Despite the centralisation of Britain's parliamentary 
democracy, it does not possess a unitary police service as one 
would expect, but rather a decentralised system whereby there are 
52 forces in the United Kingdom, of which 43 are in England and 
Wales. Each force is headed by a Chief Constable, or in the case 
of the Metropolitan Police, a Commissioner, and the head of each 
force is accountable to a local police authority which generally 
consists of magistrates and local councillors. 
The Home Office is the governmental body in overall charge of 
the police, and in this respect differs from some other European 
states which have separate Ministries of the Interior and 
Justice. The Home Secretary, while being directly responsible for 
the Metropolitan Police in terms of overall policy, is only 
partially responsible for the other police forces in England and 
Wales. In sharing responsibility for these other 42 forces with 
the local police authorities, the Home Secretary is responsible 
for ensuring the efficient running of each force and the 
provision of half of the running costs to be met from central 
government funds. The police authorities for their parts are 
responsible for maintaining an adequate and efficient police 
force, as well as meeting the other half of the running costs 
from local taxation. 
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The English criminal justice system is unitary in nature in 
that there is a single body of laws that is applicable across the 
country and to all police forces. The system is adversarial as 
opposed to the inquisitorial system conunon among continental 
European states. The police have historically had the power to 
decide on prosecutions, until the Prosecutions of Offences Act 
1985, which saw the introduction of the Crown Prosecutions 
Service, under the control of a Director of Public Prosecutions, 
the role of which was to take over the initiation and conduct of 
prosecutions from the police. The Director of Public Prosecutions 
is in turn directly accountable to the Attorney General. 
Van den Wyngaert outlines the basic principles of the 
adversarial system by stating: "The criminal process (in England 
and Wales) is overwhelmingly adversarial in character, so that 
the trial is not so much a search for the truth as a test of the 
evidence that is presented before the court by the parties. It 
is an essential principle that a person is innocent until he is 
proven guilty, and that the burden of proving that guilt is upon 
the prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt. It follows from the 
presumption of innocence that a person who is accused of criminal 
misconduct should generally be permitted his liberty on bail. The 
English system also subscribes to the principle that nobody 
should be tried twice for the same offence, through the operation 
of the defences (really procedural bars) of autrefois acquit or 
autrefois convict." (van den Wyngaert 1993: 82) 
Finally within the context of this research it should be noted 
that historically the UK has not had a national police force. The 
policing system has been decentralised, with the Chief Constable 
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of each force having a fair degree of autonomy within his area 
of responsibility. Areas of serious long term criminality were 
handled by a series of Regional Crime Squads across the country, 
which dealt with crimes of a supraregional, national or 
international nature. This however changed in April 1998 with the 
introduction of a National Crime Squad (NCS). The new NCS is on 
a statutory footing and incorporates the various Regional Crime 
Squads (RCSs), under the control of a Director General. The 
implications of this development will be explored during the 
course of this case study. 
7.1.2: THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NCIS) 
The United Kingdom prides itself, within the context of the 
requirement of the Europol Convention for each state to create 
a national unit, as being the only EU member state to have 
specifically created a new national criminal intelligence 
facility to meet this criterion. The impetus for NCIS came 
through a series of reports since the mid 1970s, such as the 
Baumber Report of 1975, the Pearce Report of 1978, and the 
Ratcliffe Report of 1986, which all highlighted the UK's need for 
a criminal intelligence facility at the national level. Following 
a report by ACPO in 1990, the Home Secretary announced plans for 
such a facility, and set up a Steering Group under his 
chairmanship which included representations from the ACPO, HM 
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Inspectorate of Constabulary, Customs, the Home Office, and the 
local Police Authorities. 
NCIS eventually came into being in 1992. Its objectives are as 
follows: 
1) To be the national focal point to gather, collate, evaluate, 
analyse and develop relevant information and intelligence about 
serious crime and major criminals of a regional, national and 
international nature; 
2) To disseminate information and intelligence to appropriate law 
enforcement agencies; 
3) To provide intelligence and analytical support for the 
appropriate operational and intelligence arms of law enforcement 
services; 
4) To assist in the coordination of operational activity by 
identifying major criminals and the incidence of serious crime 
which are of interest to more than one operational unit; 
5) To help the law enforcement effort by coordinating and 
identifying links between individuals or organisations involved 
in major crime; 
6) To provide strategic intelligence to assist and promote the 
efficient and effective use of operational resources and to 
enable the development of law enforcement strategies; 
7) To identify new trends and crime patterns and disseminate 
intelligence on these to the appropriate law enforcement 
agencies; 
8) To facilitate and monitor the enforcement of requests for 
assistance relating to the proceeds of drugs and other serious 
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crimes, made under bilateral and multilateral confiscation 
agreements; 
9) i) To provide a central point for the receipt of all 
disclosures made under the Drug Trafficking Offences, 
Criminal Justice and Prevention of Terrorism Acts; 
ii) To develop such disclosures through the intelligence 
process and disseminate to the appropriate agency of the 
police service or HM Customs and Excise for further action 
and where appropriate to provide feedback to the disclosing 
body; 
10) To identify and develop sources from which relevant 
information concerning major criminals and serious crimes can be 
obtained; 
11) To provide a nucleus of specialist intelligence personnel who 
are able to advise and assist investigating officers concerning 
operational priorities and deployment of resources; 
12) To establish channels of communication with domestic and 
overseas law enforcement agencies and to provide a national focal 
point for the promotion and exchange of information and 
intelligence about serious crime and major criminals. (NCIS 
Briefing Document, October 1992) 
In addition to its main offices which are based in London, NCIS 
also has 5 regional offices in London (NCIS SE Region), Bristol 
(NClS SW Region), Birmingham (NCIS Midlands Region), Manchester 
(NCIS NW Region), and Wakefield (NClS NE Region). Together these 
regional offices, along with a new NClS office for Scotland 
comprise the UK Division of NCIS. The other two main divisions 
are the Headquarters Division and the International Division. 
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The Headquarters Division is responsible for the provision of 
strategic and tactical intelligence on a wide range of serious 
criminal activity. It includes among others the Organised Crime 
Unit, the Drugs Unit, the Economic Crimes Unit, the Fraud and 
Financial Crimes Section, the Football Unit and the Organised 
Vehicle Crime Section. In addition this division also contains 
an Intelligence Coordination Unit (ICU) which is responsible for 
coordination and development of policy and research, and ensuring 
that the processes for developing and producing intelligence 
provide value for money and meet the needs of NCIS' s main 
customers ( predominantly the various forces), and an Operational 
Support Unit (OSU) which is responsible for the receipt and 
processing of requests from police forces in England and Wales 
for warrants relating to serious crime under the Interception of 
Cormnunications Act 1985 (NCIS HQ Division Briefing Document, 
1995) . 
Finally the International Division is the main liaison point 
for cooperation with external police agencies. Its objectives 
include its acting as a focal point for the international 
exchange of information/intelligence, and the provision of 
strategic and tactical intelligence from an international 
perspective. It includes the UK National Central Bureau (NCB) of 
Interpol, the Europol Liaison Desk Officer, the International 
Projects Unit, and the Drugs Liaison Officer network. 
From the perspective of this research, the International 
Division is the most relevant department of NCIS. The 
organisation is attempting to develop the International Division 
as a "one stop shop" for all enquiries, information etc with 
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respect to international police cooperation. The reason for this 
is twofold. Firstly, the development and provision of strategic 
intelligence mandates that the centre is kept abreast of all 
relevant developments. Secondly, a totally decentralised system 
whereby everyone had freedom to contact whoever they wished would 
ultimately be inefficient, as substantial duplication of effort 
would ensue. Finally the development of the International 
Division as a one stop shop fits in with the requirement of the 
Europol Convention that each state's national unit should be the 
only body that liaises with Europol. Therefore the testing of 
this research's basic question about the viability of the 
centralised mode of information exchange with respect to the UK 
will be greatly influenced by the International Division's 
success in developing its monopoly as a one stop shop. 
7.1.3: COMPUTER SYSTEMS 
Except for the PNC2, which holds information on stolen 
vehicles, vehicle records, and persons who are missing, wanted 
or convicted (as well as appropriate warning flags), the UK does 
not have a central information system such as INPOL in Germany 
to which all forces have access. Each force has its own computer 
system which is often incompatible with the systems of other 
forces. NCIS' s main information system is called ALERT, and 
became operational in 1995. NCIS describes ALERT as "forming the 
backbone of its computer systems and includes features which 
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include: specialised free text; structured data; and analytical 
facilities. In addition, ALERT provides access to other databases 
and up-to-date office systems. It concentrates on turning 
information into intelligence rather than the usual storage and 
retrieval of information and allows the result to be effectively 
presented" (NCIS Press Release 11/94, 25 August 1994). Mainly as 
a security precaution, the ALERT system is purely for the use of 
NCIS officers. 
NCIS also makes use of a system called INFOS (Intelligence 
Network Forcewide System Computer) which is a free text system 
based on a well tried and flexible data retrieval software 
package. One of INFOS' s prime advantages and uses is in the 
flagging of targets. This allows NCIS personnel to ascertain when 
more than one officer or unit is targeting a specific person, 
organisation etc. INFOS is therefore a tool by which duplication 
can be avoided. 
The computer system used by the Regional Crime Squads is called 
CLUE (Computer Language User Easy). An NCIS Computer Support 
Briefing paper describes CLUE as an adaptable IBM computer base 
package developed specially for the needs of the RCS and which 
is easily modified for other applications. It is also capable of 
holding indexes of varying kinds such as nominal, addresses, 
vehicles, telephone numbers etc. providing that the relevant data 
is entered, it can be sorted in such a way as to produce a 
sequence of events log which will be useful in analysing 
operational data. (NClS Computer Support Briefing Document, 
October 1992) NCIS for its part, while having an interface with 
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CLUE, which allows personnel to access information from the 
system, has no ability to input data into the system. 
During the course of the research, the question was put to NCIS 
personnel, 'should the UK have a decentralised intelligence 
database to which officers at all levels should have access?' The 
response was that, with an adequate budget, it would be highly 
desirable to have a national database with access by all levels, 
with those areas that were particularly sensitive, or which 
applied to specific cases, restricted by password. Such a system 
would enable the UK to develop a central repository of criminal 
intelligence for use by all levels of policing, with adequate 
safeguards built in that would protect the security of cases 
being dealt with by the RCS or NCIS. 
In keeping with this belief, NCIS, under the direction of the 
Criminal Intelligence Steering Group, is in the process of 
putting forward a recommendation for the implementation of a 
national system. Part of these recommendations include the 
development of a series of 'data warehouses' to which officers 
at all levels will have rights of access and input. It is 
believed that a prime advantage of such a system will be that all 
the data will not be located on one system at one location. This 
initiative is being complemented by others such as the National 
Standard for Police Information Systems (NSPIS), which represents 
a common format for information systems that has been signed up 
for by ACPO. It aims to implement 'common data models' in 
several areas of policing, and is currently having its first 
trial in Greater Manchester, via a common data model that 
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attempts to standardize the way that cases are prepared for the 
Crown Prosecution System. 
The effect however of the current system is that the UK's 
approach to computerised intelligence systems is highly 
fragmented, with each force having its own systems and software 
which is often incompatible with that of other forces. This can 
mean that officers in different parts of the country often are 
unable to grasp the bigger picture. Such fragmentation lends 
itself towards keeping information to oneself, and quite often 
duplication of effort, despite the coordinating function of NCIS. 
An ACPO Report on International, National and Inter Force Crime 
of 1996, commented quite heavily on a perceived void in the 
police service's ability to gather intelligence at the inter-
force/regional level, particularly with respect to those 
criminals who fall outside of NCIS's definition or remit. This 
is in part a function of the fragmented and often parochial 
approach to computer systems, and can in turn have an effect on 
the desire of force intelligence bureaus to pass on information 
to the 'information blackhole' that is NCIS. This point will be 
developed further, later in this case study. 
7.2: INFORMATION FLOWS 
7.2.1: INTERNATIONAL TO NATIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS 
As with the other states targeted in this research, the main 
criterion governing the exchange of information with the Europol 
Drugs Unit, is the Europol Convention. The mandate for all 
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communications with Europol to go through the national unit of 
each state, is perfectly in keeping with NClS's attempts to make 
its International Division a one stop shop for all international 
communications, which will decide on a case by case scenario, 
which is the best channel for use. NCIS claims that its officers 
in this division will be in the best position to decide when 
information, an enquiry etc should go to Interpol, Europol or the 
DLO network. 
In terms of exchanging information with other states generally, 
one of the main factors affecting this process that emerged 
during the course of the research was the requirement for 
confidentiality within the receiving state's criminal justice and 
jurisdictional process. While the UK generally has few problems 
with accepting tactical intelligence from abroad, especially 
under the new Criminal Procedures and Information Act (CPlA), it 
is usually obliged to attach a lien to all information shared 
externally to the effect that the infonnation shared is not 
disclosable unless and until the UK gives its authority to do so. 
The rationale for this prohibition is based on the requirement 
of some justice systems for the source of the 
information/intelligence to be disclosed. For security reasons, 
it is often ill advised that these sources be revealed, 
particularly where information was gained covertly via telephone 
intercepts, bugging etc. This problem is currently being 
addressed by the P8 Group in an effort to find ways of protecting 
the integrity of tactical intelligence within the confines of 
countries' disclosure laws. This however was one of the main 
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areas emphasised that affects the exchange of information 
internationally. 
Other factors identified that encourages the exchange of 
information with Europol is the convenience of having the ELOs 
of all 15 states under one roof, which in turn has a knock on 
effect on speed. Taking into account the UK's emphasis on 
security, Europol's status as a virtually closed intelligence 
system is an added bonus. Security was cited as a prime reason 
why Europol was born in the face of Interpol. Inasmuch as 
Interpol's charter requires it to exchange information freely 
with any and all its members, the UK has shied away from passing 
on any tactical or operational intelligence. While there are 
little or no concerns about passing on strategic 
information/intelligence on strategic threats or post case 
analyses, the UK would not want to pass on tactical intelligence 
on terrorist threats to an organisation where the Libyans, 
Iranians etc could have access to it. 
Interpol therefore is seen as an instrument, second to none, 
for the routine procedure of international police communications 
and the processing of requests for information and assistance. 
Europol however, while as a political construct is assured of 
survival, will depend for its ultimate success on its ability to 
be operationally useful through the processing of tactical 
intelligence. 
This emphasis on Europol' s tactical usefulness is of particular 
relevance to the basic parameters of this research. If Europol 
is to be exclusively concerned with the provision of a strategic 
overview of serious crime in Europe, the centralised mode of 
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information exchange will be the most obvious route to achieving 
this as it will be necessary for the centre to be in possession 
of all the relevant information at all times. If, on the other 
hand, Europol is equally expected to be of tactical relevance, 
in terms of the coordination of operations, investigations etc, 
it will be extremely difficult to achieve this by funnelling all 
contacts through the Europol Desk Officer at the International 
Division. Police officers who traditionally take the quickest 
route to the operational success of their own priorities, are 
increasingly likely to bypass NCIS, and deal directly with 
Europol, particularly where there is only interest in one's own 
parochial problem as opposed to the larger picture. 
Another factor that impacts heavily on the channel of 
cooperation used, is the status of ELOS as opposed to DLOs. UK 
DLOs are attached to UK embassies in the countries to which they 
are posted and are accorded the status of First Secretary (as are 
the DLOs of all other European states). Therefore, a DLO in 
approaching a foreign Chief of Police with tactical intelligence 
that requires the allocation of resources, has the prerogative 
of presenting the UK Ambassador's compliments when requesting 
these resources. Should the request be refused, there is the 
leverage of the UK Ambassador presenting a protest to the Foreign 
Secretary of the state concerned. This authority means that a DLO 
stands a very good chance of having his requests acceded to. 
ELOs on the other hand, are generally middle ranking officers 
of the rank of superintendent or the equivalent. Without a 
comparable status to their DLO counterparts, they do not have the 
same authority, and consequently their requests do not carry as 
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much weight. This can therefore affect the decision as to when 
to use a DLO as opposed to an ELO, and may partly account for the 
reason why officers interviewed at the BKA in Germany admitted 
that some cross border operations such as controlled deliveries 
were easier through the DLO network than Europol. It is not 
necessarily a reflection on the viability of one organisation 
against the next but rather a reflection on the imbalance in 
status between the two. 
Paradoxically, several EU states are now in the process of 
running down their DLO network in favour of ELOs. This may be 
partly due to the fact that criticism about duplication of effort 
between DLOs and ELOS has lead to a reduction of one in the 
interest of efficiency. Inasmuch as Europol is a political 
creation, and there is a strong impetus for it to succeed, if 
rationalisation has to take place, the DLO network may be 
considered the easier target. The UK, for its part, with its 
emphasis on national priorities is against a diminution of the 
DLO network. Nevertheless its relationship with Europol, though 
described as patchy to begin with, is now improving. This 
relationship is likely to continue improving, especially if 
Europol can significantly show itself to be tactically useful in 
combatting serious international crime. 
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7.2.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL/FORCE CONSIDERATIONS 
The criteria which governs the passing of information by the 
various Force Intelligence Bureaus, or the RCS to NCIS are as 
follows: 
1) Service Level Agreements: A service level agreement (SLA) is 
an official agreement which sets out what both parties agree to 
do for the other. It differs from other agreements such as: 
a) a Memorandum of Understanding, which is a lesser document, 
and is sometimes agreed on a case by case basis, or on a 
generality as when one country agrees in an MOU to be 
understanding to the needs of another country, or 
b) an operational protocol, which generally deals at a tactical 
level with specific operations. 
Prior to the adoption of service level agreements, forces 
operated via clear but informal understandings about what was 
expected from other forces or agencies. If these conditions were 
not met, commanding officers would have an informal chat with 
their opposite number and try to resolve the situation. Under the 
current system however, the service to be provided by each party 
is clearly delineated. In its proper form, an SLA should also 
include a complaints and arbitration procedure to be adopted in 
the event of one party breaking its side of the agreement, and 
a system of penalties, usually financial, that should be imposed 
on the guilty party. An example that was given related to the SLA 
governing the provision of air support by the Metropolitan 
Police's aerial surveillance unit to the ReS. The SLA lays down 
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the service that the aerial unit agrees to provide, and the cost 
per hour, as well as the number of hours per month that the RCS 
agrees to use the unit. 
NClS has a plethora of SLAs which governs its relationships 
with a range of bodies, including Customs, the Benefits Agencies 
and the Security Services. NClS also has an SLA with ACPO which 
governs its exchange of information with the 43 police forces of 
England and Wales, as well as the RCSs. The gist of this SLA is 
mirrored in NClS's Mission Statement and Statement of Purpose 
which is: 
a) To provide a quality service in the gathering, collation, 
evaluation, analysis and development of relevant information 
and intelligence about serious crime (excluding terrorism) 
and major criminals of regional, national and international 
interest; 
b) To disseminate that information and intelligence to the 
appropriate law enforcement agencies, so as to facilitate 
the bringing to justice of offenders; 
c) To coordinate other nominated intelligence functions. 
2) Core nominal system: The core nominal system consists of a 
database containing a core of 366 major criminals who are 
involved with serious criminal activity on a regional, national 
or international basis. This database was originally created 
through forces, HMCE and the RCSs, at the request of NClS, 
submitting the names of their top criminals. These names were 
then sifted according to certain criteria such as previous 
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convictions, associations etc, until the final figure of 366 was 
arrived at. 
The core nominal system is further complemented by a system of 
current nominals, which according to NeIS are also top criminals 
of international, national or regional significance who do not 
qualify for the status of core nominals but nevertheless are 
actively engaged in the commission of serious crime. (NCIS Annual 
Report 1994) The number of current nominals currently stands at 
3378. 
Within the context of the criteria for passing on information 
to NeIS re core nominals therefore, the salient points are the 
quality of the offender, the quality of the crime they are 
involved with, and the prospects for the disruption to their 
organisation. This last point has become of increasing importance 
to NeIS's approach to combatting serious crime. NCIS's 
intelligence system tends to be target rather than product 
oriented. Towards this end, the core nominal system is aimed at 
the "kingpin players", who control serious crime, and yet manage 
to keep their hands clean, thereby becoming virtually 
untouchable. While the main emphasis remains the prosecution of 
these persons, equal time is also rendered towards the disruption 
of their organisations. A carefully planned and executed 
operation that takes out some key personnel of such an 
organisation, while relieving it of a large share of its 
financial resources, through the confiscation of assets, can set 
the organisation back as much as 10 years. Where certain types 
of criminal organisations are concerned, sufficient damage will 
lead to their place in the market being taken by someone else. 
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Recovery of trust and influence could take years to achieve again 
(an example of this type of operation is given on pages 220 -
221). This in turn can have an effect on the type of information 
that NCIS requires from forces and the RCS. 
Part of the evolutionary thinking towards the core nominal 
system is the plan to create more flexibility in the system, 
whereby every core nominal will be owned by a particular agency, 
be it Customs, RCS etc. Under this system every core nominal will 
be actively concentrated on by someone, even when he or she is 
in prison. Such a system should be sufficiently flexible to allow 
a current nominal target who rises in significance in the 
criminal world to be elevated to core nominal status, thereby in 
the process raising the core nominal ceiling to accommodate him. 
One significant drawback of this system of targeting was 
identified by the ACPO Report on International, National and 
Inter Force Crime of 1996. This report identified a void in 
intelligence coordination at the inter force level particularly 
in the sense that when NCIS disseminates intelligence on core 
nominals to the forces, it is not telling the forces anything it 
does not already know, in light of the fact that the initial 
information on core nominals came originally from the forces 
themselves. This however can only be significant where forces 
receive information back on their own nominals, as they would not 
necessarily have information or intelligence on nominals from 
other forces. The report goes on to state: 
"What is apparent from the above is that the Service is not 
best served by its intelligence gathering capabilities at the 
inter-force/regional level. There is no focal point - no 'one 
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stop shop' using popular parlance. For their part NCIS are only 
likely to enter the equation when the crime or criminal meets 
their criteria for selection, which in the main is far too 
restrictive to encompass the type of criminal and the nature of 
criminality that forces are dealing with on a daily basis. The 
consequence of this is, that whilst the police service has the 
capability to gather intelligence at a local level (for all 
forces have criminal intelligence offices, and NCIS continues to 
address criminality at a higher level) an obvious void is created 
in the capacity to gather criminal intelligence at the inter-
force/regional levels. This is the level at which over 262,906 
crimes or 5% of the nation's crime is conunitted." (ACPO Report 
on International, National and Inter-Force Crime, February 1996: 
33) This drawback could well have repercussions in terms of the 
central question of this research, and will be addressed in the 
next section. 
Finally the criterion used for grading information/intelligence 
passed up to NCIS is called the 4*4 system. The purpose of this 
system is for vetting information passed up to NCIS with 
reference to its accuracy, motives (of informants), how the 
information was acquired etc. The range of validity can run from 
A to 0, with levels of corroboration running from 1 to 4. 
Therefore intelligence that is graded between Al to A4 will be 
of the very highest calibre, while those rated between 01 to 04 
will be of the lowest level of reliability, needing substantial 
further corroboration and authentication before being further 
refined by NCIS. The process of grading is generally performed 
by desk officers, before the incoming information is refined into 
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actionable intelligence. In this way, NelS ensures that the 
information it deals with is of the highest quality, and in 
keeping with its core nominal priorities. 
Other factors identified during the course of the research that 
affects the exchange of information between the national 
force/regional levels are as follows: 
1) Poor feedback: In terms of sharing information with NelS, the 
organisation is sometimes seen as an information blackhole, in 
that it has acquired a bad reputation for debriefing or giving 
feedbacks to force intelligence bureaus (FIBs) about the outcome 
of information/intelligence that has been passed up to it. One 
respondent claimed that NelS was even bad at saying thank you for 
information received. This naturally has the effect of alienating 
FIBs, which manifests itself in a reluctance to pass on 
information the next time. The problem is further exacerbated by 
the fact that there is often a lack of interest at force level 
about NelS's needs as the level of crime that NelS deals with 
does not always affect the forces. The point was made however 
that this problem is endemic through out the police service, and 
is not just confined to NelS. 
2) Keeping control of information: This has already been 
identified as a perennial problem of police officers everywhere, 
in that they are generally interested in their own local policing 
problems, often to the exclusion of all else. This inevitably 
leads to duplication. Part of the problem identified during the 
research is that police officers are often not trained in the 
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value of intelligence, and are often not aware that their 
intelligence may be only one part of a much larger picture. 
Dealing with this problem therefore mandates that officers at all 
levels are educated in the usefulness of their 
information/intelligence to others. This would involve higher 
levels such as NelS being more forthcoming in their responses and 
feedback, which as highlighted in the previous section, it has 
not been very successful at to date. 
7 . 3: DIRECT CONTACTS 
In attempting to promote its International Division as a 'one 
stop shop', NelS advertises itself as the gateway to the rest of 
Europe. This is necessary, both for developing strategic 
intelligence and for maintaining quality control, particularly 
as in theory, NelS has expert knowledge in the quickest route for 
all enquiries. 
However, despite these efforts, there has been a history of 
officers at the force, and particularly the ReS level, 
circumventing NelS, and having direct contacts with the UK ELOs 
at Europol. One respondent at NelS commented on this practice by 
stating: "policemen being policemen will bypass anything if they 
get a response." This position was confirmed by one of the UK 
ELOs interviewed. He stated that the two UK ELOs get direct 
requests for information and assistance all the time, to which 
they never say no. The one proviso on these direct contacts 
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however is that the answers are generally either channelled back 
through NCIS, or where an answer is given directly, NCIS is 
briefed on the response. The point was reiterated however, that 
officially the correct process should be that all contacts are 
made via NCIS. However, unofficially, the ELOs are prepared to 
deal directly with officers at various levels of policing in the 
UK, in the interests of operational expediency, and developing 
a good working relationship with the various policing and customs 
agencies. 
There is not however in the UK, the same quasi official 
blessing to this practice as in Germany, where it has become 
officially sanctioned. While there was the admission that this 
practice takes place, and that it will in all likelihood increase 
in the future, there is still the belief that it needs to be 
restricted as much as possible. There is little objection to 
officers, especially from the ReS making what are described as 
'what if enquiries,' or passing routine information directly to 
the UK's ELOs, once NCIS is kept informed. However there is the 
feeling that anything more involved, particularly in respect to 
putting together operations directly, should be discouraged. In 
keeping with the development of NCIS as a 'one stop shop,' it lS 
important to be able to show a direct line of communication that 
goes through the proper channels (i.e. the International 
Division) so that other interested parties such as the DLOs are 
kept informed. 
Finally, during the course of research, the point was made that 
the Police and Customs Operational Protocol recognizes that there 
is nothing wrong with officers contacting their opposite numbers 
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in other countries directly as a preliminary manoeuvre. If this 
is permissible, it follows that there can be little wrong with 
contacting a UK liaison officer directly either, albeit that this 
liaison officer is based at Europol. In respect of information 
flows therefore, NelS, like the BKA, has found it virtually 
impossible to preserve its Convention based monopoly of liaison 
with Europol. 
7.4: DATA PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS 
Data protection in the UK is governed by the Data Protection 
Act of 1984. This act is primarily concerned with regulating the 
use of data rather than with human rights considerations. One 
police respondent attributed this to public apathy stemming from 
the UK not having been occupied during the Second World War. The 
higher sense of data protection awareness of some continental 
states as the Netherlands can be seen as a function of the misuse 
of official documents by the Germans that inevitably had 
catastrophic consequences. 
During the research, the only areas highlighted in which data 
protection affects the exchange of information/intelligence was 
in the requirements that sources of information be protected, and 
that information exchanged was only used for the purposes for 
which it was originally exchanged. To this end, a caveat is 
usually attached to all information or tactical intelligence 
exchanged that it is not to be used without the authority of the 
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UK officer/agency transmitting the information. Even under these 
conditions, care is still usually taken over the contents of 
transmissions. As a rule the UK does not identify to its foreign 
counterparts the source of intelligence shared, and this often 
means maintaining a tight balance, as the judicial procedures of 
some European states require the disclosure of the source of 
intelligence that leads to a prosecution. 
One example was given of a prosecution resulting from a joint 
UK and Dutch operation. During the preliminary proceedings, the 
UK officer was asked how the operation originated, and was unable 
to give a reply, because the operation was initiated as a result 
of a telephone intercept, and Section 9 of the Interception of 
Communications Act forbids the public disclosure by the police 
of the source of intercepted information. Consequently the 
British officer's evidence was discounted. The result was 
described as "a legal minefield." 
Another example revolved around intelligence passed to another 
state about the imminent arrival of a boat carrying a consignment 
of drugs at a particular port at a specific data and time. The 
originating officer also unwisely gave the current latitude and 
longitude of the vessel, which indicated that there was a Global 
Positioning System aboard the boat that had been planted by the 
police. As the receiving state did not have a disclosure 
exemption, it was obliged to give in evidence that the source of 
the intelligence was a tracking beacon on the vessel. This lead 
to further questions being raised about police activities with 
respect to the planting of the tracking device, questions which 
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the UK police were not prepared to give any further details on. 
Consequently the case was thrown out of court. 
Despi te these setbacks however, the general opinion from 
respondents was that data protection legislation does not 
seriously hamper the UK's ability to exchange tactical 
intelligence. The point was made, particularly with reference to 
the last example given, that if the UK had intelligence about the 
imminent arrival of a consignment of drugs or arms, or an 
assassination attempt in another country, it would be dilatory 
of the UK if it did not pass on this intelligence (the 
implication being, in spite of data protection restrictions) . 
In response however to the question of whether the UK's data 
protection laws prohibits the UK from exchanging information with 
states that do not have data protection legislation, responses 
to this were invariably vague. One officer's reply to this 
question was: "Whether a strict interpretation of UK Data 
Protection Law does or does not, we have not been inhibited in 
passing intelligence to counterparts where we have been satisfied 
of their bona fides that this intelligence will remain 
confidential." 
This statement indicates, particularly in respect to sharing 
information among member states of Europol that have had no DP 
regulations in the past such as Italy and Greece, that what is 
of greater relevance is the trust that exists between police 
officers than a strict adherence to formal DP legislation. Within 
what is at present a fairly closed Europol system, which has few 
exchanges of information with third countries or agencies, the 
trust that is developing between officers at force or RCS level 
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and the UK ELOs, either via NCIS or directly, is what appears to 
be driving the exchange of information rather than what is 
formally allowed under the DP law. While this can be also said 
to apply to the DLO network, it cannot be applied to Interpol for 
the same reason. Because Interpol is an open system, intelligence 
shared with Interpol could end up anywhere. 
As in other areas, this will change when the Europol Convention 
is completely ratified, and Europol proper comes into existence. 
Then the organisation will have its own database and data 
protection regulations and governing bodies. This however is now 
not likely until the year 2000. At present, national DP laws 
govern the exchange of information, and from the UK's perspective 
have less importance than trust and expediency. 
7.5: OPERATIONAL FACTORS 
7.5.1: INTERNATIONAL - NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As with the section on information flows, the main criterion 
that governs the decision to take operations or tactical 
intelligence to Europol is its utility as a facilitator of 
domestic operations that have an international dimension and 
therefore require coordination. While Interpol has been described 
as: "an information and trends communicator, who by its charter 
has to share things with all its members," Europol is seen as 
being more operationally focused and relevant. 
During the course of the research at NCIS, one problem area 
identified was the development of the organisation as a gateway 
to the rest of Europe and the world. This gateway function is 
seen as necessary both for the prevention of duplication and for 
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keeping the centre updated. It is also necessary however so as 
to promote trust in officers at all levels, in the knowledge that 
any information that is required re dealing with other states is 
readily available at NCIS. The problem however with this gateway 
function is that it is not NCIS's primary function. The 
organisation's primary function is intelligence, and yet, it is 
increasingly obliged to divert resources to other duties such as 
this as well as tactical operations. This results in a 
substantial imbalance between tactical and strategic in favour 
of the former. 
The same reasoning can likewise be applied to Europol. Police 
officers tend overwhelmingly to be concerned exclusively with 
their own tactical priorities. In accepting tactical intelligence 
from national units or police agencies at other levels, Europol 
is trying to build a good relationship with these units. In the 
process however, it is contributing to the increasing imbalance 
between tactical and the strategic that is also evident at the 
national and other levels of policing. Yet it cannot afford to 
ignore the tactical priorities of officers at the regional or 
force level as it invariably depends on these officers to furnish 
it, via the national units, with the information/intelligence it 
needs to fulfil its prime strategic remit. Hence the reason why 
one of the main criteria for UK police officers, particularly in 
the ReSs, dealing with Europol, was its tactical operational 
utility. 
One of the main types of operation that Europol gets involved 
with is controlled deliveries. An example given by one of the 
UK's ELOs is as follows: 
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An operation arose (in 1995) as a result of an exchange of 
requests for information between the Irish and Spanish police. 
The Irish police had identified 2 Irish drug traffickers who they 
understood were going to collect a fairly sizable consignment of 
cannabis from Spain, and transport it through Europe to Ireland. 
The problem for the Irish police though was that they did not 
know exactly where the 2 targets were collecting the consignment 
from, except that it would be somewhere near the Spanish/French 
border. When the 2 targets finally took a flight to France, the 
Irish police contacted Europol to request the coordination of a 
controlled delivery, beginning with a surveillance on the 2 
targets once they landed at Charles De Gaulle Airport. 
Under the coordination of Europol, the French police agreed to 
keep the 2 targets under constant surveillance, and consequently 
they were followed from the French airport to the Spanish border. 
As the targets crossed the border into Spain, the Spanish ELO at 
Europol arranged for the Spanish police to take over the 
surveillance operation. The targets met a lorry in northern 
Spain, and then travelled back through Spain, France, then 
Belgium, before returning to France, and then taking a ferry 
across to the UK, for the final leg of the journey back to 
Ireland. Europol coordinated the handover of surveillance from 
police force to police force each time the lorry entered a new 
country or policing authority. Ultimately, when the lorry reached 
its destination in Ireland, the traffickers and those receiving 
it were arrested and prosecuted. 
Controlled deliveries however, do not always consist of 
surveillance of lorries or containers. It may also take the form 
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of postal deliveries, air courier deliveries, air passengers 
suspected or identified as carrying drugs etc. Another similar 
type of operation can consist of the controlled delivery of 
consignments of illegal immigrants. These however have proved 
more difficult to coordinate due to a reluctance of some states 
to cooperate in these operations. One example was given of an 
attempted controlled delivery of illegal inunigrants bound for the 
UK. While cooperation was forthcoming from the authorities in the 
Netherlands, it was not from France and Belgium together. 
Permission was gained from these two states separately under 
certain conditions, but not together, particularly as the 
requests being made were not legally possible in France, and 
consequently the operation had to be abandoned. The reasons for 
these problems can vary from a lack of sympathy by one state for 
the laws of another to, as in this case, the sensitive nature of 
the particular offence involved (immigration). 
During the research carried out at the Bundeskriminalamt the 
conviction was expressed that controlled deliveries were easier 
with the DLO network than with Europol. When this question was 
raised during the fieldwork at NelS it elicited a different 
response. Firstly, from NelS's view, there is a difference 
between controlled deliveries that are the product of undercover 
operations, and those that are non planned and that arise in 
isolation. One such scenario would be where Spanish authorities 
discover a consignment of drugs in a lorry bound for Denmark via 
France and the Netherlands. Such an operation that arises on the 
spot, and not as a result of protracted undercover surveillance, 
requires a quick response, and is ideally suited for Europol to 
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coordinate, as opposed to DLOs who are country specific. DLOs on 
the other hand are more effective in a specific tactical 
operation in the country where they are based. In such 
circumstances, they can draw upon their relationships with the 
local policing agencies, and be of greater utility than ELOs. 
Another reason for the disparity in view between the BKA and 
NelS lies in the differing national positions on the future 
viability of an operational Europol. The German view that 
controlled deliveries are easier via the DLO network can be 
understood in terms of their vision of an operational Europol. 
If it can be shown that in light of the existence of Interpol and 
the DLOs, there is no need for another intelligence exchange 
organisation, it may lend greater credibility to their claims 
that Europol' s true calling should be in filling the gap in 
operational policing at the supranational level. The British view 
on the other hand is that the current situation in which there 
are varying judicial and policing systems and procedures, 
precludes any possibility in the foreseeable future of such a 
supranational policing facility. What is therefore required is 
greater efficiency in mutual legal assistance treaties, and 
cooperation generally. 
Another criterion which governs the decision to pass actionable 
intelligence to the DLO network as opposed to Europol is the 
differential in status between the DLOs and the ELOs (as 
emphasised in the section on information flows). Again another 
example was given of a British operation concerning the imminent 
arrival of a shipment of cocaine in Holland. When this 
intelligence was taken to the Dutch authorities, they were unable 
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to allocate the appropriate resources to it as the shipment was 
due to arrive on a Saturday, and the force in question did not 
have sufficient overtime resources to deal with this operation. 
Because of the importance of this case to the UK, the DLO 
attached to the UK embassy in Holland was able to go to the Chief 
Commissioner of Amsterdam, present the Ambassador's compliments, 
and seek that adequate resources be provided for this operation. 
As the DLO had the authority of First Secretary status, the Chief 
Commissioner was obliged to provide the necessary resources for 
the operation to take place, especially as to refuse would have 
culminated in the lodging of a protest by the UK Ambassador to 
the Dutch Foreign Secretary. In relating this example, the point 
was made that had this operation been conducted via an ELO, who 
would have been of the rank of superintendent or thereabouts, he 
would not have had the clout with which to gain compliance for 
his requests. Hence the reason that one operational reason for 
deciding to use a DLO as opposed to an ELO is the status 
differential between the two. 
From NCIS' s perspective therefore, the allocation of 
responsibility between the 3 main channels of operational 
cooperation are as follows: 
a) Interpol: The exchange of routine low level information and 
evidence; 
b) Europol: The coordination of multinational operations and 
investigations; unplanned controlled deliveries; a facilitator 
of tactical intelligence. 
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c) The DLO network: For use in specific countries where local 
knowledge is required; for use in situations where extra 
diplomatic authority is required. 
7.5.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL FACTORS 
Arguably one of the most important factors in considering the 
passing of operational competence from the regional to the 
national level in the UK is the introduction of a National Crime 
Squad which is planned for April 1998. Since 1965 operations that 
have been regional (i.e. above force level, or involving more 
than one force) or international in nature have been handled by 
the Regional Crime Squads (RCS). The concept of the travelling 
criminal, therefore, whose activities cover more than one force 
area, was one of the main reasons why the regional crime squads 
were initially instituted. 
While the original terms of reference of the RCS were: "To 
identify and arrest those responsible for offences which 
transcend Force and Regional boundaries, and at the request of 
chief officers, to assist in the investigation of very serious 
crime," its current terms of reference are as follows: 
"To identify and arrest persons responsible for serious criminal 
offences within that region, (the region in which the squad is 
based) nationally and internationally; 
At the request of the chief officer, to assist in the 
investigation of a serious crime by undertaking, normally for a 
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limited period, specific tasks as agreed with the regional 
coordinator; 
To cooperate with the National Criminal Intelligence Service, 
Force Intelligence Bureaux and where appropriate Her Majesty's 
Customs and Excise, in the gathering and development of 
intelligence on persons responsible for serious criminal offences 
and to provide an operational response in appropriate cases." 
(ACPO Report on International, National and Inter-Force Crime, 
February 1996: 27-28) 
In terms of dealing with serious (organised) crime, the RCS has 
3 main targets, which are: 
a) Arrest and convict offenders; 
b} Seize and confiscate assets; 
c} Cause maximum disruption to the organisation, and where 
possible dismantle at least part of it. 
Although when targeting an organisation, the prime aim remains 
the arrest and prosecution of all offenders, in reality the ReS 
will settle for disruption or partial dismantling, especially 
through the large scale confiscation of assets. This strategy is 
based on the belief that where sufficient evidence cannot be 
gained to convict all offenders, it is preferable to cause 
maximum disruption, as this can set an organisation back several 
years. 
During the research an example was given of an operation 
against a family involved in drug trafficking in the UK. Due to 
intelligence, a major drugs Shipment was seized, and although the 
members of this family were not prosecuted as a result, the 
financial disruption caused by the confiscation of this 
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consignment was sufficient to cause a reversion to armed 
robberies as a means of recouping some of the money lost. 
Subsequently, an attempt to rob a post office in Surrey was 
foiled by the police, leading to arrests and prosecutions. This 
was considered a good example of how the financial disruption of 
an organisation was sufficient to cause reversion to another form 
of criminality that was easier to detect and prosecute. 
The rules which govern the ReS taking over an operation revolve 
around a specific scoring mechanism. Such mechanisms are widely 
used by the various force intelligence bureaux around the country 
in deciding when an operation should be passed up to force level 
from division. The usual criteria for a force deciding to pass 
an operation up to the ReS are: 
a) serious criminality 
b) operations involving more than one force; 
c) operations that are national or international in nature; 
d) operations that are likely to be either time or resource 
intensive. 
Once an operation has been passed up to the ReS, the relevant 
Branch Commander uses a specific scoring formula for deciding 
whether or not to accept it. If the operation does not reach a 
stated minimum it is rejected and delegated to another 
operational team at a lower level. A further scoring mechanism 
is used, once the ReS takes on a case that allows the National 
Coordinator of the RCS to monitor the effectiveness of the RCS's 
progress. Again the scoring formula include the following: 
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a) quality of criminal; eg, significant member of criminal 
organisation, or existing current nominal; head of criminal 
organisation or core nominal; 
b) geographic impact, i.e. whether national, international, 
inter-force, within force, requiring RCS capabilities for best 
resolution; 
c) type of offence targeted; 
d) average points scored per operation; allows the Coordinator 
to ascertain whether a particular squad is coping adequately, 
in light of the time and/or resource intensiveness of the 
operations being handled. 
This procedure ensures a measure of accountability, and allows 
for the measuring of the RCS's national performance indicators, 
expressed as numbers of arrests per 100 officers. 
ACPO, via the Police Research Group (PRG) has been able to 
ascertain that 45% of RCS time is spent on operations of an 
international nature, and 33% on operations of a national nature. 
Of these operations, on average 47% of the offences dealt with 
are drug trafficking offences. (ACPO Report on International 
National and Inter-Force Crime, February 1996: 29-30) These 
figures help to explain why, as with information flows, the RCS 
frequently takes operations directly to Europol, bypassing NClS 
in the process. This practice is being facilitated by Europol's 
increasing skill in providing a venue where transnational 
operations and investigations can be put together and 
coordinated. 
From an official perspective there appears to be some ambiguity 
towards this practice. While in practical tactical terms the 
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utility of being able to take an operation directly to Europol 
in terms of speed and efficiency is acknowledged, there are the 
countervailing legal requirements of the Europol Convention, as 
well as the desire to develop NCIS's capacity as a one stop shop. 
Allied to this is NCIS's desire to be all things to all people; 
a gateway to the rest of Europe, an intelligence organisation, 
and a facilitator of tactical operations. Inasmuch as NCIS' s 
prime function must be as a strategic intelligence agency, what 
is increasingly being acknowledged is the practice of direct 
operational contacts between the RCS, as well as force agencies 
such as drug squads, vehicle trafficking squads etc, and Europol, 
with the proviso that the ELOs keep NCIS abreast of all 
developments. 
It is envisaged that the advent of the National Crime Squad in 
April 1998 will streamline this process. The NCS will be a new 
police force under a new service authority, into which the RCS 
will be incorporated. The proposed method of deciding when a case 
will be passed up to it are: 
a) where a case/offence involves more than one force; 
b) where the crime/s involved is/are of a sufficiently serious 
nature; 
c) at the request of a Chief Constable. 
At the moment, the most that the National Coordinator of 
Regional Crime Squads can do is to advise fellow coordinators 
that all operational contacts should take place via the 
International Division of NCIS. It is believed however, that as 
a new police body, with its own Director General, who has day to 
day directional control over all his officers, it will be easier 
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to direct all NCS officers to follow a specific policy with 
respect to taking all international operations involving Europol 
through NelS's International Division. 
However it can be argued that if there was no success in 
preventing RCS officers from taking tactical intelligence 
directly to Europol, there is no evidence to suggest that there 
will be any difference with the NCS, despite its central 
direction. As a matter of fact it may very well be that as a 
national unit in its own right, the NCS may one day argue that 
it has as much right to directly access Europol as NCIS. This 
position finds justification in the experience of other EU states 
such as Italy which has several national policing agencies such 
as the Direzione Investigativa Anti-Mafia (DIA) , and the 
Direzione Centrale par i Servizi Antidroga. In such instances the 
various agencies have just as much right as the official national 
unit for directly accessing Europol. 
Any future central direction and control of the NCS also does 
not stop the force intelligence bureaux, drug squads and stolen 
vehicle squads of the 43 forces in England and Wales from taking 
operations and tactical intelligence directly to Europol, 
particularly as there is a void between the cases and targets 
that are of interest to NClS, and those that are of relevance to 
the forces. 
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7.6: CONCLUSION 
In conclusion therefore it can be seen that, as with Germany, 
the central hypothesis of the research holds true, albeit for 
slightly different reasons. Whereas in Germany, the development 
of 'special treatment' has been a function of the federal 
autonomy that allows the various LKA to legitimately claim the 
status of being national units on the same footing as the BKA, 
in the UK, similar developments are a result of the imbalance 
between the priorities of NCIS and the forces. NCIS's remit is 
predominantly national and international in character, while much 
of the work conducted by the RCS is likewise national and 
international. The use of a core nominal system results in a void 
at the inter-force level. This was confirmed by the ACPO report 
into International, National and Inter-Force Crime which states: 
... "whilst the UK has a national strategy for gathering 
intelligence about criminals (as evidenced by NelS), no similar 
strategy or commonly accepted procedures exist between the 43 
forces in regards to those criminals who fall outside of the NCIS 
definition. The working group therefore recommend that ACPO take 
account of this void in the Service's capacity to gather 
intelligence at the inter-force/regional level during the course 
of its current study into criminal intelligence matters." (ACPO 
Report on International National and Inter-Force Crime, February 
1996: 32) 
In operational terms, this report also identified problems in 
the ability of force central squads in conducting inter-force 
cross border investigations. These were listed as: 
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a) Senior managers are reluctant to commit resources to 
investigate crime which occurred outside their own area; 
b) Officers often find it difficult to make contact with the 
right person in a force with which they had no previous 
dealings; 
c) Officers feel that there was a lack of relevant intelligence 
about cross border crime because NCIS focuses only on those 
it perceives to be serious criminals; 
d) Although officers are generally satisfied with the cooperation 
they receive from other forces they do mention the 
difficulties that are caused by incompatible equipment. (ACPO 
Report on International National and Inter-Force Crime, 
February 1996: 26) 
This lack of coordination at the force level gives one 
indication why force central squads are increasingly likely to 
take tactical intelligence and operations of a European nature 
to Europol. The preoccupation of the RCS with investigations of 
an international and national nature are another reason. The 
implementation of the NCS could also exacerbate this problem. 
When questioned about this, the National Coordinator of Regional 
Crime Squads stated his view that he did not believe the NCS 
would result in everything gravitating to London. In support of 
this position he stated that while part of the success of large 
scale criminals was based on the anonymity that large cities such 
as London provided, a sizable proportion of their money was still 
made in the regions. Also there will be no diminution of 
attention in the regions because London is not the only centre 
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of criminal excellence in the country. The North East region of 
England is a prominent area for drug trafficking, particularly 
via the UK/Amsterdam (Crayfish) drug connection. The North West 
is the site of the Colombia/venezuela connection (re cocaine 
trafficking), and the Midlands is a centre for drug trafficking 
with the Indian sub-continent. 
Finally the example was given of the British Transport Police, 
which does not lose anything by being commanded centrally from 
London, inasmuch as its jurisdiction stretches as far as the 
north of Scotland. However despite these assurances, there is no 
guarantee that the NCS will be any more successful in addressing 
the areas of interest to the forces than NClS, or even the RCS 
(taking into account the high percentage of its time spent on 
international and national as opposed to force level 
investigations). The results of the research into the UK's 
relationship with NClS shows therefore, that as with Germany, the 
official process of centralizing the exchange of information and 
intelligence, has also very quickly evolved into a qualified 
centralized process whereby, due to tactical exigencies, officers 
at the regional and force level are bypassing NClS and dealing 
directly with Europol, on the proviso that NCIS is kept informed 
by the ELOs. 
The following case study on the Dutch national unit was 
included in the research because the Dutch view on police 
cooperation issues lies somewhere between the extreme views of 
Germany and the United Kingdom. While the Netherlands is 
generally enthusiastic about European political union, it has 
shown surprising reluctance to endorse any executive policing 
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powers at the European level. The juxtaposition of these two 
views provides an interesting point of comparison, lying as it 
does, somewhere between the Euro-federal enthusiasm of Germany, 
and the nation-state centred position of the United Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 8; DUTCH CASE STUDy 
8 .1: BACKGROUND 
8.1.1: The Dutch Political System 
The Dutch political system has evolved from and is a function 
of the social and religious cleavages that are a basic historical 
characteristic of the country. The religious divisions are 
between the Catholic and Protestant faith which is itself sub 
divided into the Dutch Reformed Church and the Rereformed Church 
or Gereformeerde churches, while social cleavages revolve around 
more classic stratifications between the working and the middle 
classes. The effects of these cleavages have been to fragment the 
Dutch political system to the extent that no political party has 
ever succeeded in winning an electoral maj ori ty (Andeweg and 
Irwin 1993: 23) as the society and by extension the electorate 
consists of a number of minorities. 
Out of this political fragmentation into minorities has ensued 
a number of political and social concepts and developments that 
are unique/specific to the Netherlands such as the concepts of 
pillarisation and consociational democracy. Pillarisation refers 
to the propensity for the various minorities to remain rigidly 
segmented within their particular sub-culture in virtually all 
facets of life. For example, Catholics could be expected to 
associate almost exclusively with Catholic communities and 
institutions from birth till death. Therefore pillarisation often 
extended to every area of social life, encompassing hospitals, 
trade unions, schools, marriage, sporting and recreational 
activities etc. Examples of pillars identified in Dutch society 
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are: the Catholics; the Gereformeedenj the Social Democrats; the 
Dutch Reformed Church and the Liberals. 
This form of social segregation was considered to be an 
impediment to stable government, and has been balanced by the 
concept of cross pressures, whereby, according to Andeweg, 
"Social cleavages are to be rendered harmless by their cross-
cu t t ing each other: (i. e, social groups that are homogeneous wi th 
respect to one social cleavage are heterogeneous with respect to 
another) ." (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 33) This in theory has a 
moderating influence in that social groups may be divided on one 
issue yet united on another. Overseeing these arrangements are 
an impartial government within which the elites of each pillar 
are represented, and which maintains stability through a series 
of ordered compromises. Thus the deep divisions at the mass level 
are compensated for by overarching cooperation and pragmatism at 
the national level. (Jones 1995: 15) 
Despite a process of depillarisation which began in the 1960s, 
by which the rigidly segregated pillars have lost some of their 
importance, the Netherlands remains a country of minorities in 
which political parties are unable to command sufficient support 
with which to form parliamentary majorities. The political system 
is headed by a monarchy, which in the absence of parties gaining 
electoral majorities, plays an important role in forming a 
government, often based around a coalition cabinet. The 
legislature is bicameral, consisting of two chambers. The First 
Chamber is a 75 seat senate elected by provincial legislatures 
with limited powers of revision, while the Second Chamber is a 
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150 seat elected chamber. Together they comprise the States 
General or parliament. (Jones 1995: 25) 
8. 1.2: TIm DUTCH JUDICIAL AND POLICING SYSTEM 
The Dutch judicial system is heavily influenced by the 
incorporation of the country into the French empire between 1810 
and 1813. The first Dutch code of criminal procedure dates from 
1838, but was in many respects virtually identical to the French 
code that it replaced. The current code of criminal procedure 
came into effect in 1926, and even though it exhibits 
specifically Dutch national characteristics, the original 
influence of the French system can still be identified. 
The judicial system is inquisitorial in nature and revolves 
around the Public Prosecutor who has the powers of investigation, 
prosecution and execution of court decisions as well as the 
exclusive discretionary right to caution offenders. Each district 
and sub-district has its own public prosecutor although with 
respect to the authorisation of detention and searches, senior 
Dutch officers above the rank of inspector are empowered to act 
as Assistant Public Prosecutors (within carefully defined 
limits). The Minister of Justice heads the judicial system 
although the Public Prosecutors go to great effort to emphasize 
their independence. The Dutch judicial system operates on an 
"opportunity principle," whereby the Prosecution Service has 
flexibility in deciding whether or not to prosecute a case. This 
principle will be examined in Chapter 10 with respect to the 
effect it has on cross border police cooperation with states such 
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as Germany that does not have such flexibility in prosecution 
decisions. 
The Dutch policing system was originally divided into 148 
municipal forces, which were funded by and came under the direct 
control of the Ministry of Horne Affairs, as well as the 
nationwide State Police which came under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Justice. This separation of competencies between the 
Ministries of Justice and Horne Affairs is seen by the Dutch as 
vital in ensuring that the powers of coercion are not 
concentrated in the hands of one governmental department. However 
in practical terms it has lead to problems in terms of 
establishing the correct line of accountability, as well as 
duplication resulting from one Ministry not knowing what the 
other is doing. 
Since 1994 the Dutch police service has been reorganised into 
26 forces consisting of 25 regional forces and 1 national police 
agency. Each regional force is overseen by the burgomaster of the 
largest municipality in the region (or of the municipality which 
is the administrative centre), who acts as force manager, as well 
as the chief public prosecutor of the district. The chief of the 
force is in charge of the day to day running of the organisation. 
The regional forces come under the control of the Ministry of the 
Interior, (which is the Dutch equivalent of the UK's Ministry of 
Home Affairs) which controls the budget although in certain 
circumstances as with the allocation of staffing levels, 
decisions are reached in consultation with the Ministry of 
Justice. 
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The National Police Service or KLPD comes under the authority 
of the Ministry of Justice and is responsible for supporting the 
work of the regional forces as well as specific functions that 
require a more centralised approach. Towards this end it consists 
of the following five divisions: 
a) Mobility: which includes the traffic and water police as well 
as the Aviation Investigation Unit; 
b) Royal and Diplomatic Security; 
c) Support: this division includes a number of disparate agencies 
such as the Information Technology Service, the Horse and Dog 
Unit and the Aviation Unit; 
d} Logistics: this division is responsible for the administration 
of stores, vehicles, equipment etc; 
e) The National Criminal Intelligence Service 
8 • 1.3: THE CENTRALE RECHERCHE INFORMATIBDIBNST - CRI 
The CRI is a criminal intelligence unit, based in the Hague, 
which is tasked with the collection, analysiS and dissemination 
of information/intelligence. It has no executive powers, and is 
primarily concerned with supporting the regional forces. It has 
a monopoly on international contacts and incorporates both the 
Interpol NCB as well as the Buropol contact point. The CRI 
maintains a number of databases with information on crimes, 
methods of operation, fingerprints, informants etc. It also 
possesses 5 regional intelligence branch offices. 
Throughout the research carried out at the CRI, officers that 
were interviewed placed significant emphasis on the fact that the 
hub of policing emphasis revolves around the regional forces, and 
234) 
the CRI' s primary goal was to add value and where necessary 
coordinate, without usurping the competence or authority of the 
regions. The remit of the CRI is based on the use of organised 
crime as an umbrella that encompasses all other forms of serious 
crime. This is based on the European usage of the term' organised 
crime' as any offence which requires a degree of organisation to 
commit. Such an approach acknowledges the fact that it is 
increasingly difficult to separate serious transnational crimes 
like terrorism, drug trafficking and trafficking in stolen 
vehicles into neat compartments. There is generally therefore an 
interrelatedness between these offences that has prompted the 
overarching use of 'organised crime' as an umbrella encompassing 
all other serious forms of cross border crime. Therefore while 
the CRI may have specific departments dealing with such offences 
as: drugs crime; environmental crime; fraud and forgery; and 
assault and theft, they all come under the overall banner of 
organised crime. 
8.2: INFORMATION FLOWS 
8.2.1: INTERNATIONAL - NATIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS 
Dutch law stipulates that the CRI is the only body allowed to 
undertake international contacts and liaison. As a signatory of 
the Europol Convention, the eRI is obliged to supply Europol with 
all necessary and relevant information, as well as to respond to 
all requests for information from the organisation. It also has 
the responsibility for keeping information up to date, and for 
analysing data, where applicable, before disseminating it to 
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Europol. The main criteria, as laid down in the Convention for 
passing information up to Europol, are that it is within the 
bounds of the organisation's remit, and that it involves or 
affects two or more member states of the EU in such a way as to 
require a common approach by the Member States owing to the 
scale, significance and consequences of the offences concerned 
{Art.2.1 Europal Convention}. Therefore, as with Germany, the 
criteria for the supranational transmission of information 
between the Dutch national unit and Europol are based on the 
Europol Convention from the top down, and national legislation 
from the bottom up. 
In keeping with its statutory monopoly on international liaison 
and transmission of information, it is also the responsibility 
of the CRI to decide which is the appropriate channel for any 
given case. Whereas the UK has designated a specific department 
of its NCIS, the International Division, to deal with the process 
of allocation, the CRI is in the course of developing an 
alternative method for dealing with this area. It admits that 
there have been problems with duplication in the past in that 
officers were often unable to ascertain that a particular person 
or case was being dealt with by other officers in other forces. 
The CRI however has rejected the idea of designating a physical 
department for this function in favour of a system whereby the 
officer dealing with the case is the one responsible for deciding 
which is the appropriate international channel. In this process 
he will be aided by improved computer systems that will identify 
when a case is being dealt with by someone else thereby cutting 
down or eliminating duplication. 
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Other factors identified which influence the exchange of 
information between the national and supranational levels are as 
follows: 
1) Core Nominals: In keeping with its stated objective of being 
fed only so much information as is required to perform its 
functions, the CRI has a system that is similar to the core 
nominal system in the UK whereby regional CIn and intelligence 
officers create lists of targets that are considered suitable for 
CRI attention. These are invariably persons involved with serious 
organised crime, which either is of national/international 
importance or would benefit from centralised attention at the 
national level. Unlike the UK however where a top down approach 
operates, with NCIS deciding upon its core nominal base, in the 
Netherlands the process is reversed with the regional forces 
deciding on the targets that are passed up to the CRI. This in 
turn influences what information the CRI can share with Europol, 
as it will be based more on what the regional forces consider to 
be important than what the CRI considers to be significant. This 
is in keeping with the emphasis on the CRI as being there to 
serve the regions and not the other way around. 
2) Familiarity: While familiarity was one aspect that influenced 
the flow of information between Europol and Germany, it is of 
even greater relevance taking into account the size of the 
Netherlands, as well as the location of Europol. The total number 
of police officers in the country numbers approximately 39 
thousand. This means that there is a greater likelihood that CIn 
and intelligence officers will be known personally by ELOs at 
Europol. This is further amplified by the emphasis in the 
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Netherlands on bringing the higher echelons of policing as close 
to the pivotal regional forces as possible. Therefore the 
development of informal bonds between crD and intelligence 
officers at the regional levels and ELOs is positively 
encouraged. 
Access to liaison officers from other EU states via personal 
contacts with Dutch ELOs was another area that enhanced 
communication with Europol. As with Germany, Dutch police 
officers asserted when asked that the operational successes that 
there have been involving Europol, did not occur specifically 
because of Europol. These operations such as controlled 
deliveries have been described as routine policing which were 
possible before the advent of Europol via the drug liaison 
officer network. What Europol has facilitated however, has been 
access to EU states which do not have a liaison officer network, 
such as Greece. Prior to Europol, operations involving these 
states were invariably problematic due to difficulties in 
contacting the correct person at any given point in time. Now 
access to the competent authority is readily available via all 
the ELOs being under one roof in the Hague. 
3) Embargo information: The Dutch police employs a highly 
secretive system of undercover officers that are involved with 
the infiltration of large organised crime outfits. These officers 
are termed embargo officers and the information they transmit is 
called embargo information. Allied to this is the use of a 
mathematical coding system for identifying particular types of 
offences, areas of the country or types of information. For 
example all drugs codes begin with the number 2.0, with 2.1. 
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referring to cocaine exports and 2.20 referring to cocaine 
imports. The code 5.1 refers to fraud, and the code 1700 refers 
to the south of Holland. 
In terms of CrD work, the code 11 applies to information that 
can be used by all operationally and can therefore be shared. 
However the code 00 refers specifically to embargo information, 
and cannot be shared under any circumstances. Usually the only 
two people privy to the contents of embargo information will be 
an embargo team member, i.e. an undercover operative, and his 
informant or infiltrator. An interim classification is 01 which 
applies to information that can only be shared with the express 
permission of the officer who owns or has acquired the 
information, and then only for stated purposes. 
The net effect of this system is that the only information that 
can be freely passed to an agency such as Europol is information 
that is classified 11. Embargo information 00 as well as 01 
cannot be passed to external agencies such as Europol. Therefore, 
despite the fact that part of Europol's remit is to collate and 
analyse information relating to serious organised crime, such 
information that is acquired in the Netherlands through certain 
undercover procedures cannot be shared. The claim by one officer 
within the NeID that as much as 80-90% of information was coded 
as 01 means that the amount of relevant information that can 
actually be shared with Europol must be very significantly 
constrained. This claim was verified by one Dutch ELO at Europol, 
who while declining to give a percentage, indicated that a 
significant amount of intelligence is routinely reclassified. 
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While most of the information that is passed among CID officers 
is coded 01, it is often the case that information that can be 
classified as 11, is sometimes coded as 01 instead so that 
officers can maintain their personal control over it. This of 
course is a very common policing problem. However with the 
current coding system in the Netherlands, police officers can 
cloak their reluctance to share information by using the 01 
category. 
The use of embargo teams has lead to one of the largest 
policing scandals in the history of policing in the Netherlands. 
The implications of this will be considered later in this chapter 
with respect to the effect of operational considerations on the 
applicability of the centralised mode of information exchange to 
Europol. However within the context of this section, the use of 
embargo teams and information has a substantial effect on the 
exchange of information between the national and the 
supranational levels. 
4) The Netherlands as host state: As with the experience of 
Interpol and France, the siting of Europol on Dutch soil means 
that the country has a vested interest in making the organisation 
a success. This has lead to the posting at Europol of a special 
Dutch representative whose job it is to liaise between Europol 
and various Dutch ministries such as the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Finance, Justice and the Interior, as well as assist in 
negotiating the signing of Memoranda of Understanding between the 
Dutch state and the other 14 EU states with respect to the status 
of all ELOs. The Dutch government and police have also taken 
steps to encourage the use of Europol by Dutch police officers, 
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particularly in light of its emphasis on bringing the services 
of such agencies as close to officers at the regional and local 
level as possible. 
5) Speed: Again as with Germany, a prime factor in the decision 
of Dutch police officers to use Europol as opposed to any other 
agency is it's speed. During the course of a research interview, 
while the Dutch representative to Europol reiterated the fact 
that Europol will not encroach upon the territory of either 
Interpol or the DLOs, he confirmed that an advantage in Europol' s 
favour was the speed with which it could answer requests. While 
admitting that many of the requests dealt with to date were low 
level requests, Europol could expedite these in 2 hours as 
opposed to 2 weeks by Interpol. Coupled to the 24 hour 
availability of ELOs, the reputation and consequent use of 
Europol was likely to dramatically increase in the future, 
particularly in relation to the quality of cases handled. 
5) Language: As with other states, the current bilateral nature 
of the Europol Drugs Unit means that police officers in the 
Netherlands can liaise with fellow Dutch officers in their own 
language. This convenience is another major factor that 
encourages the use of Europol. However the Convention designates 
the organisation's working languages as English, German and 
French, and this stipulation will take effect upon the full 
ratification of the Convention, when Europol proper will come 
into existence. 
In the case of Interpol, it would have been unthinkable for 
French to have been excluded as a working language, both in terms 
of French national pride, but also in practical terms. It is 
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conceivable that the exclusion of Dutch as a Europol working 
language, can have a negative impact, particularly in light of 
Dutch efforts at bringing the organisation as close as possible 
to police officers at all levels. 
8.2.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL INFORMATION FLOWS 
The areas which influence the transmission of information from 
the regional to the national levels in the Netherlands are as 
follows. 
1) Filter criteria: This criterion is based around the European 
concept of organised crime, which states that this category of 
offences consists of any crime which requires an element of 
organisation to commit. In the Netherlands this usage has been 
further refined in that the term organised crime is used, not as 
a phenomenon in its own right, but rather as an umbrella 
definition covering or encompassing all other forms of serious 
criminality. This in turn is based on the reasoning that all 
forms of serious crime such as drug trafficking, trafficking in 
stolen vehicles, fraud, illegal immigration networks etc, 
requires varying degrees of organisation to successfully commit. 
As a system, filter criteria are in the process of being 
developed and implemented in the Netherlands. Its aim is to 
filter out all extraneous information that is passed to the CRI, 
but to ensure that what information is passed is what is 
necessary for the organisation to fulfil its remit. In keeping 
with regional force autonomy, the regional force does the 
filtering, and not the CRI. Time and again during the course of 
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the research interviews the point was stressed that the CRI 
requires as little information as possible, but only what is 
relevant to provide coordination at the supraregional, national 
and international levels. 
Under the current process, regional CID and intelligence 
divisions and units compile lists of persons they believe to be 
inVOlved in serious organised crime. These lists are then passed 
up to the CRI, who feed it into their system and try to ascertain 
whether these targets have been reported as being active in other 
parts of the country. The information passed up however is 
generally very sparse consisting primarily of basic details as 
well as classification codes. When the CRI wants to know the 
contents of a particular target's dossier, they still have to 
request this information from the regional forces. 
At present the system is not as yet automatic. However in the 
very near future it will have progressed to the point where all 
regional forces and technical investigation units will be able 
to input information into a national system. Information that can 
be input includes, the purpose of the investigation, the 
target/s, the goals of the investigation, start and projected 
termination dates etc. While the CRI will conduct supraregional, 
national and international coordination, the officers in the 
regional forces will have on-line access to the national system. 
This system will be similar to the INPOL system in Germany which 
allows decentralised access, but different to the situation in 
the United Kingdom where regional forces do not have access to 
NCIS's information systems. 
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The criterion for the type of crime that is dealt with by the 
eRI is serious organised crime. However within the context of the 
filter criteria process, the filter emphasis is on the word 
'organised' as opposed to 'serious'. The point was made during 
the course of the research that a robbery in which 10 people are 
killed would not be a case for the eRI as the 'organised' 
criterion had not been fulfilled. However a series of 10 small 
robberies with elements of organisation would be of relevance to 
the eRI, and therefore information on them would be passed up. 
The system of filter criteria is a function of the devolved 
autonomy of the regional police forces in the Netherlands. The 
eRI performs a functional supportive role only. It has no power 
to task the regional forces or to demand action or information. 
The system of information exchange is not governed by law as in 
Germany or by service level agreements as in the United Kingdom. 
Instead the exchange process is based on an informal request 
basis that keeps autonomy devolved to the regional level. The 
regional forces are the ones that decide what information, or 
which core nominals to pass up to the eRI. Where the eRI requests 
information, the forces are under no compulsion to respond. In 
this wayan environment is created in which the eRI can have an 
overview without being directly involved. And even in the area 
of coordination, the regional forces are always the ones to 
request coordination. 
Finally the devolved nature of the filter criteria process 
often results in an uneven balance of information passed up to 
the eRI as different forces have different types of offences and 
different policing priorities. Also some forces such as Amsterdam 
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have organised themselves in such a way that they can carry an 
investigation further without any external assistance from the 
CRI, whereas other forces lacking expertise in certain areas will 
call in the CRI earlier. This fragmentation can make the CRI's 
role of providing both supraregional coordination and developing 
a strategic overview more difficult. 
2) Strategic Intelligence Research: Another relatively unique 
criterion for deciding when to pass information up to the CRI is 
the innovative and proactive system known as Strategic 
Intelligence Research or SIR. The people involved in this system 
are not just police officers but consist of criminologists, 
academics, psychologists, historians and social scientists. Their 
work includes not just assessing the current situation as regards 
to serious organised crime, but also all possible future threats. 
The concept is based on three interrelated phases which are as 
follows: 
a) Society or Environment Scan: This consists of compiling a list 
of all the potential areas for the involvement of organised crime 
throughout Dutch society. For example all possible information 
and assistance will be acquired from the financial institutions 
in the country in analysing the potential weak points re money 
laundering. Likewise weak points in drug trafficking routes will 
also be highlighted by acquiring as much information in such 
areas as the haulage industries, the ports etc. 
b) Sector Scan: This phase concentrates on a specific sector of 
society usually a business sector so as to identify any weak 
spots that would make it particularly liable to infiltration by 
organised crime. The ACPO Report on International National and 
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Inter-Force Crime of 1996 outlines how this phase operates: 
"This data would mostly be gathered from public or half open 
systems of public bodies. If during this phase signs surface 
which suggest that something is wrong, then a draft 'risk model' 
is drawn up, by means of which a specific inventory can be made 
of possible wrongdoing enterprises and groups. In this context 
a draft risk model describes what the impact is of sector 
characteristics and social processes on the vulnerability of a 
certain sector to penetration by organised crime groups. An 
example was given of this in the waste processing sector. The 
working group were told that with the strict environment 
protection regulations drawn up by the Netherlands central 
government in recent years, legally processing all sorts of waste 
has become much more expensive. As a consequence it has become 
more lucrative to process waste by observing all the rules on 
paper but in reality to have waste disappear in all sorts of 
illegal ways. It stands to reason that the more sorts of waste 
are processed by a company, the easier it will become to mix 
waste flows. With this, a risk factor was identified which 
possibly furthers illegal practices and which therefore gives a 
direction to strategic intelligence research." (ACPO Report on 
International, National and Inter-Force Crime, February 1996: 41) 
c) Organisation Scan: Information gleaned from a sector scan can 
yield sufficient data to warrant the concentration on a 
particular business or organisation. Apart from information 
available from open sources, this phase often relies upon the 
local knowledge and intelligence files of local and regional CID 
officers. If sufficient data is collected, an organisation scan 
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can lead to the mounting of tactical operations that can result 
in arrests and prosecutions. Sometimes the process can work in 
reverse in that an organisation scan can lead to a sector scan. 
Again an example of this was given in the ACPO Report of 1996 
which highlighted the case of the use of money exchange offices 
in Amsterdam by an Israeli criminal group to launder money. This 
lead to a general sector scan of all money exchange offices in 
Amsterdam, which culminated in operational success and the 
statutory control of these offices. 
The SIR system has now expanded to include a series of 
Memoranda of Understanding with groups such as trade unions, the 
financial sector, banking staff, the chemical industry etc. There 
have also been the establishment of codes of conduct with such 
groups as solicitors, restaurants, bars, cafes etc. While being 
expensive, resource intensive and requiring patience for results, 
it represents an innovative approach to the strategic proactive 
combatting of organised crime. By concentrating on mainly non 
police personnel it has also gone some way towards correcting the 
tendency for the tactical to drive out the strategic in the areas 
of police cooperation and intelligence. 
Inasmuch as it is usually the case that police officers are 
more interested in operational successes and the prosecution of 
offenders than the long term view of strategic oversight, which 
seldom gives an innnediate return on resources employed, the 
strategic is therefore usually sacrificed in the pursuit of the 
tactical. With the employment by the CRI of dedicated civilian 
strategic analysts however, the pressure for short term 
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operational gains is usually not a factor. This allows for a more 
balanced approach between the strategic and the tactical. 
The Strategic Intelligence Research project is primarily about 
analysing and intervening in the encroachment of organised crime 
from the underworld into the upper world. It therefore stands in 
contrast to the stated goals of filter criteria which mandates 
that as little information as possible be passed to the CRI. To 
the contrary the success of SIR is dependant on the quantity of 
information that the strategic analysts at the CRI receives. This 
however is a function of the CRI's role in providing added value 
to the regional forces which maintain their autonomy, as opposed 
to its other function in providing a strategic national and 
international overview of serious organised crime in the 
Netherlands. 
8 .2 .3: DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE BOU 
In keeping with the autonomy of regional police forces in the 
Netherlands, great emphasis is placed on bringing support and 
coordination from other levels as close as possible to the 
regional forces. An example was given during the course of the 
research by the then Europol project Leader at the CRI with 
reference to the Europol chain of communication. Usually in the 
past, if a Dutch officer wished to acquire or pass on information 
from/to Europol, he would have to pass the request or information 
to CID, who would pass it to one of the five regional CRI 
offices. From there it would be passed up to the national eRI 
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offices in the Hague for onward transmission to Europol. 
Initiatives have now been implemented however to eradicate these 
tortuous transmission routes. 
In the interests of providing a fast and high quality service 
devoid of unnecessary middlemen, the eRI has instituted a 
dedicated liaison desk based at Europol itself. Forces are now 
equipped with direct lines to this liaison desk, and this is 
being complemented by the posting of eRr officers to regional crD 
offices. The effect of this initiative has been that officers at 
all levels can now bypass the national eRr and contact a Dutch 
liaison officer directly in the Hague. The problem of the eRI 
being kept informed of these communications has been overcome by 
the inputting of all relevant information into the national 
database by the liaison officer in the Hague. 
However a further consequence of this flexibility has been an 
increased tendency of police officers to contact their ELOs 
directly, bypassing the eRr and the liaison desk al together. This 
is facilitated by the fact that Europol is based on Dutch 
territory, so that there is still the sense that one is 
contacting Dutch officers on Dutch soil as opposed to Europol 
officers. Also the size of the country means that there is 
greater personal knowledge by Dutch ELOs of police officers in 
different parts of the country, which further facilitates direct 
contacts. 
It should be noted however that direct contacts are not 
formalized in the Netherlands as in Germany, to the extent of 
regional forces being considered as national units, or having the 
right to petition for representation on Europol' s Management 
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Board. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the function of the CRr, and by 
extension Europol is to support and provide added value to the 
regional forces, Dutch officers have the right and are encouraged 
to contact Europol directly. The impetus for this is further 
increased by the fact that two of Europol's analysts are Dutch. 
While this may be in contravention of both the Europol Convention 
and Dutch law which states that all international contacts must 
go through the CRr, the tactical imperatives for faster and more 
effective cooperation and coordination has resulted in the 
equivalent German practice of special treatment being duplicated 
in the Netherlands. 
8.3: DATA PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS 
The Police Records Act was given the royal assent by Queen 
Beatrix of the Netherlands in 1991. The Act laid down the 
guidelines governing the police's ability to exchange information 
particularly with foreign bodies and police forces. The main 
definitions of the Act are as follows: 
a) criminal intelligence: this refers to records set up with the 
aim of preventing or investigating offences which, in view of 
their seriousness or frequency, or the organised group by which 
they are committed, have a serious effect on public order; 
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b} CrD subject: refers to a person concerned as a subject or who 
might reasonably be concerned as a subject in the offences in 
respect of which the crD records were set up; 
c) grey field records: records set up in order to establish 
whether the person registered can be regarded as a crD subject 
in relation to other data. 
The Act lays down the stricture that no data can be disclosed 
from police records for purposes other than those for which the 
records were set up, except in the following cases: 
a) disclosure is for the purpose of investigating an offence 
representing a serious public order contravention; 
b) disclosure is for the purpose of inclusion in crD records or 
"grey field" records; 
c) the data itself leads to a reasonable suspicion that a 
specific person has committed a punishable act. 
rn terms of the ability of the police to transmit data to the 
police of a foreign state, this is permissible where: 
a) it is necessary for the proper exercise of the police function 
in the Netherlands or the execution of instructions deriving from 
the reporting of persons by authorities of the Netherlands; 
b) to prevent a serious and imminent danger or for the 
investigation of a crime that has the potential to seriously 
undermine public order in that state; 
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c) for the proper exercise of the police function in that state , 
on the basis of a request relating to a specific person or 
specific case. 
The Act also stipulates that due account must be taken of the 
data protection provisions in existence in the state to which 
data from the Netherlands is being transmitted. This applies not 
only to the proper use of data but also the protection of 
personal privacy. This requirement means, that to date, in 
relation to the ability of Dutch ELOs to share information with 
EU states such as Italy and Greece, which have not had data 
protection provisions in the past, to do so would have been in 
contravention of this Act. 
This has been a problem for each EU state with data protection 
legislation. Of course once the Europol Convention has been 
ratified by all 15 EU states, and Europol proper comes into 
existence, this problem should be rectified. Articles 14-18 of 
the Europol Convention state that the standard of data protection 
to be given at the national level of each member state should at 
least correspond to the standard resulting from the 
implementation of the principles of the Council of Europe 
Convention of 28 January 1981. Articles 23 and 24 also require 
each member state to designate a national supervisory body (Data 
Protection Authority) to monitor the information put in by that 
state. (Statewatch, The Europol Convention 1995: 7-8) 
Unfortunately Europol proper will have a similar problem, when 
the Convention is ratified, to that experienced by ELOs currently 
who disseminate information to states with no or inadequate 
national data protection legislation. As an organisation it is 
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merely obliged to receive an undertaking from the non EU 
receiving state that the data transmitted to it will be used for 
the purpose for which it was communicated. Without at the very 
least the requirement for compliance with the standards laid down 
by the Council of Europe Recommendations, coupled with a lack of 
enforcement rights of the Joint Supervisory Body, the citizens 
of the EU will have little protection with respect to misuse of 
data supplied by Europol to third party states or organisations. 
Finally the Act decrees that all disclosures of data must take 
place through the CRI. The only exception to this is when there 
is an agreement with foreign police authorities allowing direct 
disclosure, on the proviso that any such agreement is approved 
by the Minister of Justice or the Minister of the Interior, 
within specified parameters. In effect this stipulation suggests 
that the practice of Dutch police officers outside the CRI 
communicating with Europol directly is in contravention of the 
Police Records Act. 
In the course of the research, officers interviewed emphasised 
the individualistic nature of the Dutch people that has resulted 
in a high priority being placed both in peoples' minds and in the 
political arena upon data protection. The Dutch police tend to 
see themselves as being virtually "strangled" by the strict rules 
and regulations in terms of what can and cannot be done with 
personal data. In addition to the police Records Act, officers 
mentioned the Persons Registration Act, and the Police 
Registration Act, along with a plethora of smaller regulations 
that all govern the exchange of information. Areas of restriction 
include such stipulations as: 
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a) restrictions on exchanging information in terms of the source 
of that information. For example, the information being 
exchanged should not be the product of an entrapment exercise; 
b) restrictions relating to the use to which information 
exchanged will be put. For example that the information will 
not be leaked to the press (a stipulation that is usually 
difficult to ensure or enforce) ; 
c) in relation to a state requesting information, whether the 
information is to be used for investigative purposes, as 
evidence etc. 
The area of data protection therefore has a substantial formal 
impact on the ability of Dutch police officers to exchange 
information between different policing levels. The point was 
repeatedly emphasised that in terms of information exchange, 
everything was possible, but within specific parameters. Couched 
within these reassurances lurks the implied suspicion that as 
always police officers find ways of circumventing onerous 
administrative restrictions. However in terms of how Dutch police 
officers would like to see police cooperation progress in the 
future, there was little or no interest in the development of a 
supranational policing facility, but rather a desire for a freer 
environment in which cooperation generally and information 
eXChange specifically could take place. 
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8.4: OPERATIONAL FACTORS 
8.4.1: INTERNATIONAL - NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The research carried out at the eRI did not reveal the 
conviction expressed by German police officers that a non-
operational Europol was unnecessary as there were other perfectly 
adequate forms of cooperation involving information exchange. The 
three aspects that were emphasised were, intelligence, good 
cooperation and the fast exchange of information. 
In relation to operational successes involving Europol, these 
were modest in number but increasing, as trust in Europol was 
developed. Examples of operational Europol successes given by 
Dutch ELOs are as follows: 
1) "An investigation team in the south of the country (the 
Netherlands) was investigating the organised thefts of cars, 
which were being stolen in south Belgium, Holland and Germany, 
and then exported by criminals in parts to Greece, to a certain 
area; Thessaloniki. The local police (in the Netherlands) tried 
to come in contact there (in Thessaloniki) for a long time via 
Interpol channels, and it didn't work, because they needed a 
house search on a scrap yard in Thessaloniki. It was very 
complicated to organize. They lost a transmitter which they had 
put on one of the trucks (transporting parts to Greece), which 
the police follow by satellite. So there was really the need to 
do an in-depth investigation in Thessaloniki. We organised the 
contact with the Greek desk, and we organised a small meeting, 
and we put quite some pressure on the case. Within one week a 
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house search took place in Thessaloniki and they found a lot of 
stolen cars from the Netherlands and parts etc. There were 
arrests made in Thessaloniki, and it also lead to arrests in the 
Netherlands as well as the disclosure of evidence." 
2) "A courier/trafficker arrested on his way to Spain with 2 
kilos of heroin had a hotel bill in his possession from a hotel 
in Amsterdam. The police rapidly wanted to know what telephone 
numbers he contacted while he stayed there as there was the 
suspicion that he contacted the person who he had to deliver the 
heroin to. By making direct contact with colleagues in Amsterdam 
from our personal network, the same evening, an organised search 
of the hotel was made. They came up with several very interesting 
Spanish telephone numbers where the guy was on his way to. They 
are small successes but they highlight the use of Europol." 
In connection with these successes, there was often the 
conviction expressed that Europol could not be given unreserved 
credit for successful operations such as controlled deliveries, 
as these types of operation have been just as easily carried out 
by the DLO network in the past. This sense however that 
controlled deliveries and the coordination of transnational 
operations would be possible were Europol not to exist, was 
tempered by the observation that it is nevertheless useful in 
terms of organising or coordinating transnational operations with 
states such as Greece that does not have a DLO network. Again the 
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housing of ELOs from all 15 EU states under one roof was seen as 
a significant advantage, particularly in terms of accessibility 
and speed. 
8.4.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Netherlands has recently had a National Criminal 
Investigation Department (NCID) instituted within its national 
police force. The national force is not considered as being above 
the 25 regional forces, but rather as a 26th force that gives 
support to the other 25. The remit of the new NCID consists of 
difficult financial investigations, with the term 'financial' 
being limited to money laundering activities, and the processing 
of international requests from other states such as the UK and 
Germany. 
In operational terms, the use of the NeID has echoes of the 
principle of subsidiarity in that all coordination should 
normally be devolved to the lowest level, this being the regional 
forces. Only if a case cannot be effectively handled by the 
regional forces can it be passed up to the next layer of 
coordination, this being the 7 supra regional crime squads that 
are paid for by the 25 regional forces. Once again, a case is 
only then passed up to the NCID if it cannot be effectively dealt 
with by the supra regional level. The criteria for deciding when 
a case moves up from one level to the next are as follows; 
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a} operations that are too expensive; 
b} operations that require specialisation (in the case of the 
NeID, complex financial investigations); 
c} operations that are time intensive. 
As with Germany and Europol, a system of project based work has 
also been incorporated into the 7 supra regional crime squads. 
Therefore one squad deals exclusively with Turkish criminals 
while another deals with South American drug trafficking or 
environmental crime. Multi regional operations are coordinated 
by the eRI via a system called Meldingrechercheonderzoek or MRO. 
MRO is a database in which the basic details of major organised 
crime operations are kept and collated on behalf of the chief 
officers heading these operations. Therefore a team embarking on 
such an operation would first forward to the eRI details as to 
the target, goals, projected time span of the operation, methods 
to be employed such as infiltration, observation, telephone 
tapping etc. 
Upon receipt of this information the eRI checks the MRO 
database to ensure that there are no other teams in the country 
working on the same case or target. The purpose of the MRO system 
therefore is strictly coordination so as to avoid duplication. 
The eRI does not become involved in the operational coordination 
of an investigation and as such is not given tactical operational 
intelligence. 
The net effect of this is that, as with the exchange of 
information, there is evidence that Dutch officers sometimes 
bypass the eRI, and go directly to Europol when the coordination 
of a transnational operation is required. Again as with 
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information exchange the CRI tries to ensure that it is at least 
kept abreast of developments, but where there is not the 
immediate need to avoid internal duplication, the practice of the 
CRI being given only as much information as it needs, is often 
incompatible with the contradictory wish to be kept informed of 
tactical operations. 
The autonomy and concomitant secrecy that finds expression in 
such areas as the use of embargo teams has resulted in one of the 
greatest scandals to beset the Dutch police. What has become 
known as the IRT affair (Interregional Recherche Team), consisted 
of secret operations that were aimed at infiltrating the 
organisations of top organised crime and drug trafficking 
syndicates. The IRT operations attempted to place an informant 
within these organisations. To establish the credibility of these 
infiltrators, the IRTs arranged for the large scale importation 
of cannabis, as well as hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin, 
from outside states such as Colombia. Every aspect of these 
consignments, from the purchase, transport, warehousing, to the 
distribution, were paid for by Dutch undercover police teams. 
In the process the sovereignty and trust of several states, 
including Britain and Belgium were abused, through a deliberate 
failure to inform them of these activities which were having the 
effect of increasing the importation of drugs into their 
respective states. 
In 1995, a parliamentary enquiry under Dutch MP Maarten van 
Traa was initiated. The resulting report catalogued a long list 
of errors including the following listed in 'The European' : 
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a) Between 1991 and 1995 chief of Haarlem CrD Klaas Langedoen and 
assistant Joost van Vondel helped themselves to confiscated cash 
to fund their undercover activities. They were unable to account 
for Nfl 5 million ($2.9m)j 
b) The CrD (Haarlem) was involved in importing 47 containers 
carrying 230,000 kg of cannabis. Detectives allowed 10,000 kg of 
cocaine to flood the market from 1991j 70 kg of cocaine in their 
charge disappeared; 
c) More than 400 tonnes of cannabis a year were allowed into the 
Netherlands. Since Holland's annual consumption is 300 tonnes, 
over half of it home grown, much of the imports must have been 
shipped to neighbouring countries; 
d) At least 1.45 million Ecstasy pills, 1,840 kg of cannabis and 
200 kg of amphetamines were exported to Britain. On one cross 
Channel consignment, British customs intercepted a lorry 
containing thousands of Ecstasy tablets - and a Dutch undercover 
CID agent; 
d) An estimated Nfl 40m of public money was "invested" in Haarlem 
CID's war against drugs. (The European: Catalogue of Errors, 23-
29 May 1996) 
The report went on to make a raft of recommendations, the 
majority of which were accepted and adopted by the Dutch cabinet 
and a significant majority of the parliament. The civil rights 
monitoring publication Statewatch has outlined some of the 
decisions which include the following: 
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a) the termination of the "closed route" system, which was a 
secret phase in criminal investigations. Courts will now be 
entitled to full knowledge and disclosure of all police 
activities related to criminal investigations on which it is 
required to pass sentence, and only the judge will decide on 
whether extremely sensitive information, such as the identity of 
an informant, can be withheld from the defence; 
b) the public prosecutors office is charged and empowered with 
the task of exercising greater oversight of sensitive operations; 
c) the shipment of clandestine goods such as drugs and weapons 
with the intent to identify receiving criminal networks and build 
an informer's credibility will only be allowed in the most 
exceptional cases with the explicit personal consent of the 
minister of justice; 
d) the CRI is to be reorganised with the intent to give it a more 
effective role in the information sharing network, with new 
"crime desks" to service the regional and foreign police 
services. It has also been given the mandate to permanently 
monitor the top 100 major criminals in the country; 
e) the CrD departments where most of the covert policing took 
place in the past are to be reorganised under the general 
criminal detective branches. (Statewatch Vol 6 No 3 1996: 13) 
The net effect of these changes has been the overhaul of the 
Dutch criminal justice system in an attempt to salvage public 
trust in it, and to ensure that the concept of regional policing 
autonomy cannot in the future be taken to the extreme where 
police officers can break the law under the guise of covert 
operational necessity. 
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8.5: CONCLUSION 
Within the context of this research, the relevance of the 
aforementioned IRT affair lies in its ability to once again 
illustrate the importance of regional autonomy, which in turn has 
a direct bearing on the central research question. Inasmuch as 
the devolution of responsibility can give rise to a scenario 
where police officers can conduct operations that are in 
violation of the law, unbeknownst to anyone else, it also allows 
for officers to likewise circumvent, when necessary, the national 
unit. As with Germany therefore, the imposition of a centralised 
mode of information exchange and coordination, can be at variance 
to a decentralised system of policing. 
In delineating some of the factors outlined in this chapter, 
that constrain the exchange of information, such as: the Europol 
Convention; the CRI's statutory monopoly on international 
contacts; the emphasis on regional forces; embargo information; 
data protection regulations; filter criteria and the principle 
of subsidiarity, Dutch officers interviewed still made the 
assertion that police officers will always find ways around legal 
or bureaucratic obstacles. Hence the reason why, despite the many 
constraints, Dutch officers still contact the EDU directly. 
Therefore, while in formal terms the central ised mode of 
information exchange is in operation between Europol and the CRI, 
in informal practical terms, as with Germany and the UK, a system 
of qualified centralised information exchange has quickly 
evolved. While the former allows the transference of information 
that is vital for the formulation of a strategic overview, the 
latter is necessary from a tactical perspective. 
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The eRI for its part has been caught in a paradox whereby, on 
the one hand, it continuously emphasises the fact that it only 
requires as little information as necessary with which to fulfil 
its remit, so as not to unduly impinge upon regional policing 
autonomy. Yet on the other hand it is also obliged to ensure that 
lower levels of policing are accountable to it from the 
standpoint of keeping it constantly abreast of major tactical 
operations, particularly with reference to external agencies such 
as Europol. The basic premise of the research can therefore be 
shown to apply to policing in the Netherlands as well, whereby 
the centralised mode of information exchange has in practice been 
augmented or replaced by a qualified centralised mode in which 
international coordination and information exchange officially 
takes place solely via the eRI, whereas in practice, police 
officers at the regional and supraregional levels bypass the eRI, 
with the stricture that the national unit is kept informed. This 
in turn, as will be examined in chapter 10, will have dramatic 
repercussions for the future of Europol. 
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CHAPTER 9; SWEDISH CASE STUDy 
9.1: BACKGROUND 
9.1.1: THE SWEDISH POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy, and its political 
character is unitary in nature, which means that its national and 
local governmental institutions are constitutionally subordinate 
to parliament. It is the largest of the Scandinavian countries 
with a mainly homogenous population of approximately 8.69 million 
people. Sweden is governed by a modern Constitution that came 
into effect in 1975. It's parliament and principal law making 
body is called the Riksdag, and the country's twenty four 
provinces serve as regional constituencies for the election of 
the Riksdag's 349 deputies. Most of the seats (310) are allocated 
among the constituencies on the basis of the number of eligible 
voters and the relative strength of the parties competing for 
support in each of them. The remaining 39 seats are distributed 
among the parties according to their aggregate percentage of 
votes within the country as a whole. 
The powers of the Riksdag include: 
a) the election of the prime minister (statsminister) after every 
general election, or in the event of the resignation of a 
prime minister; 
b) the exclusive right of taxation and appropriation; 
c) principal law maker; 
d) the proposal of constitutional amendments (a power it shares 
with the cabinet) . 
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The monarch, as head of state, is limited to purely ceremonial 
functions such as the opening of parliament. The prime minister 
on the other hand, is primarily responsible for the following: 
a) the selection of the cabinet, which is responsible for the 
formulation of policy; 
b) the determination of the broad outlines of government policy; 
c) being the chief spokesperson for government policy both to the 
Riksdag specifically, and the country generally. 
Today, Sweden is well known both for its stability that is seen 
as a consequence of its social homogeneity, and the high standard 
of living it has achieved which is complemented by a generous 
welfare system. This however has sometimes been tempered by 
criticisms of the centralisation of political and economic power 
into the hands of a small governing class. 
9.1.2: JUDICIAL AND POLICE SYSTEMS 
The Swedish judicial system is divided into the following: 
a) The Tingsratt: These are district courts of which there are 
97. They are also the courts of first instance; 
b} The Hovratt: Courts of Appeal of which there are 6; 
c) The Hogsta domstolen: The Supreme Court. (Benyon 1994: 54) 
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The Swedish police is governed by the Police Act of 1992, and 
its organisation at the regional level is based around the 24 
counties. Benyon highlights the recent reorganisation of the 
Swedish police by stating "The aim (of the reorganisation) is 
rationalisation by forming larger administrative units, while the 
responsibility for actual police work is to lie with the lowest 
possible level. In six counties the authorities of the local 
police districts have formed one county police authority, for 
example Stockholm County Police Authority. The six counties are 
Stockholm, Goteborgs och Bohus, Malmohus, Halland, Gavleborg and 
Orebro." (Benyon 1994: 57) The other counties followed suit in 
1995. 
The defining and monitoring of regulations concerning such 
areas as police powers, duties, basic organisation and the 
administrative structure of the police is the responsibility of 
the National Police Board. Headed by the National Police 
Commissioner I the board has overall responsibility for the 
National Police College, the Swedish Security Service (SAPO), 
Police Methods Department, Technical support, Logistics, the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service (Rikskrirninalpolisen or 
RKP) and the National Financial Intelligence Service. 
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9.1.3: THE RIKSKRIMINALPOLISEN (RKP) 
The RKP is responsible for dealing with offences which are of 
a national or international nature such as drug trafficking and 
financial crime. It is divided into the following sections: 
a) The Criminal Intelligence Service 
i) Drugs 
ii) Illegal Immigration 
iii) Special Objects 
iv) Economic Crime 
v) The National Liaison Office which contains the following 
units: the Interpol National Central Bureau (NCB), the 
Schengen Sirene (SIS), the DLO desk, the Europol National 
Unit, the Baltic Sea Group and the CUstoms Liaison Officer; 
vi) The Analysis Department 
b) The Security Section 
i) Aviation Unit 
ii) Communication Centre 
iii) Airport Security 
iv) UN Service, Nuclear Power, Violence in sport etc 
c) Investigations and surveillance 
i) Investigations 
ii) Surveillance 
iii) Identification 
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9.2: INFORMATION FLOWS 
9.2.1: INTERNATIONAL - NATIONAL 
The factors influencing the exchange of information in Sweden 
between the international and national levels are as follows. 
a) Europol' s mandate: The Swedish ELO interviewed during the 
course of the research pointed out that during the couple years 
of the EDU's existence, many of the ELOs were very strict in 
their interpretation of Europol's mandate as laid out in the 
Convention in terms of what requests they would and would not 
accept. The wording in requests for information or action had to 
be just right, and well within the boundaries of what was allowed 
under the Convention. Of particular relevance was the type of 
crime that applied to each request. For example most requests had 
to involve some type of organised criminality, before it would 
be accepted. However as there was no official European definition 
of what organised crime comprised, this requirement was often 
difficult to comply with. 
This situation has now changed somewhat as there is more 
flexibility in what will be accepted. This is in part due to the 
trust that is building up between the ELOs and the national units 
of the various states. The ELOs now have a better appreciation 
of each other's national problems. They socialise and even play 
football together, and as such much of the original formality of 
information exchange has dissipated. This however raises the 
intriguing question of whether as a result of this growing 
comraderie, Europol is now informally exchanging information in 
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areas that are not at present within its mandate. 
There can also even be problems in areas that are within the 
organisation's competence. For example, while the smuggling of 
nuclear substances is within Europol's mandate, in Sweden this 
offence is handled by the Security Services. Because of the 
special legislation that governs the disclosure of information 
by the Security Services, they would be unable to supply via 
Europol, information on this offence requested by any member 
state. In such an instance the request would have to be made 
formally via a Commission Rogatoire. 
The term Cormnission Rogatoire or Com Rog derives from the Latin 
Rogare: to ask, and Commission: to action, carry out the 
investigation on behalf of another. As such a com rog is a formal 
letter from a magistrate or other judicial authority requesting 
that enquiries are carried out in another state. In the UK, com 
rogs are also known as Letters of Request. 
b) Flexibility: The above mentioned area of Commission Rogatoires 
is another that affects the decision to use Europol. Despite the 
existence of other channels such as Interpol, and bilateral 
agreements, it has often been the case that com rogs have been 
the only means of acquiring certain types of information from 
other states. The advent of Europol has meant that certain 
categories of information can be expedited much more easily and 
quickly via the ELO system than the formal and time consuming com 
rog procedure. 
However there are limits to the types of information that can 
be passed via Europol. These constraints are governed by the 
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provisions of the Confidentiality Act which will be elaborated 
upon further in section 9.4. Sweden will not pass certain types 
of personal information on targets, suspects etc such as health 
histories, whether or not a person has previously been a victim 
of or suspect for a crime etc. For such types of information a 
com rog is required. Other types of requests, not necessarily 
specific to Sweden that require com rogs are: requests for the 
interviewing of witnesses, suspects and prisoners, requests for 
house searches and the seizure of property, requests for the 
freezing and confiscation of criminal assets and requests for the 
acquisition of evidence. 
Finally, it has been the case in the past that some states 
continue to demand com rogs for situations that have become 
routine for Europol. A prime example of this has been Belgium's 
refusal in the past to expedite requests for controlled 
deliveries because Europol was unable to handle com rogs. While 
this situation has now been rectified, it is a function of a 
greater need for increased judicial cooperation which will be 
examined in the section on operational considerations. 
c) Hard v Soft Information: Another factor which, from a Swedish 
perspective, encourages the use of Europol is its ability to 
facilitate the exchange of soft as opposed to hard 
information/intelligence. Hard information has been described as 
basic information such as names, addresses, vehicle registration 
numbers etc. These are readily available through standard 
channels of information exchange such as Interpol. Soft 
information on the other hand is usually the product of covert 
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operations such as bugging, telephone and mail intercepts, 
surveillance etc. It can also be the product of analysis 
techniques. Because of its sensitive nature, soft 
information/intelligence is not usually shared with agencies such 
as Interpol, and is therefore not always readily available to 
police officers in other states. However because of the closed 
and confidential nature of Europol's information exchange 
process, ELOs are usually quite willing to share soft infonnation 
and intelligence with their counterparts. This often therefore 
represents an important criterion for deciding to use Europol as 
opposed to any other channel of cooperation. 
d) Thematic priorities: For the most part there is a convergence 
of crime priorities among the 15 EU states. These priorities tend 
to revolve around drug trafficking, organised crime, illegal 
immigration networks, and associated money laundering acti vi ties. 
However in some circumstances some states have fairly specific 
crime priorities that may differ from the norm. Such a case can 
be found in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries who are 
plagued by what is described as a war between rival motor cycle 
gangs. The 2 main gangs are the Hells Angels and the Bandidos, 
and while they are both engaged in drug trafficking, the main 
focus of their conflict is in establishing primacy between the 
2 groups. Both gangs are heavily armed, with their arsenals 
including grenades and rocket launchers. They have been 
responsible for several murders in Sweden as well as other 
notorious criminal activities such as the bOmbing of ' t an a1rpor 
with a rocket launcher. 
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Inasmuch as this type of criminality ranks alongside drug 
trafficking as the most serious form of national and 
transnational crime affecting Sweden, it has a substantial impact 
on the type of information or requests for information that is 
passed up to Europol. 
e) Special Projects: Allied to the above point is the use of 
special project clusters in Europol as a main strategic 
intelligence tool. As highlighted in Chapter 5 on Europol, these 
clusters consist of groups of ELOs from different states with an 
interest or expertise in different forms of transnational 
criminality. The members of these clusters bring together as much 
information and intelligence from their own states as well as 
other member states, so as to develop a strategic profile of 
their particular proj ect, which can then be refined into an 
operationally actionable analysis package. 
The Swedish ELO interviewed during the research, in addition 
to being a member of a special project dealing with outlaw motor 
cycle gangs in Europe, is also part of the following clusters: 
i) An Albanian project concentrating on Albanians from the 
area of Macedonia and the former Yugoslavia who are 
involved in drug trafficking. This group operates as a 
network encompassing the Scandinavian states, Austria and 
Switzerland. The purpose of the project is to identify the 
different groups, their modus operandi, their trafficking 
routes, with the eventual aim of turning the strategic 
intelligence gathered into viable operations; 
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ii) The heroin project group, which is linked to the one above, 
and which looks at, among other things, the use of 
controlled deliveries, and the development of special 
techniques used for cross border observations; 
iii) A non operational project group on the development of the 
Europol computer system. 
Membership of these special proj ect groups therefore has a 
significant effect on the type of information that a state passes 
to its ELOs at Europol. It is unlikely that information on 
Albanian criminals will be routinely passed up to the UK's ELOs 
unless specifically requested, as it is not (as yet anyway) a 
type of crime that affects the UK. 
f) Success In The Past: Trust was identified as another key 
factor that heavily influenced the decision in Sweden as to when 
to use Europol. As Europol has become better known in Sweden, so 
has the number of times it has been used increased. As police 
officers have come to realize the benefits of using Europol, in 
terms of speed and confidentiality, so has their trust in the 
organisation grown, as well as their propensity for returning to 
it with subsequent enquiries. This point was emphasised by the 
Swedish ELO who stated that police officers will always return 
to the channel in which they have been successful in the past. 
g) Vetting Systems: While Sweden does not as yet officially 
employ a vetting system for filtering the information it passes 
up to Europol, or that is received by its ELOs, unofficially, the 
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ELOs use the UK's 4*4 system. This means that information and 
intelligence being passed up to Europol is graded to ascertain 
validity, accuracy, corroboration etc. The grading sequence runs 
from Al - A4 for the best quality information, to Dl - D4 for the 
most unreliable type of information. Having this system in 
operation means that only information and intelligence of a 
certain quality is accepted by the Swedish ELOs. 
Finally, one of the main problems identified from a Swedish 
context with the current system of information exchange, was the 
volume of information contained in replies which resulted in a 
time consuming process of translation. This surprisingly was not 
an issue raised in any of the other case studies. However it 
remains a valid problem that is often overlooked, and is strongly 
tied in with Europol's role, and can be viewed as one intrinsic 
to any mUlti-language organisation. 
While it in the interest of the organisation to build up its 
clientele in the member states by being anxious to facilitate any 
requests it might have, it does not want, in the process to 
become another Interpol. Europol's role is primarily meant to be 
strategic, and as this thesis shows, it is becoming increasingly 
active in the operational facilitation of tactical intelligence. 
What it does not want to do however is to become bogged down with 
a plethora of low level enquiries that can best be dealt with by 
other channels such as Interpol or bilateral contacts. Inasmuch 
as the responses to tactical operational enquiries have to be 
translated from Swedish into English, French or another EU 
language, the ELOs cannot afford to also be spending their time 
translating responses to low level enquiries as well. 
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In response to the juxtaposition of the strategic and tactical 
considerations, the Swedish ELO interviewed estimated that one 
third of the Swedish ELOs' time generally was taken up with 
tactical intelligence and operations and two thirds with 
strategic intelligence. This he considered as too little time 
being spent on tactical intelligence, and emphasises the finding 
of this research on the growing incursion of tactical matters 
upon the strategic as far as Europol is concerned. This point 
will be further explored in the section on operational 
considerations. 
9.2.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL 
As with other EU states, the RKP is the focal point for all 
international contacts, as well as crimes, cases etc of a 
national nature. In terms of information flows to the RKP 
therefore, the main criterion revolves around information that 
is either of national or international relevance. However there 
are no formal agreements that compel regional forces, or that 
even lay down guidelines as to when to pass up information to the 
RKP. The receipt of information from the regional forces was 
described by one member of the RKP as being based on persuasion 
and reciprocity. This is in keeping with the relative autonomy 
of the regional forces. 
During the course of the research, intelligence officers from 
four regions of Sweden were interviewed. These regions were: 
Gothenburg; Uppsala; Norrkoping; and Karlstad. Together with data 
acquired from the RKP itself, the other criteria that governs 
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information flows between the regional force and the RKP are as 
follows: 
a) Special Obj ects: Special Obj ects is a person based system that 
is similar to the Dutch position on treating organised crime as 
an overarching umbrella that encompasses all other types of 
serious crime such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration 
networks and trafficking in stolen vehicles. Information on 
persons and offences that fall into the category of special 
obj ects is therefore routinely passed up to the RKP. However this 
still tends to be at the discretion of the regional forces. 
b) The CBS System: The Criminal Behaviour System or CBS is a 
special computerized national file which specifically analyses 
the modus operandi of criminals. It particularly deals with 
analysis and pattern matching of serial crimes. While the 
inputting of information into this file was once conducted 
centrally by the RKP, a process that required all relevant 
information to be passed to it, the procedure has now been 
decentralised to the extent that these functions are now 
performed by the regions. Despite this however, the CBS remains 
a national file, and as such is a factor in determining when 
specific types of information are passed to the RKP. 
c) Personal Discretion: In each of the interviews held with 
intelligence officers in the 4 regions targeted, the response to 
the question "How does your department decide when to pass on 
information/intelligence to the RKP?" was the same. In the 
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absence of formal agreements delineating when information should 
be passed up to the RKP, the decision was at the discretion of 
the intelligence officer/department concerned. One respondent 
stated, "I decide when we shall pass information to the RKP. I 
know most of the policemen there, so it is no problem." Another 
respondent stated, " We decide from one case to another what the 
RKP can be interested in. There are no formal agreements that 
outline when the RKP must be used." 
Similar responses were forthcoming in answer to the question, 
"How do you decide when to pass on information/intelligence to 
other police agencies such as other forces, regional crime squads 
etc?" Again the response was generally at the discretion of the 
officer concerned if in his opinion the information affected 
another force or if the crime in question was cross border in 
nature. One respondent stated, "As soon as information has been 
collated and found more useful in another force, we pass it on 
to them." 
When interviewed, the head of the RKP's Intelligence 
Coordination Unit admitted that the devolution of responsibility 
to the regional forces can sometimes cause problems in terms of 
the RKP acquiring the information they need, as opposed to 
waiting to be passed what was deemed necessary by the regions. 
This however only has a limited impact as information of a 
national and international character must be passed to the RKP 
anyway, and where applicable, it has the power to take over a 
case with these characteristics. However the ubiquitous problem 
of police officers wanting to hold on to their information is as 
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evident in Sweden as anywhere else, and was cited as one 
impediment to information being freely shared with the RKP. 
In terms of a return on information shared with the RKP, the 
responses from the 4 regions targeted was evenly split between 
those who thought that they received an adequate return from the 
RKP and those who disagreed. This is broadly similar to 
sentiments expressed in the other 3 case studies whereby the 
national units are often viewed by the regional and local levels 
as black holes into which information disappeared without ever 
being seen or heard of again. 
Finally, the question was asked as to what percentage of time 
was spent on tactical operations as opposed to strategic 
intelligence. Three of the four regions responded that tactical 
operations outweighed strategic intelligence, despite the fact 
that their units were all predominantly strategic intelligence 
units. The fourth region declined to comment on this question. 
One respondent claimed, "This first year of this division 
(Gothenburg) has included education. This education has taught 
us mostly about tactical intelligence. I think that 80% of our 
time has been used for producing tactical intelligence." 
Again this response has been in line with the general findings 
in all this research's case studies. It is a general rule that 
police officers are always under pressure to show operational 
results for resources allocated. Concentrating on tactical 
intelligence provides these rapid results as opposed to strategic 
intelligence which can take a long time before any tangible 
benefits are forthcoming. While this problem has been reduced at 
the national level by the hiring of civilian analysts whose jobs 
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are exclusively the production of strategic intelligence, at the 
regional level the problem remains. Hence the reason why officers 
at the regional and local levels are increasingly likely to carry 
tactical intelligence to their ELOs at Europol. In doing this 
however, they are not actually providing the EL08 with the type 
of material needed to generate the proactive strategic 
intelligence that Europol's mandate requires. 
9 .3: DIRECT CONTACTS 
Interview data from both the RKP and the Swedish ELO at Europol 
both confirms, that as with the other 3 case studies, Swedish 
police officers all have the right to exchange information with 
Europol directly. This is partly based on the small size of the 
Swedish police force generally which means that the Swedish ELOs 
often know personally the intelligence officers in the regions. 
Direct contacts however are also a function of the relative 
autonomy of the regional forces, which allow them to generally 
demand and be granted the right of direct access. 
In considering the widespread practice of direct contacts, the 
implication was given that unlike Interpol, which will only 
entertain requests via the national central bureaux, the evolving 
flexibility of Europol which allows direct contacts was a 
beneficial development. The point was also made that officers 
also routinely make direct contacts with Sweden's DLOs as well. 
This information was unsolicited, and not the result of a 
specific question asked by the researcher. While it was also not 
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asked of the other national units, the fact that direct contacts 
take place with Europol, indicates that it may be safe to infer 
that the same practice of direct contacts with DLOs takes place 
in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands as well. 
As with the other national units targeted, the RKP makes the 
stipulation that they should be kept informed about all direct 
exchanges of information. Therefore the basic premise of this 
research holds true with Sweden as with the other states. While 
officially the exchange of information with Europol is based upon 
a centralised mode, in practice, the system has quickly evolved 
into a qualified centralised mode that takes account of regional 
autonomy, and the tactical requirements of officers to whose 
work, Europol is intended to add value. 
9.4: DATA PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS 
In response to the question of how Swedish Data Protection laws 
affect the exchange of information in Sweden, particularly in 
respect to the ELOs, the Swedish ELO interviewed stated that it 
did not affect their work at all as far as the routing of 
requests and replies were concerned. This is because Swedish DP 
law has less to do with the transmission of data as the storing 
of that data. Where it does affect the work of the ELOs is in the 
fact that they are not allowed to store any personal data (at 
Europol) without the permission of the DP authorities. In the 
current situation therefore the ELOs must use the information 
stored at the national unit, which in turn creates an incentive 
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to keep the national unit informed, especially where direct 
contacts are concerned, so that the national databases can be 
kept updated. 
However the exchange of information is affected by the 
Confidentiality Act. The purpose of this act is the protection 
of Swedish citizens, and it prohibits the passing of personal 
data. Within the context of this act, personal data does not mean 
names, addresses, dates of birth etc. Instead it refers to 
confidential data such as a person's health history, whether or 
not they have been a victim or a suspect of a criminal act etc. 
Information such as this that is governed by the Confidentiality 
Act can only be obtained officially via a Com Rog. It cannot be 
routed through Europol. 
Finally in response to the question of whether or not Swedish 
DP laws prohibited the sharing of information with states that 
do not have DP laws of their own, the point was again reiterated 
that it is Sweden's Confidentiality Act rather than its DP laws 
that affects the exchange of information. In answer to the 
question the point was made that inasmuch as information is 
routinely passed to Interpol which has a membership of well in 
excess of 170 states, most of whom do not possess any DP 
legislation, it is therefore not a problem as far as Europol is 
concerned. This of course has been a common means of sidestepping 
what is clearly a difficult and grey area to address. For 
example, when the same question was put to a British officer, his 
response was that irrespective of the restrictions of the UK's 
DP law everything in terms of information exchange and 
cooperation was possible. A German officer questioned on this 
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point however gave an answer that was nearer the truth by stating 
that if police officers observed the letter of the various 
national DP laws, it would be impossible to share information 
with anyone. 
It is therefore possible to see that Swedish law does affect 
the type of information that can be shared with an organisation 
like Europol. However it does not interfere with the ability of 
officers at whatever level to exchange information with Europol 
directly as long as the information shared does not impinge on 
the areas prohibited by the Confidentiality Act. Where Sweden's 
DP law does affect the basic premise of the research is that in 
preventing the ELOs from holding personal data at Europol, it has 
ensured that while information can be exchanged directly, the 
national unit must be kept informed, thereby fulfilling the 
tenets of the qualified centralised mode. 
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9.5: OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
9.5.1: INTERNATIONAL - NATIONAL 
In operational terms, the main criterion that influences 
decisions to take tactical intelligence to Europol is its growing 
ability to coordinate operations and investigations, anywhere in 
the European Union under one roof. While it was admitted that the 
many Swedish operational successes involving Europol would have 
been possible with other channels such as the DLOs, had Europol 
not existed, the convenience and consequent speed of having 
operations coordinated 'in house' was stressed quite strongly. 
One example of this was gi ven in regard to an operation 
concerning Albanian groups from the former Yugoslavia. During the 
course of surveillance and analysis, it was noticed that the same 
telephone numbers and addresses etc were coming up in Scandinavia 
and the rest of Europe. A routine request was made to all ELOs 
at Europol for the tracing of these numbers, addresses etc. 
Europol was able, not only to provide a quicker response than 
other channels such as Interpol, but it was also able to provide 
soft information such as intelligence from wiretaps, 
observations, bugging etc, whereas all that would have been 
forthcoming from Interpol would have been hard information. 
As a result of the intelligence gathered via Europol, it was 
possible to ascertain that 6 states had the same contact points, 
not only in the EU, but also in the Czech Republic and Turkey. 
Within a short space of time, it was therefore possible to 
arrange a meeting at Europol of the various operational teams of 
all the countries involved, and to plan a system of coordinating 
investigations. Consequently the result was that much more 
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disruption was caused to the criminal network across a much 
larger area than would have ordinarily been possible. 
In another case, the French police opportunistically seized a 
consignment of cannabis at the border with Spain. As a result of 
a routine enquiry with Europol, it emerged that the details of 
the French operation were similar to an operation in progress 
between Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain. As the details of the 
connection became clearer, the French police, via Europol, were 
provided with information on the suspects in Sweden and Spain and 
vice versa. The resulting operational success covered a much 
larger area than would otherwise have been possible, had the 
French operation taken place in isolation. For a start it 
prevented duplication of effort, as without Europol, different 
groups of police in different parts of the Union would have 
unknowingly been working on the same case. The Swedish officer 
providing this example was also keen to highlight the fact that 
while some operations such as controlled deliveries could be 
expedited just as easily had Europol not existed, operations such 
as this would have been difficult to coordinate without an agency 
that housed all the relevant liaison officers under the same 
roof. 
Another important factor in deciding when to take operations 
to Europol is its emerging status as a centre of expertise. This 
view is partly based on Sweden's location on Europe's periphery, 
and is also bound up with its vision of how Europol should 
develop in the future. Europol' s Business Plan's prime obj ecti ves 
include the development of the agency as a centre of excellence 
for law enforcement practices (Valls Russell 1995) . From Sweden's 
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perspective, Europol is becoming invaluable to peripheral states 
such as Sweden, Portugal, Greece etc in terms of dealing with 
unusual cases that have a transnational dimension to them. For 
example such states when faced with an exceptionally large drug 
seizure, of say a ton of cocaine on a ship, may not know how to 
proceed within the wider framework of drug trafficking routes 
that the seizure was a part of. 
Another example may include the uncovering of a network dealing 
in the smuggling of nuclear substances. While this may be a part 
of Europol's remit, not all states have the expertise for dealing 
with such relatively unusual offences on a large scale. Of even 
greater relevance is the many other types of crimes listed in the 
Convention that could one day be incorporated into the 
organisation's remit. At the Dublin summit in December 1996, 
Europol's remit was extended to include international 
prostitution, particularly the trafficking in women, and 
paedophile rings. Furthermore, the annexe to the Convention lists 
the various crimes that could one day be added to Europol' s 
competencies. These include, environmental crime, illicit 
trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters, 
endangered animal and plant species, the illicit trade in human 
organs and tissues and computer crime. As these unusual forms of 
transnational criminality are gradually added to Europol' s remit, 
it will become of increasing importance to all states, but 
particularly those on the periphery for providing expertise on 
how to deal with these types of offences on a large scale. At 
present for states such as Sweden, it is already a significant 
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factor in determining when to take certain types of operations 
to Europol. 
Another operational advantage of Europol, listed by the Swedish 
ELO interviewed, is the organisation I s ability to deal with large 
organised crime syndicates with tentacles in several states. 
These networks are invariably ethnic groups such as Chinese, 
Iranian, Turkish, Nigerian etc which have interconnected cells 
in several European states. The problem with mounting operations 
against such groups in the past has involved questions such as 
who will pay for the necessary equipment, where to find the space 
for coordinating the investigations etc. This can now ideally be 
handled by Europol. The vision is of an evolutionary 
transformation to the use of quasi operational Task Forces as an 
advance on the current project groups, which would consist, on 
a case by case basis, of officers from the countries concerned, 
wi th Europol providing coordinating, technical and computer 
facilities and expertise. This is viewed not as a federal police 
force with executive powers anywhere in the Union, but a 
practical progression for dealing with the increasing mosaic of 
transnational organised crime networks in Europe. 
Yet another criterion identified that encourages the use of 
Europol is its increasing role in facilitating practical judicial 
cooperation. While there are now advanced forms of cooperation 
for police and customs in Europe, no similar systems exist for 
judges, magistrates and public prosecutors, who generally have 
little or no knowledge of other national systems and their 
problems. Successful transnational operations such as controlled 
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deliveries invariably involves public prosecutors giving their 
official sanction for the transit of drugs through their 
territory, and as such Europol is increasingly organising forums 
in which judicial authorities from across the Union can meet 
their counterparts and discuss their own problems and needs while 
gaining an appreciation for the problems of other judicial 
systems. 
To illustrate the type of problem routinely faced, an example 
was given in which a Swedish DLO received a phone call from a 
regional force informing him that they were dealing with a covert 
case involving persons in the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK. 
Having acquired certain intelligence, the regional force now 
required assistance, especially as certain targets were believed 
to be about to visit the Netherlands with a large quantity of 
cash with which to purchase drugs. As an official request via a 
Com Rog was required by the Dutch authorities, the relevant 
Swedish prosecutor was approached for this. The prosecutor 
however did not have the requisite knowledge or experience, and 
therefore took the request to a judge for a Com Rog from the 
court, which was a more formal document. 
This was duly dispatched by the DLO to the Netherlands via 
Interpol. Although the request was only for cross border 
surveillance, which could have been expedited by the less formal 
request from a prosecutor, because the actual request was in the 
form of a judicial request, the Dutch were obliged to have it 
dealt with by a Dutch judge. Consequently the procedure took 
weeks where it should have only been a matter of days. 
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Problems such as these are frequent and stem from the differing 
judicial procedures across the Union. In some instances, a public 
prosecutor may forward a request with a police report which is 
only 2 paragraphs long, which can be easily translated and dealt 
with by the receiving DLO. In other cases a similar request may 
come in the form of an official 3 page Com Rog. Unlike the former 
example, the OLO will be unable to translate it as it is a 
judicial document. It then has to be translated by an official 
translator, which takes time. Such differing judicial procedures 
and idiosyncrasies makes the work of police cooperation more 
onerous. The Swedish ELO interviewed asserted that what was vital 
for Europe generally and Europol specifically was not a common 
judicial system, but rather cormnon procedures for official 
requests. By providing a forum in which judicial cooperation is 
promoted, Europol is increasing its attraction as the preferred 
vehicle for coordinating transnational operations and 
investigations. 
Finally, the criteria used for channelling operational 
cooperation revolves around the general use of Interpol for the 
transmission of hard information and Com Rogs, and the OLO 
network for operations specific to the country where they are 
based. As with other targeted states such as the Netherlands, 
Europol was quoted as being particularly useful in relation to 
cooperating with states like Greece which does not have a OLO 
network. 
The question of the differential in status between the OLOs and 
the ELOs, which was of concern to the UK, eliCited a different 
response from Swedish interviewees. Whereas UK respondents 
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emphasised the greater authority that the DLOs' diplomatic status 
conferred upon them in terms of organising the allocation of 
resources in host states, the Swedish perspective concentrated 
on the differential in levels of protection available to the 2 
types of liaison officer. Therefore whereas the DLO, while 
operating in a foreign state has full diplomatic immunity from 
prosecution, the ELO based at the Hague does not. While it may 
be argued that being operational, the DLO needs the added 
protection more than the ELO, there are other instances in which 
the ELOs need the same level of protection. The levelling of 
false accusations at an ELO would lead to an arrest and would be 
an ideal means of discrediting or disrupting an intelligence 
agency. 
The Swedish ELO interviewed during this research was able to 
give an apt example of this problem, which for the purposes of 
explanation will be reproduced. 
"I have experience in losing this status as I was a DLO in the 
Hague before I was an ELO. As a DLO I had full diplomatic status 
and full protection. I could not even be issued with a parking 
ticket. On one occasion while I was still a DLO, based on 
information from one of the Nordic countries, I made a report, 
translated from Scandinavian language to Dutch. While we had 
secretaries translating, my name was at the bottom of the report. 
The Dutch authorities asked afterwards if they could use some 
information as evidence from this report. That request was 
accepted. This was a sensitive operation and my report was also 
provided as an official document to the Dutch, and it included 
in some parts, information about bugging devices and a tracking 
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device. This concerned a ship transporting drugs from Morocco to 
Scandinavia, but it was a Dutch case. In examining the documents, 
looking for grounds for a mistrial, the defence found this 
paragraph in my report that vaguely alluded to the installation 
on the ship of a tracking device. The defence requested from the 
court that Dutch police officers should testify. As these 
officers were intelligence officers, and Dutch law prohibits 
intelligence officers from giving evidence in court, they did not 
give evidence. The court could not ask the Dutch police officers 
to testify. They could have asked for a Danish officer involved 
with this case, but he isn't obliged to give evidence in a Dutch 
court. However as I had signed the report and was resident in 
Holland as a DLO, I was called to give evidence. Fortunately at 
the time I was a DLO and had full diplomatic status. The Swedish 
Foreign Ministry via the Swedish Embassy in Holland instructed 
the Amsterdam Public Prosecutor via the Dutch Ministry of Justice 
that I was not allowed to testify. If however I was an ELO, I 
would have been obliged to give evidence. We have no protection. 
If the Dutch authorities request us to testify, or give evidence 
and we refuse, they could get a court order to make a house 
search of the liaison office." 
What this statement shows is that in the areas of both 
information exchange and operational support, ELOs will require 
the same level of protection and status afforded their DLO 
counterparts as well as intelligence officers in some EU states. 
This will be particularly pertinent if as planned by the European 
Council Europol is to be formally given what it terms 'operative 
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powers' in the future. Europol's increasing role as a centre of 
expertise as well as facilitator of transnational operations, 
complemented by judicial cooperation, means that more and more 
it will be the preferred vehicle for international operational 
cooperation. This requirement is recognised, and already there 
are negotiations in hand to afford Europol diplomatic status of 
some sort, although the exact details have not as yet been made 
known. From a Swedish perspective these developments are needed 
if their view of the future of Europol as a vehicle for 
combatting the many tentacled organised crime groups that is one 
of the RKP's main priorities, is to become a reality. 
9.5.2: NATIONAL - REGIONAL 
As the RKP is operational, it has the power to take over a case 
which is national or international in character. In all other 
cases however, such as the coordination of cases involving more 
than one force, the decision is taken by the regional forces 
themselves. Therefore it is at the discretion of the regional 
force Commissioner whether in the event of a transregional case, 
to appoint one force to coordinate the operation, or whether to 
request the RKP to act as coordinator. Again, a case might be 
purely regional in nature, but of such a magnitude that the force 
in question cannot cope. In such a scenario, the RKP may also be 
requested to intervene and take the case over. 
In keeping with the autonomy of the regional Commissioners 
therefore, operational control, as with information flows, 
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remains at the regional level, except in national or 
international cases. Because of this, there is sometimes a 
reluctance to pass operations up to the RKP because of the 
universal fear of losing operational control, and the glory that 
comes with success. It is also the case, as with information 
exchange, that Swedish CID and intelligence officers routinely 
take operations directly to Europol. Because Europol emphasises 
its willingness to add value, without in any way taking over a 
case, the use of Europol usually does not impinge on the regional 
forces' credit for success. Again as with information exchange, 
the only stipulation of the RKP, which agrees with the right of 
the forces to directly contact Europol, is that the requisite 
information is passed to them. In this way there is a central 
repository of information on what international investigations 
are taking place, in the interest of avoiding duplication. 
9.6: CONCLUSION 
The Swedish case study has revealed a range of areas that have 
not arisen with the other case studies, and has more than 
justified the decision to include Sweden among the countries 
targeted for this research. It has given a particularly 
Scandinavian perspective to the process of police cooperation. 
As with the other case studies however, the highly developed and 
decentralized police system of Sweden has resulted in an 
incompatibility between it and the centralizing tendency of the 
Europol convention, which places significant authority in the 
hands of the national units. The hegemony that the Convention 
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bestows upon the RKP in allowing it sole right of liaison with 
Europol is at variance with the devolved authority of the Swedish 
regional forces. While this hegemony is vital for a purely 
intelligence oriented organisation, it is at odds with the 
tactical imperatives of police officers at a regional and local 
level. 
Consequently, as in the other case studies, the regional forces 
have very quickly developed their own tactically relevant 
procedures for expediting investigations and exchanging 
information/intelligence directly with Europol. The centralized 
mode has been replaced by a qualified centralized one, and the 
evidence from this case study reveals that as with Germany, this 
process is more accepted as the norm in Sweden than in the 
Netherlands or the UK. Inasmuch as Swedish interviewees were able 
to confirm that direct contacts also take place in Denmark and 
in Finland, it is possible to state that the premise of this 
research holds true from a Scandinavian perspective as well. 
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CHAPTER 10: SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
10 . 1: BUROPOL AS A CENTRALISED MODEL 
The Methodology chapter of this thesis outlined a list of non-
equivalent dependent variables which were necessary to prove that 
Europol conforms to the centralised state model. This list, and 
the supporting data gleaned from the Europol chapter as well as 
the four case studies are as follows: 
1) That the premise of Europol being grounded on a centralised 
mode of information exchange will be based on legal validity: 
This is evident by both the Maastricht Treaty and the Europol 
Convention. Article Kl of Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty 
states the following as being of common interest, "police 
cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of 
international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of 
customs cooperation, in connection with the organisation of a 
Union-wide system of exchanging information within a European 
police Office (Europol)." 
Having established the intention to initiate and develop a 
European Police Office, the Europol Drugs Unit, as the forerunner 
of Europol proper was brought into existence via the signing of 
a Ministerial Agreement, with the later signing of the Europol 
Convention giving a proper legal basis to Europol proper. While 
the Maastricht Treaty stipulates Europol' s character as an 
information exchange agency, both the Ministerial Agreement and 
the Convention both articulate that the exchange of information 
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must take place exclusively through national units in each member 
state that are specifically designated for this purpose. 
2) The national units will have their own tools for maintaining 
national control over the flow of information: 
The four case studies showed that each national unit did in 
fact have rules that governed the exchange of information, both 
internationally, and internally. However the format and character 
of these rules varied from state to state. In the case of 
Germany, the exchange of information was firmly grounded in the 
federal nature of the German state. The BKA Law formally confers 
the sole right of jurisdiction in international cooperation. The 
only exception to this rule is in the case of the Federal Border 
Police who have restricted rights of liaison with foreign police 
forces, but even in this case, the Federal Border police are 
still constrained to liaise with and keep the BKA informed of 
their activities. 
Going hand in hand with this is the BKA's sole prerogative on 
deciding the appropriate channel to be used in international 
cooperation, be it Interpol, Europol, Schengen or the DLO 
network. This prerogative has allowed the BKA to build up a 
certain level of expertise in ascertaining which is the 
appropriate channel in any given situation. The flow of 
information from the national to the regional levels is also 
formally governed by the BKA Law. The area of the BKA's remit 
includes: 
a) the collection and analysis of all information and documents 
of interest to the CID function; 
295) 
b) the fighting of criminal elements who are, or may be expected 
to become active beyond State or national borders; 
The 1973 amendment to the BKA Law also conferred specific 
responsibility for the following offences: 
a) internationally organised trafficking in arms, ammunition, 
explosives and narcotics; 
b) internationally organised production and/or distribution of 
counterfeit money; 
c) offences against the life or freedom of the Federal President, 
members of the Federal Government, the Bundestag, the Federal 
Constitutional Court or of the guests of the constitutional 
institutions. 
Therefore the BKA has specific legal means for maintaining 
national control over the flow of information, both 
internationally and nationally. 
The means however by which the UK's NCIS controls the flow of 
information is of a less formal legalistic character than in 
Germany. In the UK, the flow of information internationally is 
governed by NCIS's main objectives which includes its function 
as the national focal point for the gathering, collation, 
evaluation, analysis and development of relevant information and 
intelligence about serious crime and major criminals of a 
regional, national and international nature. This process is due 
to be put on a more formal legal basis in 1998, when NClS will 
be revamped on a statutory basis. 
At the level of information exchange between the national and 
the force/regional levels, the exchange of information is 
governed by a system of service level agreements which are 
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official agreements which set out what both parties agree to do 
for each other. This information exchange process in the UK 
therefore is of a lower order of formality than in Germany where 
the similar process is governed by legislation. 
The UK's NelS attempts to maintain its control of information 
flows by developing it's International Division as a 'one stop 
shop' which specialises in the expertise and contacts necessary 
for effective international police cooperation. This 'one stop 
shop' facility is seen as essential in maintaining NelS's mandate 
as a central repository and developer of strategic intelligence. 
This mandate cannot be adequately fulfilled if the central 
institution does not routinely have possession of all relevant 
information. Hence the reason why NelS has instituted the 
procedures for maintaining such control via the development of 
the' one stop shop facility', the core nominal system and the 4*4 
corroboration and reliability system. 
In the Netherlands, the ability of the eRI to exclusively 
liaise and exchange information with foreign police agencies is 
again based on legislation such as the Police Records Act of 
1991. In keeping with this power, it also has the authority to 
decide which is the most appropriate channel to use, although 
unlike the UK, there is not a designated department for carrying 
out this function. Instead the case officer concerned makes the 
decision as to which channel to use. 
The exchange of information between the eRI and the regional 
forces on the other hand is based on a much looser process known 
as filter criteria. This system is a function of the inherent 
autonomy of the regional police forces in the Netherlands. The 
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eRI therefore does not have the same level of dominance as its 
counterparts in Germany and the UK. Instead it is very much at 
the mercy of the regional forces. The process is based on an 
understanding of the phenomenon of organised crime as being any 
offence which includes a measure of organisation. Organised crime 
therefore acts as an umbrella which covers other serious forms 
of transnational criminality such as drug trafficking, illegal 
immigration networks etc, and the criterion for deciding when to 
pass information up to the eRI is the term "organised". If an 
offence contains an element of organisation, then information on 
it is passed up to the eRI. In this way, the eRI, despite the 
autonomy of the regional forces, also has the means whereby it 
can control the flow of information both internationally and 
internally from the national to the regional levels. 
Finally in Sweden the exchange of information/intelligence 
between the Rikskriminalpolisen (RKP) and international police 
agencies such as Europol is again based upon legislation. However 
unlike the other three states targeted, the exchange of 
information between the RKP and the regional forces is not based 
on formal agreements of any sort. During the course of the 
research, the basis of information exchange was described as 
depending upon persuasion and reciprocity. While this regional 
autonomy was in one sense described as sometimes being an 
impediment, in another sense it did not pose a significant 
problem to the RKP fulfilling its mandate, as regional forces 
were obliged to pass information/intelligence of a national or 
international character to the RKP anyway, and the RKP also has 
the fallback power of taking over a case with these 
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characteristics. This tension between regional and national 
authority is therefore one in which the devolution of 
responsibility at the regional level is balanced by control, 
within certain parameters, at the national level. Even without 
the benefits of formal agreements or legislative powers, the RKP 
still has the ability to maintain a control over the national 
and/or international flow of information/intelligence. 
3) The central body will take steps to avoid duplication and a 
lack of coordination. Towards this end, initiatives will be set 
up to ensure the compatibility of computer systems across varying 
levels. 
undoubtedly the most advanced computer system encountered 
during the course of the research is the INPOL system in Germany, 
and its many sub-systems such as PI~S, APOK, APIS and APR. While 
the BKA acts as the central office, the INPOL system is run 
jointly between the BKA and the LKA. Input, retrieval and up-
dating is done decentrally at the State level, and all officers, 
irrespective of where in the country they are based, have access 
to the system. This decentralization ensures that duplication is 
cut to a minimum, especially as information that is input into 
the system is instantly accessible anywhere in the country. 
This system is particularly necessary, taking into account the 
constitutional autonomy of the Lander, which often leads to 
mistrust of the BKA. In the absence of an INPOL system in 
Germany, policing would quickly degenerate into a parochial 
system with each Lander seeking to maintain personal control over 
operations, and intelligence. The INPOL system however allows 
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vital information to be disseminated freely, avoids duplication, 
and allows for tactical intelligence and operations to be 
effectively and efficiently coordinated between the BKA and the 
various Lander. 
Apart from the PNC, the UK does not have an equi valent 
decentralized system that is open to all officers. NClS's main 
information system is termed ALERT, and is primarily an 
analytical instrument. However its use is restricted exclusively 
to NClS personnel. 
The main computerized tool for preventing duplication and 
enabling coordination is the lNFOS system at NClS, and again this 
is only directly accessible by NClS personnel. While it is true 
that officers from anywhere in the country can call NCIS and make 
an INFOS check, this process does not allow the flexibility of 
the INPOL system. 
The Regional Crime Squads have their own computer system known 
as CLUE, and each force also has its own computer system, which 
invariably are not compatible with other systems throughout the 
country. However these deficiencies have been noted, and are in 
the process of being addressed. 
While the INFOS flagging system goes some way towards the 
elimination of duplication across the country, there is a 
recognition that more needs to be done. Consequently the 
proposals of the Criminal Intelligence Steering Group for the 
implementation of a national system that could involve the use 
of 'data warehouses' and 'common data models' are timely means 
of ensuring that an adequate national system of coordination and 
compatibility are soon put into place. 
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The system used in the Netherlands to avoid duplication and to 
aid coordination is termed Meldingrechercheonderzoek or MRO, and 
consists of a database which holds the basic details of major 
organised crime operations. This allows the CRI to ensure that 
2 or more teams in the Netherlands are not both/all working on 
the same operation or targets. 
The Netherlands also has a standardized system called HKS which 
is used specifically for hard information (i.e. not analytical 
intelligence) such as persons arrested etc. Every area has its 
own HKS, although the system is interconnected. Like the INPOL 
system in Germany, the HKS is also tied into the Schengen 
Information System, so that an officer who consults the SIS for 
information on an individual, will be directed via a regional 
mathematical code to an HKS terminal in the relevant part of the 
country. Despite this system, police databases are still 
partially fragmented in certain parts of the Netherlands. For 
example organised crime units in areas such as Rotterdam have 
their own computer system which may not be compatible with 
systems in other districts. However this situation is being 
addressed in the interests of developing a complete continuity 
of accessibility to all systems throughout the country. 
Finally the Swedish police also possesses national systems such 
as the Criminal Behaviour System (CBS) which deals with modus 
operandi, the Central Vehicle Register (CVR) which is the Swedish 
equivalent to the PNC in the UK, and the ASP system which deals 
with general information such as observations , sightings, 
associates of known criminals, movements of known criminals etc. 
Many of these systems can be accessed by regional officers who 
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can also input information into the system. However at the time 
of the field research in Sweden, the country did not as yet 
possess a national intelligence system although one was about to 
be instituted. The RKP also performs a coordinating function 
although it does not have a monopoly in this area, as a regional 
force can coordinate a multi-force operation on behalf of others. 
Lastly the RKP have instituted a procedure whereby all 
significant criminal or intelligence investigations are 
forwarded, at its inception, to the RKP for checking so as to 
ensure that no other unit is currently working on the same 
target/ s . Therefore, al though less developed than the other 
states in this study, Sweden is actively attempting to catch up 
with its northern European counterparts. There is already a 
system in operation to prevent duplication, and the RKP has the 
ability when asked to provide national coordination of multi-
force operations. In the CBS, CVR and ASP systems, it has gone 
some way to ensure the compatibility of computer systems 
throughout the country, and it is expected that these systems 
will shortly be complemented by an integrated national 
intelligence system sometime in the near future. 
4) Officers will be discouraged from creating or developing 
individual means of communication based on personal contacts. 
In each of the four states studied, the national units have 
instituted measures for 
international contacts, 
maintaining their 
while discouraging a 
monopoly 
process 
of 
of 
occupational deviancy which results in o,fficers developing their 
own network of direct contacts. 
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In chapter 4, the use of both formal and informal bilateral 
contacts as tools of international police cooperation were 
discussed. The chapter showed where both formal and informal 
bilateral contacts were useful for dealing with specific local 
or regional concerns, especially in terms of speed and the 
development of trust. However both types of contacts suffered 
from very specific disadvantages. They are both of little or no 
use in developing strategic intelligence with which to combat 
transnational crime, and they both are prone to suffering from 
a lack of dissemination to other interested parties within the 
police that can lead to inefficiency and duplication. Finally the 
information and intelligence that is built up over many years via 
bilateral contacts is often lost with the death, retirement, 
transfer or resignation of one or both parties of the bilateral 
contact. 
However the existence of bilateral, multilateral and other 
forms of contacts within the police shows that at one level there 
is scope for police officers to contact and deal with their 
counterparts in other states. Nevertheless within the context of 
the development of strategic intelligence at the Buropean level, 
and especially with regards to Buropol, the national units of the 
four targeted states have all attempted to institute procedures 
for maintaining either control of information that goes out to 
Buropol, or at the very least, ensure that the national unit is 
kept informed and up to date. 
Towards this end, the national units of all four states have 
a legal monopoly of international contacts. This is based on the 
fact that the ability to develop strategic intelligence depends 
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on the necessity of having all the available information and 
intelligence. Some states like the UK have built on the legal 
foundations and begun marketing the national unit as a one stop 
shop for all enquiries and details pertaining to international 
police cooperation. By portraying the national unit as a 
repository of expertise on international police cooperation it 
is hoped that police officers will be dissuaded from acting 
independently, but will instead act within the boundaries of a 
tightly integrated system with the national unit at the apex. 
Therefore from within the context of the list of non-equivalent 
variables listed in chapter 3 which are necessary to prove that 
the Europol system is based on the centralised model, it can be 
shown where each of the 4 points have been proved. This proof 
however is not just limited to the 4 states in question. Appendix 
A lists (see Appendix A) the national unit structures of each of 
the 15 member states. While most have incorporated the Europol 
liaison function into existing national criminal intelligence or 
policing agencies, in each case, the Europol liaison desk or 
bureau has been integrated into an international police 
cooperation department that amalgamates the Interpol National 
Central Bureau, the Schengen Sirene and the DLO liaison point. 
It is therefore possible to see that each state in the European 
Union is attempting to achieve the same as the 4 targeted states 
of this research, a national central agency which has an 
integrated and compatible computerized intelligence system, and 
which is able to control the flow of information both internally 
and externally. Therefore while within each state there is 
clearly, from a tactical perspective, a partially decentralised 
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mode in operation, whereby officers from each level can contact 
officers from other levels, the exchange of information or 
intelligence with Europol is clearly based on the centralised 
mode in that a single national body officially controls all 
information flows. 
10.2: PROOF OF BASIC ITERATION 
The basic iteration outlined at the beginning of this research 
is as follows. Because of the interrelatedness between strategic 
and tactical considerations in combatting transnational crime, 
a centralised mode of information exchange for Europol, that 
indicates a purely intelligence lead approach, will prove to be 
inadequate. In looking at what the data of the 4 case studies 
says about this iteration, 3 main areas will be examined. These 
are: the criteria used for exchanging information/intelligence 
between various policing levels; the proportion of time taken up 
by ELOs at Europol between tactical as opposed to strategic 
intelligence; and the prevalence of direct contacts between 
officers in the 4 targeted states and Europol. 
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10.2.1: INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE CRITERIA 
In terms of information and intelligence exchange, the most 
common factors encouraging such exchanges, apart from formal 
agreements and legislation, were the speed of response afforded 
by the EDU, and the facility of having liaison officers from all 
15 EU states under one roof. All 4 national units cited these 
aspects as being among the most important advantages of Europol. 
Other factors that were heavily accentuated, particularly by 
Germany and the Netherlands were the familiarity of ELOs with 
police and intelligence in their respective states and the 
facility of being able to communicate with the EDU in one's own 
language. Taken as a whole, the importance of these factors is 
their role in facilitating tactical investigations and 
operations. 
For example, one of the most common complaints about Interpol 
is the time it generally takes to receive a response to an 
enquiry. In operational terms, such a delay can mean the 
difference between success and failure. The ability to access 
representatives from any EU state coupled with the facility of 
being able to communicate with a liaison officer who has become 
known and trusted, and in one's own language, makes the 
initiation, planning and coordination of large, possibly 
transnational operations much easier and smoother than it would 
ordinarily have been otherwise. While many states admitted that 
the same operations could be effected via other channels, such 
as the DLO network, Europol has had a beneficial effect on the 
efficiency of such large scale operations. 
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Other factors listed included the following: 
1) Hard v soft information/intelligence. The ability to access 
not just hard information such as names, addresses, dates of 
birth etc, but soft information such as the product of 
surveillance, wiretapping, telephone and mail intercepts, 
analysis etc, was a prime advantage of using Europol that was 
emphasised by both Sweden and the Netherlands. Prior to the 
advent of Europol such intelligence could usually only be 
accessed via the time consuming process of commission rogatoires. 
The ability to access this type of information has added an extra 
fillip to the mounting of operations between 2 or more states. 
2) Security and confidentiality. The problem of security was one 
of the main weaknesses of Interpol that lead to the creation of 
Europol as an independent agency, and not just an organ of 
Interpol. Its guiding concept of reciprocity resulted in Interpol 
being obliged to freely share information with all its members. 
This proved, for most Western European police agencies to be an 
unacceptable security risk, especially in terms of the propensity 
for intelligence to fall into the hands of states which sponsor 
terrorism or that are actively involved in certain types of crime 
such as drug trafficking. For these reasons, most European states 
now only exchange hard information with Interpol, and not the 
more tactically sensitive soft information. 
Therefore the security of Europol as a currently closed system 
of information exchange was quoted by UK authorities as one of 
the main incentives for using Europol as opposed to any other 
channel, particularly in light of the requirements of the 
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Criminal Procedures and Information Act (CPIA), which requires 
that a lien be attached to all information shared externally, 
which prohibits that information from being disclosed to a third 
party without the express authority of the relevant UK authority. 
3) Flexibility. This point was raised by both Sweden and the 
Netherlands, and is connected to the aforementioned ability of 
Europol as a conduit for exchanging soft intelligence. This 
facility gives greater flexibility to the facilitation of 
transnational operations, especially when taken together with 
other factors as having all liaison officers under one roof, and 
having access to European states such as Greece that has no DLO 
network. 
4) Core nominals and quality control. Three of the states 
examined have in operation a core nominal system of some 
description. These are the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. The 
use of core nominals has an impact on the information that the 
national units will be able to pass on to Europol in that only 
criminals or organisations of a certain quality will be included 
within the system. Of these 3 states, the UK and Sweden both make 
use of the 4*4 system for vetting the quality, accuracy and 
reliability of information received from other levels of 
policing. Together these 2 factors heavily influence the type of 
information passed to Europol, although in some cases, 
particularly in the UK, the core nominal priorities of the 
national unit do not always coincide with those of the regional 
forces. 
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5) Thematic priorities and special projects. The data revealed 
that some states may have special thematic priorities that are 
peculiar to that country, but not necessarily to the rest of the 
EU. The most obvious case of this was the preponderance of motor 
cycle gang warfare and criminality in Sweden and the other 
Scandinavian states. Because of the national seriousness of this 
type of crime, tactical and strategic intelligence on this 
phenomenon is regularly disseminated to Europol personnel via the 
Swedish ELOs, and there is now a Europol special project dealing 
with this type of crime. 
The use of project based work, whereby special groups target 
specific types of offences and organisations is widespread in all 
4 targeted states. Europol has also adopted the practice of using 
project clusters for the building up of strategic intelligence 
on specific offences and organisations. surprisingly all the ELOs 
interviewed for this research were part of project clusters 
except the Germans despite the heavy emphasis within the BKA on 
project work. Unlike virtually all other ELOs interviewed, the 
German ELOs spend all their time facilitating tactical 
intelligence. The reason given for this was in keeping with the 
general German view that Europol should be an operational 
European policing facility rather than an information and 
intelligence exchange agency. Also because of the German federal 
structure and the constitutional autonomy of the Lander, the 
German ELOS, many of whom are LKA officers themselves, are 
usually heavily called upon by LKA and other officers to deal 
with requests, operations and investigations. 
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Conversely the main areas listed which discourage the use of 
Europol, and the states to which they pertain, are as follows: 
1) Lack of an operational status for Europol: Germany; 
2) Duplication with other agencies such as Interpol and the DLO 
network: Germany and the UK (ACPO Report on International, 
National and Inter-Force Crime, February 1996); 
3) Lower status of ELOs as opposed to DLOs: The UK; 
4) Embargo information: The Netherlands; 
5) Strict adherence to the EDU's mandate in the past: Sweden. 
With the exception of the core nominal system, special project 
groups and embargo information, most of the factors outlined by 
the various ELOs and national units which have a bearing on the 
passing of information and intelligence to Europol, are 
specifically related to tactical needs and requirements. Despite 
Europol's primary role as a strategic intelligence agency, the 
various national units, as the only formal conduit between 
Europol and their various regional forces, have been obliged to 
reflect the tactical needs of their clients which are invariably 
regional police forces. Therefore such advantages that have been 
afforded by speed, familiarity, having all ELOs under one roof, 
confidentiality etc, are all a function of operational 
requirements rather than strategic needs. 
In the area of the exchange of information between the national 
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and regional levels, the main areas uncovered in the research 
that encouraged such exchanges apart from formal agreements and 
legislation are as follows: 
1) The acquisition of extra resources. This point was 
particularly stressed in Gennany, where the advantages of gaining 
the extra resources for an operation or investigation from the 
BKA, often outweighed the disadvantage of losing overall control. 
The distinction was drawn between rich states like Bavaria which 
needed the intervention of the BKA less than poor areas such as 
Hamburg which when faced with a time consuming operation was 
likely to seek federal intervention at a much earlier stage. The 
issue of resource variance was also raised in the Netherlands as 
a reason for passing an operation or tactical intelligence up to 
the national level. 
2) Core nominal system and quality control. As in the previous 
section, the use of core nominals in the Netherlands, the UK and 
Sweden represents an important criterion for passing information 
to the national unit. Once again, going hand in hand with the 
core nominal system is the 4*4 quality control measures for 
ensuring the accuracy and reliability of information being 
disseminated. 
3) Strategic Intelligence Research (SIR). This is a unique 
proactive strategic intelligence system that is specific to the 
Netherlands. 
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4) Filter criteria. This system is likewise unique to the 
Netherlands, and consists of an approach to filtering information 
to the CRr that hinges on the term 'organised.' Any offence that 
requires an element of organisation to commit is filtered up to 
the CRr. 
5) Special Objects. The Swedish system of special objects is 
fairly similar to the abovementioned system of filter criteria. 
Special obj ects encompasses all other types of serious crime such 
as drug trafficking and illegal immigration networks, and all 
information that falls within this category is routinely passed 
up to the RKP. 
6) Computerised system requirements. One factor that affects the 
decision to pass information to the national unit, is where that 
unit is responsible for updating specific computerised systems, 
such as the Criminal Behaviour System (CBS) in Sweden which 
specifically analyses the modus operandi of criminals. 
7) Personal discretion. While the concept of officers exercising 
personal discretion in deciding when to share information with 
their national units, was to some degree obvious in all 4 case 
studies, it was most pronounced in Sweden. This was clearly as 
a result of the lack of formal agreements between the RKP and the 
regional forces, as well as the devolved autonomy of the regional 
forces. Consequently while the decision to pass on information 
to the RKP was often based on the national or international 
nature of the information, it was often also based on the 
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tactical self interest of the respective officer rather than the 
strategic requirements of the RKP. 
Conversely the areas that tended to discourage the sharing of 
information with the national units are as follows: 
1) Fear of losing control. This is a universal policing problem, 
as police officers instinctively wish to maintain control of 
information, and by extension, the glory that comes from 
operational successes. This factor came up in each of the 4 case 
studies, but one of the most prominent examples was Dutch 
officers who purposely reclassify the number coding of operations 
and information from codes that can be freely shared to those 
that are classified, so as to artificially maintain possession 
and control of the information. 
2) Poor feedback. This point was raised in the UK with reference 
to the NelS's perceived poor record on providing feedback, or 
even conveying thanks to officers who have shared information 
with it. Officers interviewed drew the analogy of NelS being a 
'black hole' into which information disappeared and was never 
heard of again. The result of this practice has been that 
officers become increasingly sceptical and reluctant to share 
information with NClS the next time around. 
AS with the exchange of information between the national units 
and Europol, several of the factors elaborated upon in the above 
section pertain specifically to the tactical concerns of 
operational officers in the regional forces. The areas that 
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discourage the sharing of information with the national units are 
of particular importance. As was noted by one interviewee in the 
UK, the interests of national units are often remote to regional 
and local officers and therefore usually of little interest. Most 
officers in their day to day duties have little contact with the 
world of serious criminality such as drug trafficking, organised 
crime and money laundering. What is of interest therefore is the 
issues that are relevant at the local or regional levels. The 
time and effort it takes to forward information to the national 
unit may be viewed as a waste of time, especially where there is 
no feedback which clarifies to the originating officer the 
usefulness of the information shared. 
What becomes obvious therefore is that for the national units, 
there must be a mix of the tactical and the strategic. It is of 
little use being so strategically minded as to be of no tactical 
relevance. As one interviewee noted, it is of no use at all 
producing vast quantities of strategic analyses if at the end of 
the day it cannot be translated into successful operations. This 
equation is further compounded by the universal reluctance of 
police officers to share information, and has had to be counter-
balanced in several states by the promotion of the autonomy of 
the interests of the local and regional forces, and the concept 
of the national units as being there to add value to the work 
carried out by other policing levels. Only by tactical 
reciprocity therefore can national units acquire the legitimacy 
and trust that translates into a flow of information for 
strategic use. 
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10.2.2: THE USAGE OF ELO'S TIME 
The proportion of time spent by the ELOs of the targeted states 
on strategic as opposed to tactical matters is as follows: 
1) Germany: German ELOs interviewed claimed that one hundred 
percent of their time is spent on facilitating tactical, 
operational and investigative matters. They are not members of 
any of Europol's project groups, and they are uniformly happy to 
leave all strategic matters in the hands of Europol's specialist 
in-house analysts. A major reason for this position is that the 
BKA is itself an operational unit and is more geared towards 
being operationally active rather than just passively exchanging 
intelligence. Also some of Germany's ELOs come from the LKA 
rather than the BKA, and again their prime interest is 
facilitating the operational requirements of their respective 
states. 
2) The UK: When questioned on this matter, the 2 UK ELOs stated 
that circumstances had altered for them significantly in this 
respect. Now the percentage of time spent on tactical matters is 
one hundred percent for one of the ELOs and eighty percent for 
the other, which represented a change from a previously more 
strategically oriented approach. 
3) The Netherlands: The Dutch ELOs asserted that between eighty 
and ninety percent of their time is now spent with information 
exchange pertaining to tactical operational matters. This was 
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attributed to the fact that Europol is situated in the 
Netherlands, and consequently attracts more requests than other 
countries. 
4) Sweden: In the case of Sweden, approximately one third of the 
ELOs' time is taken up with tactical matters. This was described 
as being too little time, and the point was made that there is 
a need for much more of their time to be spent on operational 
concerns. However the Swedish ELOs are being constrained in this 
by their representation on some of Europol's project groups, and 
other administrative work currently being conducted in 
preparation for Europol proper. 
In addition to the main case studies, interviews were conducted 
with the ELOs of 3 southern European states. The responses of 
these were as follows: 
1) Italy: The Italian ELO interviewed stated that most of their 
work is tactical and that they prefer to leave strategic 
intelligence to the EDU's analysis department. 
2) Spain: In the case of Spain, approximately half of their work 
is tactical. 
3) portugal: When interviewed, the Portuguese ELO stated that he 
deals mainly with tactical intelligence and operational matters 
which takes up approximately 80% of his time, with strategic and 
analytical work accounting for only 20% of his time. 
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What these responses show is that irrespective of the fact that 
Europol was originally conceived as a (strategic) intelligence 
agency, tactical considerations have been increasingly impinging 
on the ELOs' time to the extent where in some cases it 
encompasses virtually all of their time. Europol now is 
increasingly operating on two distinct levels: the strategic that 
is being conducted primarily by the in-house analysts and to a 
lesser extent the project groups; and the tactical that is being 
conducted by the ELOs. 
The fact that Europol is increasingly being used by police 
forces across Europe is obviously exerting an influence on this 
situation. This has been a function of the organisation, in 
conjunction with the national units, marketing itself and its 
services, as well as its growing reputation. While Europol often 
manages and coordinates major transnational operations, its 
involvement is also sometimes quite small. It is often the case 
that its involvement might be limited to accessing information 
on telephone numbers, vehicle registrations etc, which might be 
a small but vital component of the entire picture. What the 
organisation is struggling to prevent however, is it becoming 
another Interpol. While it is keen to increase its utility to 
police forces across Europe, what it wants to avoid is being 
inundated with low level requests that should rightly go to 
Interpol. It is therefore attempting to strike the right balance 
between utility and quality, but in the process it has become a 
two tiered organisation that deals with both the strategic and 
the tactical. 
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10 .2 .3: DIRECT CONTACTS 
The practice of police officers directly dealing with Europol 
in contravention of both national legislation and the Europol 
Convention was noted across the 4 case studies. In the case of 
Germany the process was semi-institutionalised, based on the 
successful attempts of the various Lander to have their LKA 
categorized as national units in their own rights. Therefore 
Germany in effect has 17 national units who all have a special 
dispensation for directly dealing with Europol termed 'special 
treatment. ' 
However despite not having the same level of official blessing 
as in Germany, the practice was noted as being common in all the 
other states visited. An interview with one of the Spanish ELOs 
also revealed that direct contacts takes place in Spain as well, 
although it tends to be limited to urgent cases. Although the 
limits of this research does not show to what extent this 
practice is common among other southern European states, it is 
possible to extrapolate, from the information given during the 
interview with the Spanish ELO, that the practice of direct 
contacts may be easier to implement among decentralised northern 
European states than centralised southern European states. 
Nevertheless, within the context of this research it is known 
that the practice of direct contacts takes place in: Germany; the 
UK; the Netherlands; Portugal i Sweden i Denmark; Finland and 
Spain. The relevance of this practice is that it is a function 
of tactical requirements, and has little if anything to do with 
Europol's principal aim of developing strategic intelligence. If 
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direct contacts are viewed as a form of organisational deviance 
whereby officers develop their own contact route which 
circumvents the national units, it becomes obvious, as with the 
above two sections, that the prime concern of police officers on 
the ground is their own operational cases, and as such, interest 
in Europol will be largely based on what the organisation can do 
for these officers. Within this context the principle of adding 
value moves away from primarily adding value to the analytical 
work of the national unit, but also encompasses the idea of 
adding value to the operational work of regional and local police 
officers as well. 
It is therefore possible to see in the three categories dealt 
with above: intelligence exchange criteria; the encroachment of 
tactical considerations on the time of the ELOs and the practice 
of direct contacts, that the basic hypothesis has been proved. 
There is a close relationship between tactical and strategic 
matters, and consequently in the implementation of Europol, it 
has been impossible to shield the organisation from tactical 
matters. As such the centralised mode of information and 
intelligence exchange was the incorrect format for Europol, 
particularly as it has proven to be incompatible with the 
decentralised policing systems in many (particularly northern) 
European states. 
What has therefore rapidly evolved, even in the first year of 
Europol's existence, is a qualified decentralised mode of 
information exchange. Under this intermediate system, 
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communication is theoretically controlled solely by the national 
unit. However independent communication is allowed by regional 
and local officers within specified parameters. These parameters 
chiefly revolve around the requirements that the national units 
be kept informed of all ongoing requests, operations, 
investigations etc, and in some instances, that copies of all 
replies by the ELOs be forwarded to the national units. Such a 
system represents a departure from a purely strategic 
intelligence lead approach, to one that creates a mix of the 
tactical and the strategic. 
10 • 3: CONSEQUENCES OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
10.3 .1: MACRO LEVEL DEVELOPMENTS 
In one sense, most of the developments outlined in the research 
have been either of a micro or meso nature, in that it has 
revolved primarily around structures for police cooperation 
(principally Europol), and the development of cross national 
communication systems for the purpose of facilitating the 
exchange of information and intelligence, and the cultivation of 
direct contacts between police officers in different countries 
via the exchange of liaison officers. From the micro level 
perspective, the research has dealt with the emphasis at the 
regional and local levels of the investigations of specific 
offences. 
However these developments have had knock on consequences upon 
developments at the intergovernmental level, that impact on such 
320) 
areas as constitutional and international legal agreements, 
harmonisation of laws etc. The areas where meso and micro level 
developments in Europol have affected the macro level are as 
follows: 
1) Operative Powers For Europol: 
The encroachment of Europol into the coordination of controlled 
deliveries, cross border surveillance and transnational 
operations and investigations has blurred the distinction between 
intelligence and operations. This development has been the main 
thrust of this research to the effect that it has proved to be 
extremely difficult for Europol to remain a purely strategic 
intelligence agency. While the organisation has no officers or 
personnel with executive powers that are applicable anywhere in 
the European Union, it has become ever more involved in tactical 
operations being conducted across the EU, to the extent that many 
of the ELOS now find their time almost exclusively taken up with 
operational matters. 
paradoxically, with the exception of Germany, there has been 
little political or policing enthusiasm for the institution of 
an operational Europol. At best most states concur that there may 
be a need at an unspecified future date for such a development 
but not at the present, and certainly not until the current 
Europol had been firmly established. Yet despite this, it was 
decided at the Dublin Summit of 13-14 December 1996 that Europol 
should be given 'operative powers' working in conjunction with 
the national authorities to this end. A subsequent report by a 
"high level group" of justice and home affairs officials set out 
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the details of what these new operative powers would entail: 
a) Europol should be enabled to facilitate and support the 
preparation, coordination and carrying out of specific 
investigations ... including operational actions of joint 
teams (with Member States) comprising representatives of 
Europol in a support capacity; 
b) Europol should be allowed to ask Member States to conduct 
investigations in specific cases; 
c) Europol should develop specific expertise which may be put 
at the disposal of Member States to assist them in 
investigating cases of organised cross border crime. (Action 
Plan to combat organised crime, report from High Level Group 
to the European Council, JAI, Rev4, Limite, 6276/4/97, 
9.4.97) 
These developments are already being interpreted as a stepping 
stone on the road to a fully operational Europol. In connection 
with these initiatives, the civil liberties monitoring group 
Statewatch asserts: 
"Whatever form it takes the extension of Europol's powers into 
the operational field would mean giving its officers powers ot 
arrest or, in a "joint" operation with national police forces, 
letting "national" officers make arrests based on intelligence 
and surveillance provided by Europol. This latter road would 
obviate the need to create an EU Prosecutors Office and an EU 
police Complaints system." (Statewatch Vol 6 No 6 1996: 16) 
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The concept of a "Europol Task Force" whereby officers seconded 
to Europol, are allowed to be operational in their horne state, 
under Europol's control, has also been mooted by the Europol 
Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator, as another means of 
circumventing the need for a harrnonised judicial system to 
complement an operational Europol. While many of these plans 
would require the amending of the Europol Convention or a new 
Convention altogether, the groundwork is already being laid at 
the macro intergovernmental level. 
These developments represent one example of how the events at 
the meso and micro levels, in this case the incursion of 
operational considerations into Europol' s activities, have driven 
events at the macro level. It is an example of governments being 
spurred into action, virtually against their political instincts, 
by operational imperatives at the policing level, and within the 
context of the push/pull factors elaborated on in chapter 2, 
represents an example of meso level policing imperatives pushing 
policing competence towards the European level, rather than a 
desire for supranational competence at the European level, 
pulling policing competence towards it. 
2) Judicial Cooperation: 
The incursion of Europol into operational matters has in turn 
had a spillover effect on the area of judicial cooperation. The 
coordination and implementation of transnational operations and 
investigations are virtually impossible without the assistance 
of judicial authorities on the continent. A prime example of this 
is in the effecting of controlled deliveries. The procedure for 
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this type of operation includes the permission of each public 
prosecutor concerned for the drug consignment being followed, to 
pass through his area of competence unmolested. This in turn 
involves the ability of public prosecutors to appreciate the 
larger picture in terms of attacking organised criminal networks, 
as opposed to just apprehending a solitary drug consignment. 
The efficient handling of transnational operations therefore 
invol ves public prosecutors across the EU appreciating and 
understanding the peculiar problems faced by their counterparts 
in other states. A classic example of this problem was given in 
the Dutch case study in the tensions that exist between the Dutch 
opportunity principle and the German legality principle. Under 
the former, the power to prosecute an offence is at the 
discretion of the public prosecutor. In the case of the latter, 
no such discretion exists. prosecution of an offence is 
mandatory. The Dutch opportunity principle affords a greater 
amount of flexibility in fighting crimes such as drug 
trafficking, in that prosecution can be withheld in the interests 
of accumulating more intelligence, and thereby effecting a better 
operational result later on. In terms of cross border cooperation 
between the Netherlands and Germany however, the differences 
between the two principles means that Dutch police officers will 
often not share vital intelligence with their German 
counterparts, because they know that the German police will be 
constrained to act immediately on the information. 
Another example given during the course of the research 
involved a large scale joint EDU/Italian operation termed 
'Operation Cocktail' in the early months of 1997. The operation 
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culminated in 80 arrests across 7 countries. However at a 
preparatory meeting held at the EDU and attended by an Italian 
judge, it was arranged that 3 persons in the Netherlands were to 
be arrested, 2 Italians and a Dutchman, who were all to be 
extradited to Italy for trial. However in the absence at this 
meeting of a Dutch prosecutor, it was not realized that Italy 
does not recognize the law that allows one state to take over the 
custodial punishment of another state. While the maximum penalty 
in the Netherlands for hashish export is 4 years, in Italy the 
maximum term is 8 years. Therefore while it was possible for the 
Dutch suspect to be extradited, tried and prosecuted in Italy, 
he would have had to be returned to the Netherlands for 
imprisonment, the maximum sentence of which would be 4 years. As 
the Italian authorities resisted a situation where one convicted 
person could theoretically serve half the sentence as another for 
the same offence, it meant that the Dutch suspect could not be 
arrested and extradited to Italy. 
To address these and other similar problems of judicial 
incongruence, Europol has been acting as an unofficial ad hoc 
facilitator of judicial cooperation by bringing together judges, 
magistrates and public prosecutors from across the EU, so as to 
discuss problems and differences, and by so doing, to arrive at 
a common or approximate working practice based on an 
understanding of each others constraints. This process has been 
put on a constitutional footing by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Article K.2.2 states that Europol will be responsible for 
promoting liaison arrangements between prosecuting/investigating 
officials specialising in the fight against organised crime. 
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These powers are further enhanced by Article K.3 which adds that 
common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall 
include .... facilitating and accelerating cooperation between 
competent ministries and judicial or equivalent authorities of 
the Member States in relation to proceedings and the enforcement 
of decisions. In light of these developments, one Europol 
official interviewed voiced the expectation that one day in the 
near future it will be necessary for public prosecutors to be 
based at Europol, working alongside the ELOs. 
As with operational powers for Europol, these meso level 
initiatives are now being mirrored at the macro level. The 
Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union has 
recently passed a number of measures aimed at increasing judicial 
cooperation. These measures include: 
a) GROTIUS: a programme for promoting the exchange of legal 
practices; 
b) OISIN: a Joint Action providing a common programme for the 
exchange and training of, and cooperation between law 
enforcement authorities. 
In an Action Plan presented to the European Council by a High 
Level Group of justice and home affairs officials, a proposal was 
made for the setting up of a "Network" for judicial cooperation, 
which would act as a clearing house, problem solver and contact 
maker between judicial authorities at the national level. The 
report goes on to recommend an in depth study to examine: 
"The role of judicial authorities in their relations with 
Europol, in step with the enlargement of Europol's 
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competencies ... [and examine] whether it should in the long term 
be transformed into a more permanent structure, which could 
become an important interlocutor of Europol." 
The civil rights monitoring organisation Statewatch rightly 
interprets this as a first step in creating an EU prosecution 
service to work in tandem with a Europol with "operative powers." 
(Statewatch Vol 7 No 2 1997: 2) The impetus for these initiatives 
have clearly been tactical push factors that have resulted in 
Europol being increasingly involved in tactical operations. In 
the process these developments have spilt over into adj acent 
sectors, one of which has been judicial cooperation. As with the 
case of operational powers for Europol, these plans have not 
arisen from a desire at the national or European levels for 
greater integration in justice and home affairs, but rather from 
push pressures created at the meso and micro levels. In these 
instances therefore, macro level actions are reactive rather than 
proactive. 
3) Common European Crime Definitions: 
At the Council of Justice and Home Affairs meeting on 19-20 
March 1996, European Interior Ministers agreed a Joint Action to 
combat racism and xenophobia. The measure seeks to make it a 
criminal offence to commit anywhere in the European Union: 
a) A public incitement of discrimination, violence or racial 
hatred; 
b) Public condoning for a racist or xenophobic purpose, of 
crimes against humanity and human rights violations; 
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c) Public dissemination of material containing expressions of 
racism and xenophobia. 
These offences represent only some of a raft of European 
offences connected with racism and xenophobia, which were agreed 
at this summit. This process was furthered at the Luxembourg 
meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers when a European 
definition of organised crime was agreed for ratification at the 
Intergovernmental Conference in June 1997. The subsequent report 
of this meeting recommended that, in connection with this new 
definition of organised crime, Europol with the assistance of the 
European Commission, the Council and the Member States, should 
set up a joint "Contact and Support Network." The purpose of this 
network would be to collect and analyse data on the "organised 
crime situation, " make it more accessible for "investigations and 
prosecutions at the national level" and ensure that it can be 
actively "exchanged with other Member States" and the academic 
and scientific world. (Statewatch Vol 7 No 2 1997: 2) 
This report very clearly makes a connection between the new 
European definition of organised crime and Europol. Taken 
together with the initiatives on racism and xenophobia, these new 
definitions can be construed as the first steps in the 
development of a body of specifically European crimes. This 
development however should come as no surprise, as the response 
of police officers throughout this research, when asked if 
Europol should have operational powers has been that such a 
development would entail the need for such a body of Euro crimes, 
as well as a European judicial system. 
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As with the other areas listed above, the determination of a 
European definition of certain crimes, has not occurred in 
isolation. They are instead a function of activities taking place 
at the meso level of coordination. One of the prime functions of 
Europol has been the institution of project based work, that 
seeks to attack the various organised crime networks operating 
in Europe. Some of these networks that have been described as 
having tentacles in several states include Turkish, Albanian, 
Russian and Eastern European Crime gangs and motor cycle gangs 
such as the Hells Angels and the Bandidos. However the 
coordination of simultaneous transnational operations in several 
states is often hampered by the fact that each state may have a 
slightly different interpretation of what constitutes an act of 
organised criminality. The same is usually true of racism and 
xenophobia, with different states taking differing views on 
incitement, disseminating racist material, condoning acts of 
violence etc. 
Consequently the more operationally involved that Europol has 
become, the more the need has grown for a European operational 
framework of reference in the form of European crime definitions. 
Also this process can only grow in the future as Europol becomes 
more involved in terrorism and international prostitution and 
paedophilia offences. Once again, these macro level advances are 
not occurring as the result of any perceived desire for greater 
integration in justice and horne affairs, but rather as a response 
to pressures and developments at the meso and micro levels. 
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4) Subsuming the third pillar into the first: 
Proposals were tabled at the European Council Summit in Turin 
in March 1996 to subsume the intergovernmental third pillar of 
the Maastricht Treaty on justice and home affairs issues into the 
first pillar of the European Union. These proposals were only 
partially adopted at the Intergovernmental Summit in June 1997, 
with innnigration and asylum issues alone being transferred to the 
first pillar. However the greater involvement of the 
supranational institutions of the EU into justice and home 
affairs issues since the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty means 
the partial dilution of a purely intergovernmental approach to 
these issues. The supranational institutions of the European 
Union, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice now have a small but 
incrementally significant increase in jurisdiction over internal 
security matters. 
One of the prime reasons for these moves has been the 
inadequacy of the current intergovernmental decision making 
process. In the absence of qualified majority voting, there has 
been drift and stagnation in agreeing and signing an entire raft 
of agreements, the most notable of which has been the Europol 
Convention. The signing of this Convention was held up for almost 
2 years because 1 state out of 15 refused to agree to the 
European Court of Justice having jurisdiction over the Europol 
Convention. Eventually an unsatisfactory compromise had to be 
reached which allowed the ECJ to have jurisdiction over the 
Convention as it applied to 14 states but not the 1 dissenting 
state. This agreement had the effect of allowing the dissenting 
330) 
state to have an input in cases arising in other states that went 
before the ECJ, without it being itself subject to ECJ 
jurisdiction. (Statewatch Vol 6 No 4 1996: 21-22) 
Again these moves are in part necessary to maintain a measure 
of supranational control over Europol as it evolves into a quasi 
supranational operational agency. Within the context of this 
research, it was relatively simple to maintain intergovernmental 
control over Europol as a purely intelligence agency, operating 
under a centralised mode of information exchange. However the 
early moves towards a qualified centralised model, that 
increasingly mixed tactical and strategic matters has made the 
intergovernmental format unworkable, for the reasons stated in 
points 1 to 3 above. 
5) Third Country Liaison Capacity: 
The issue of Europol being able to liaise and share information 
with countries and agencies outside the European Union has, on 
one level not been finalised for the following reasons: 
a) The Europol computer system will probably not be on-line 
until mid 1999; 
b) The Convention with its data protection provisions, has not 
as yet been ratified by the majority of the EU states. These 
provisions include the institution of a Joint Supervisory 
Body to oversee and regulate the data protection legislation. 
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However despite these setbacks on one level, on another, moves 
are in progress to significantly expand Europol' s current ability 
to cooperate with non EU states and agencies. One of the most far 
reaching initiatives is a joint plan drawn up by the FBI and the 
Council of the European Union for the introduction of a global 
system for surveillance of telecommunications such as telephone 
calls, faxes and e-mails. These plans go hand in hand with the 
signing of the Joint EU-US Action Plan by President Clinton and 
Felipe Gonzalez on behalf of the European Union at the EU-US 
Summit in Madrid on 3 December 1995. In terms of joint 
cooperation with Europol, the plan states: 
"We are determined to take new steps in our common battle 
against the scourges of international crime, drug trafficking and 
terrorism. We commit ourselves to active, practical cooperation 
between the US and the future European police Office, EUROPOL." 
(Statewatch Vol 6 No 1 1996: 21) 
Other initiatives and agreements that commit Europol to liaison 
with external states and agencies are as follows: 
a) The Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Med Summit of 27-28 
November 1995 which commits the European Union via the K4 
Committee to closer cooperation with the Maghreb states of 
North Africa, and other Mediterranean states, to jointly 
combat drug trafficking, terrorism and illegal 
immigration; 
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b) The Interregional Cooperation Agreement (Mercusor) of 15 
December 1995, between the EU and Latin America, which among 
other things includes cooperation provisions for combating 
drug trafficking; 
c) Proposals that have been put forward for the introduction of 
new legal instruments that will allow Europol to liaise and 
cooperate with external agencies such as the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO) and Interpol. 
Once again these developments are not geared simply towards 
increasing Europol's ability to exchange information and provide 
a tactical overview. Instead they are also being driven by 
operational pressures from the meso level. For example much of 
this research has revealed the importance of soft intelligence, 
in the form of mail intercepts, telephone bugging, wiretapping, 
interception of e-mails and faxes etc, to the facilitation of 
transnational operations. Initiatives therefore such as the EU-US 
global surveillance system and others can be interpreted in 
precisely this light. It provides the tools for not only 
acquiring information for processing into strategic but also 
tactical intelligence. As one ELO interviewee stated, ultimately 
Europol's success depends not on how many strategic situation 
reports that are generated each year, but rather how many top 
grade criminals have been arrested and how many major organised 
crime networks have been smashed or seriously disrupted every 
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6) Upgrading of ELO Status: 
In conjunction with the signing of a Headquarters Agreement 
between Europol and the host state the Netherlands, there are 
currently measures being discussed to equalize the status of ELOs 
and the DLO network. As stated during the research, DLOs are 
generally based at their respective embassies in the state in 
which they are posted. As such they carry First Secretary 
diplomatic status, which gives them exceptional authority when 
making requests in the host state such as the allocation of 
resources. 
During the course of the research, only the UK mentioned the 
disparity in status between the ELOs and the DLOs as a criterion 
for using one as opposed to the other. When questioned about 
this, the other states interpreted this question in terms of 
diplomatic protection of ELOs while based within the Netherlands 
from prosecution etc, instead of the UK's view of diplomatic 
status as a means of facilitating tactical operations. However 
the consequence of the increased use of ELOs coupled with moves 
to upgrade their status, has been that several EU states have 
begun cutting back on the number of DLOs they deploy. 
The ACPO Report on International, National and Inter- Force 
Crime of 1996 noted the extensive evidence of duplication and 
lack of coordination between the work of the DLOs, which tends 
to be nationally focused, and the ELOs. The current moves to 
upgrade the status of the ELOs therefore needs to be complemented 
by greater cooperation and coordination between the DLOs and the 
ELOs. 
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A recent report from a High Level Group of the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council recommended that: 
"The central national contact points (National Criminal 
Intelligence Services) set out in the Europol Convention should 
be the contact points on behalf of all law enforcement 
authorities in the Member States. It is advisable that existing 
contact points, such as the Interpol NCB (national central 
bureaux), Sirene bureau (Schengen) etc should be brought together 
in this central contact point." (Statewatch Vol 7 No 2 1997: 2) 
These recommendations can equally apply to the DLO network, 
especially as the DLO liaison desks are all based at the 
different national units anyway. Such proposals could include a 
system whereby the DLOs are more closely tied in with Europol, 
and thereby work with the organisation instead of independent of 
it. The DLOs can therefore become a means of Europol acquiring 
'on the ground' information and intelligence, instead of the 
current system where this information goes to the national unit 
and may not necessarily be transmitted to Europol. 
What many of the aforementioned initiatives show is that there 
are currently efforts to integrate the many facets of police 
cooperation, with Europol playing a central coordinating role. 
The importance of DLOS and at a later date the Counter Terrorism 
Liaison Officers (CTLOs) are such, that it is becoming vital that 
there is a much closer linkage between these agencies and 
Europol. 
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6} The Incorporation of Schengen: 
Finally proposals were laid before the Intergovernmental 
Conference in June 1997 for the incorporation of the Schengen 
Agreement into the Treaty on European Union. Initial suggestions 
included the transference of the Schengen Secretariat to the EU 
Secretariat, and the co-opting of Schengen decision-making 
powers, which do not require national ratification, into the EU's 
third pillar. These proposals were all accepted. 
At present only the UK and Ireland have refused to commit 
themselves to the Schengen Agreement, which seeks to abolish 
internal frontier checks, while intensifying controls at the 
external borders of the EU, thereby facilitating freedom of 
movement within the EU. However the incorporation of Schengen 
into the EU structure may involve the removal of the UK's ability 
to maintain its border checks via the back door. Once again part 
of the rationale for this incorporation was listed as to ensure 
that: 
"Access by Europol may be sought to the Schengen Information 
System or its European successor." (Recommendation 25e, Action 
Plan to combat organised crime, report from the High Level Group 
to the European Council, JAI 7, Rev 4, Limite, 6276/4/97, 
9.4.97. ) 
Such a development would ensure that in addition to a vertical 
intelligence system in the form of the Europol Information 
System, the organisation would also have access to a horizontal 
one in the form of the SIS or its successor. Again the 
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implications of this move goes far in excess of the original 
intentions for Europol. Far from an information exchange agency, 
the incorporation of Schengen represents another cog in the wheel 
of a supranational European policing facility that will have 
serious implications for the future sovereignty of the nation 
state in Europe as it applies to a monopoly of the powers of 
coercion and control. 
10.4: CONCLUSION 
In terms therefore of the main theoretical developments in the 
field of police cooperation, the results of this research has a 
serious bearing on the question of sovereignty. The original 
centralised mode of information and intelligence exchange upon 
which Europol was predicated, presupposed a system in which 
national authority would reign supreme to the exclusion of any 
supranational interference. This was obvious from the fact that 
apart from Germany, no other European state advocated an 
operational capacity for Europol. 
However the exigencies of policing had unforeseen 
repercussions. The areas of policing and police cooperation are 
ones in which the principle of subsidiarity is naturally present 
in that, irrespective of what goes on at other levels, the area 
that remains of greatest importance is the lowest level of Ion 
the ground I policing. Consequently the work of other levels, be 
it regional, national or international must be of relevance to 
the micro level of policing, and the authority/legitimacy 
transfer of competence from one level of policing to the other, 
must also be directly relevant to the micro level. Despite the 
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involvement of senior police officers in the early deliberations 
on the formation of Europol, there is little indication that 
anyone foresaw the likelihood of tactical matters impinging on 
Europol's work as it has. It was always felt that Europol would 
be solely involved with the production of strategic intelligence 
only. 
This however was precisely what was revealed throughout the 
research, as despite the existence of formal legislation and 
agreements, the criteria that governed the decision to pass 
information or operational competence from one level to the next 
was invariably based on tactical micro level rather than 
strategic considerations. In addition, the interrelatedness of 
the micro, meso and macro levels were also governed by push as 
opposed to pull factors, in that what is currently driving 
forward integration measures in the field of justice and home 
affairs, is not an ideological belief in the need for a 
supranational European policing facility that is pulling greater 
authority to the European level, but rather the tactical 
imperatives of the need to combat serious transnational crime, 
that appears to be pushing integration from below. This is true 
both at the policing as well as the political levels. 
Finally current third pillar developments that revolve around 
Europol can be construed as an incremental evolution into what 
van Reenen terms vertical integration. The vast mosaic of police 
cooperation networks in Europe first gave rise to Schengen which 
represents a form of horizontal integration. According to van 
Reenen, horizontal integration occurs when the police of one 
state obtain the authority to operate within the territory of 
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another state. This authority is horizontal in that it remains 
at the level of the nation state but extends horizontally across 
state boundaries. In this respect therefore, the Schengen 
Agreement with its provisions for hot pursuit and cross border 
surveillance, represents an early and experimental form of 
horizontal integration. 
The current developments within third pillar issues generally, 
and Europol specifically however suggests a progression away from 
purely horizontal integration. The developments listed in this 
chapter that are all tied in with this study's research findings, 
suggests the beginnings of a form of vertical integration whereby 
policing competence is vested in bodies and agencies that act 
above the level of the nation-state. It is unlikely that this 
form of vertical integration will be federal in the general 
understanding of the term. The European Community/Union has shown 
itself to be a unique form of political association that does not 
neatly fall into any traditional political categories or 
groupings. While in some areas it is confederal, in that the 
constituent states holds legislative and policy-making power via 
the Council of Ministers, in others it is also federal. This is 
evident by the supranational nature of some institutions such as 
the Commission and the Court of Justice, as well as the supremacy 
of European Law over national law in certain defined areas. 
As with the Union generally therefore, it can be logically 
predicted that vertical integration in the area of justice and 
home affairs will also consist of a juxtaposition of national and 
supranational competencies. While legislative and policy-making 
339) 
competence will remain within the purview of the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council, the initiation of legislation and the 
dissemination of directives, 
the 
regulations etc pursuant to the 
Europol Convention will be the correct functioning of 
responsibility of the Commission, while the ECJ will be 
responsible for the judicial interpretation of the same 
Convention. 
With the advent of the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, this process 
is clearly in a transitory state. The confusing mix of decision 
making instruments are unwieldy and unlikely to last 
indefinitely. For example, while police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters remains intergovernmental, with the usual 
unanimous decision procedures, the old Steering Group I areas of 
free movement, immigration and asylum issues are now under the 
gambit of the first pillar. This means that the Commission will 
have the right of initiative over these, but for the first five 
years, the Council will be obliged to adopt any Commission 
proposals by unanimity rather than by qualified majority voting. 
The European Parliament will only have the right to be consulted 
as opposed to the power of co-decision. 
Consequently the JHA Council will be dealing with immigration 
and asylum issues under one pillar and police and judicial 
cooperation under another. The incorporation of Schengen into the 
EU architecture also adds another dimension of complexity 
including a system of options that allow certain states to opt 
in and out of the decision making process under varying 
circumstances. It is therefore with little wonder that the 
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monitoring group Statewatch opines that, " the complexity of this 
decision making structure will be a nightmare to the Member State 
participants, and it will create havoc for any concept of 
scrutiny by national parliaments and the European Parliament 
(Statewatch Vol 7 No 3 1997: 16 - 17). 
However these developments represent a typically European 
example of compromising incrementalism which is often a stepping 
stone to another phase of integration. What this will mean for 
the concept of state sovereignty is left to be seen. However as 
in other matters, further integration in the area of policing and 
justice can be construed either as a loss of sovereignty that 
leaves the nation state with less power, or a pooling of 
sovereignty that makes the power left to the nation state more 
effective. 
Whereas to date the area of attention in European affairs has 
centred upon the single currency, and to a lesser extent the 
moves towards the creation of a connnon foreign and defence 
policy, the evolution of a form of vertical integration in the 
field of police cooperation has as much relevance to the 
continued sovereignty of the nation state in Europe as any other 
factor. While the European project may still at present be a 
journey to an unknown destination, the evolutionary nature of 
police cooperation must at the very least be construed as a sign 
post indicating where that eventual destination may be. 
APPENDIX A 
This appendix contains diagrammatic representations of the 
national units of each European Union member state. 
, 
BEST COpy 
.. 
, . AVAILABLE 
, V,ariable print quality 
PAGES MISSING IN 
ORIGINAL 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Austria 
I nterior Ministry Section II 
General Directorate for Public Secwity 
J 
I I 1 I I 
Group IliA Group IIIB Group IIfC Group HID Group IIIE Group IIIF I 
Federal Police Central Gendannerie State Police CID Services Admin. Planning! 
Command Services Training 
I I 
Counter Terrorism! Counter Terrorism! 
Organised Crime Organised Crime 
- Immigration - Nuclear 
.It , 
I I I 1 l Group 11/8 , Group 11/9 Group UIlO Group 11/11 Group II/12 
International Interpol incl. Forensic Statistics 
Criminal Police Car Theft IAnalysis 
Co-operation 
Money 
'Drugs 
IBENU 
No central contact point Laundering 
in Austria - each section 
provides 24 hour availability 
r 
. .,.- ~ !-,~ . , 
\,,, 1 t ... ~ F: j;!. I , l c. 
,. _.. - -
-
., ~ 
5 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Belgium 
General Police Support Service 
Management Board 
Management Committee 
.--__ -1... ____ r. - - - - - "1 
, - - - - - - I r-----..L------. 
International Police I i Operational 
Support Division 
Belgian LOs 
abroad 
2610-05-StrudureOfEuropoINationaIUnits.doc 
IT Division 
Co-operation Division I 
BENU t 
I'~-------------------~ 
I 
Police Policy 
Support Division 
SIRENEI NSIS I ~ ~ Gendarmerie , 
European Co-operation I 
Support I , 
(including SCHENGEN) ~ • Local Police , 
~ N.C.B. Interpol 1 ~ 1 Judicial Police \ 
EUROPOL National Unit and Customs 
Liaison Officers 
~ 
Foreign LOs 
in Belgium 
18 November. 1996 
6 
Structure Europol National Unit - Denmark 
Police 
General Directorate 
DeptE 
Aliens 
DeptG 
Police Intelligence 
Dept A 
REND 
Co-ordination 
NCB Interpol 
Vehicles 
Drugs Intelligence 
Financial Crime 
10005-StructureOfEuropolNationaIUnits.doc 18 November. 1996 
-.. ,,---, 
". . ., .. ' : . 1 l 1 t. } i .... ,! i ," !~~ 
J ~ t~ ~! ~ f-ll \ t ~" v ,,_' __ ~~ ~,:.l2 ... ;.._~;~;.. ~-:._~_;.;.';", ........... : .. ' ____ .. __ .':".-'-_ 
I 
/ 
I 
I 
Danish Police 
Field Units 
I 
/ 
I 
I 
/ 
/ 
.. 
7 
Structure of the Europo! National Unit - Germany 
DivisionOA 
Organised & General 
Crime 
Bundeskriminalamt 
President 
DivisionKT 
Forensic Science 
Division ZD 
Central CID Services 
identifications 
Sub-division OA 1 ~iViSiOO OA 2 I I Sub-division ZD 3 HENU I I Sub-division ZD 4 Analysis: Analysis: International co-operation Organised Crime Drug Related Crime Interpol NCB 
Section OA 11 Section ZO 34 
OC related co-ordinationl Drug related Watch section 
Situation reports.! Liaison 
IronOA21 
co-ordination I I Section ZD 31 \II General inte~ional co-operation (24 hr duty service) 
Off-\\OurI ut.n\ 'JI~ 
----------------
----
---
- - - - - -O~~"'!..~nLw2!Jc_ 
t Case related work 
-------------------
Customs units 
Regional Police Forces 
Local Field Units 
O-05-StructureOfEuropoiNationaIUnita.doc 18 November, 1886 
8 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Hellas 
Anti-drug Co-ordinative Body 
(Unit) (president is the Head of the 
Police Public Security Division) 
Police, Customs and Ports Police 
desk officers 
10005-SlructureOfEuropolNationaIUnit8.doc 
Ministry of Public Order 
Security & Police Branch 
Public Security 
Division 
International Police 
Co-operation Division 
International Relations 
(NCB Interpol) Sub-
division 
European Co-operation 
Sub-division 
(SCHENGENI EUROPOL) 
18 November, 1996 
No official ENU 
HENU represented by the Heads of the 
Anti-drug Co-ordinative Body and the 
European Co-operation Sub-division 
No Hellenic DLOs (except in Cyprus) 
Desk officers available 24 hrs a day 
9 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Spain 
Director General 
Police 
Deputy Director - Operational 
, -, . orr - ~ ,~.-
International Co-operation ' .~ ~ ;: ~ I ~ f '-1 r L _; 
• . "t 
and Co-ordination Unit . . . i 'r~ . 
I I I' ~:" .. ~:2 
. -
_ ~ __ ~ .... ___ , _ _ :z.:. ... 
, .~ ~ ;: ~ I '; :'~~~i'~I~ 
.' _,: '~l~" 
,,' . 1 f" 1 
-< f~, ~~:~-
 _ ....   t~:~ 
Division Division Division Division Division 
Special Aliens & Judicial Forensic Public Order 
Branch Immigration Police Police 
Interpol Judicial Police Drugs Central HENU/ Europol 
NCB Central Unit Unit National Unit 
Operational Co-ordination Study & 
Co-ordination and Analysis Planning 
Section Section Section 
--- -
-~-.-.--
. O-OS-StructureOfEuropolNationalUnita.doc 18 November. 1996 
r 
Crime 
Laboratory 
r 
10 
Structure Europol National Unit - Finland 
Chief of National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) 
. f..'!fmw-~r·· ',c ~ ·.a .. <f.t:ttt nutv~  mmT 
. -. :'t~~~;~'".JtP1c}/ 
, 
T 1 
Administration 
Crime 
C "ril'l 
uitnUJ!«ee Economic 
Pivision . Prevention 
r:M ';" : •• 
I T 1 
I 
EDP 
Division 
CrimC:~~~I~:ence II· Ri=mrij~C" .• 11 crim~:I~~~I~:ence "- Seizing of Assets 
, ,,', .! .• " ::~ ..• r.,. ~, . ~ ."\ '". " : " ,.:" ;"~:.:' 
-I 
Areas: 
South, East, 
West, North 
r----------------------------J-------------I International Police Co-op 'I .:,pi~ ~~H~~M' >., : 
r Liaison Officers I It,cn~:~ p~~ '," 
~. '! 1"', .. 1'-,., "'0-'9'+. 'h",1:~r - .....• , ... 
[ Translation services I I .. ' ' .. N~~~ ~~~I!S 
f ·':~l" . rinl~nS . . . I ':i"':'~i 'f;:;,;; .. ; • .. '.. on .<! ')'1 ~ r.r .. ,~." ';"m •.• ;:mfj!J_~;"i '. 
r I I I Police Bulletin' ..... .. '.' ~e . .' ~~"';" . 
I Police Files I I· . r;".,:tf. . "c~ . . . . q .,'ir,: I I)f>~ •.• ~~ ','. 
I 
------------------------------------------
10005-StrudureOfEuropoiNationaJUnlla.doc 
'p. --',,' ~ ...... - ..... :- -~"' .r-.• '':'.'.-_ ..... ~.;,~ 
l· ..· .. 1'·· ,., 
. I ~ I ~ ! ~ ~:i , I '. . , , ; ,; ~ ~ , ' ~ i. 
18 November. 1996 
'J ~. ~ : ~ Ii.'! I: .. ";',..-] 
•. ' ____ , __ '"w; ._ • .....4......:.. ... l..t 
.. 
I 
I 
I 
t l Board of Customs 
11 
Structure of Europol National Unit - France 
Directorate General 
of the National 
Gendannerie 
1 
*'" ...... -"- - - - - -
, , 
, ... 
" Liaison Department " 
:\ between the Gendarmerie} 
... , .. and Judicial Police,,'" 
.... --------_ .. '" 
0-05-StrudureOfEuropoINationalUnita.doc 
Directorate General of the National Police 
Central Directorate of the Judicial Police 
HENU 
National and Regional 
Operational Services f--
International 
-
Relations Division 
~ 
N.C.B. Interpol 
Infonnation Systems 
SCHENGEN + SIRENE 
EUROPOL National Unit 
(Judicial Police & Customs) 
~_~",~~"",,-"~""""\'f"""'" 
,t' .; ... l',; . 
; I . ··1 I ~ I., I I I· i •. 
i' ~. i \ ',,' I •. ' i 
'., \. 
18 November, 1996 
~ 
Directorate General 
of Customs and 
Excise 
T 
___ t __ 
~~,-- --- ... , 
" , "National Directorate of" ... , 
" Customs Intelligence ,I 
... ... ..... and Investigations ... ,,,' 
.... _--------_ .... ' 
12 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Ireland 
National Police/ Crime Branch 
Assistant Commissioner 
HENU 
International Liaison Office 
Chief Superintendent 
International Liaison Office 
Superintendent 
Interpol N .C.B. EUROPOL 
National Office (Unit) 
2 police desk officers 
10-05-StructureOfEuropoiNationaiUnita.doc 18 NOVember. 1998 
Chief Superintendents 
in charge of 
Investigation Divisions 
\ 
13 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Italy 
Headquarters of the 
Guardia di Finanza (G.F.) 
Headquarters of the 
Anna dei Carabinieri (C.C.) 
Central Directorate of the 
Anti-drugs Services (D.C.S.A.) 
Central Operational Service of 
the State Police (S.C.O.) 
Anti-mafia Investigation 
Directorate (D.I.A.) 
10-05-StructureOfEuropo&NationaIUnits.doc 
Interior Ministry 
General Directorate of 
Public Security 
Deputy Chief of Police 
General Director 
Criminal Police 
EUROPOL National Unit 
(State Police, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza) 
1 director, 3 officers, 6 police personnel, 1 assistant 
\ 
18 November, 1996 
14 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Luxembourg 
Judicial Police 
Directorate/Secretariat 
NCB Interpol 
General Crime 
Organised Crime 
Foreigner Police 
Technical Police 
Drugs Section 
EconomiclFinancial 
Youth Protection 
Crime Analysis 
10005-StructureOfEuropoiNationaIUnit8.doc 
Gendarmerie 
IHENU 
Administration 
UNRD (National Drugs Intelligence Unit) 
including Europol contact point 
9 gendarmes 11 police officer 
/1 secretary 
18 November, 1996 
) ) 
15 
Structure of Europol National Unit - The Netherlands 
Corps National Police Services 
Central Investigation Information Division (CRl) 
~ 
'ij 
~ 
1 
e. 
Investigation 
Intelligence Unit 
National Co-ordination 
Liaisons Support 
Dutch DLOs abroad 
Foreign LOs in NL 
Regional Infonnation 
Centres (33 by 1997) 
CustomsIFIOD 
i10-05-StrudureOfEuropoINetionalUnlta.doc 
Expertise Unit 
'in 
,~ 
~ 
i g 
Theft & Violence 
Narcotics 
National Co-ordination 
Scientific Advice 
Fraud 
Support of International 
Police Co-operation 
Computer Crime 
Forensic Accountancy 
Financial Invest. Support 
18 November. 1996 
(Inter)National 
Requests & 
Mediation Unit 
StatTUnits 
(personneV 
organisation etc.) 
,..... 
.jH 
)H 
5~ 
Fingerprints 
Sirene 
Interpol 
Temporary situation 
during re-organisation 
(4 July, 1996) 
Terrorism 
Department 
16 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Portugal 
Drugs Department 
IHENU 
1 \ 
General Director 
Criminal Police 
, 
Economic Crime 
Department 
Investigation 
Teams 
Section for 
International 
Relations 
National 
Drugs 
Intelligence 
Unit 
1 
Europol National Unit 
3 police officers 
Interpol 
- 24 hr availability . . --. ., ~ -'," ·~~"-·1 ··
a ~. ... ..' j.' '. '.' .'_ ....'~ : ~''';- i i ;', ": 
.. !:'~111!,'-~-"-'-"'1: !r dll,d~:~I""l' ol'~'-:f" 
1 o-05-StructureOfEuropoINationaiUnits.doc 18 November. 1996 
Regional 
Branches 
I, ) 
17 
Structure of Europol National Unit - Sweden 
National Criminal Investigations Department 
Secretariat t-I --I 
Investigations & 
Surveillance Service 
INTERPOL NCB 
DLOs . 
~ •.... -.. ..,.~,... ... ~~. ~--~ .. ~.;- .~.~'~.-:--"' .. ' V::'Y~ 
'.. ., .' ·.~f' '''it j-L..' (, [, . 
.). '/ 'j~ :.{! , ";:l! l:~ ~·l ~ "" I')) .. ; 
•... ,,~ .. ; -' 't _ ' ..• f· -'...!. 
Co-ordination 
EUROPOL 
National Unit 
Off hours: duty office within Security Section 
Field units call either the ENU or the ELOs 
Reorganisation planned (see following page) 
;10-05-StrudureOfEuropoINationaIUnits.doc 
Criminal Intelligence 
Service! HENU 
Analytical 
Unit 
18 November, 1996 
Drug 
Crime 
Illegal 
Immigration 
Special 
Objects 
Financial 
Crime 
Security Section 
Operational 
police 
customs 
immigration 
teams 
19 
Structure of Europol National Unit - United Kingdom 
Director General NelS! HENU 
Director Intelligence 
Director 
International Division 
HQ Division Director 
UK Division 
Director 
Resources Division 
International Intelligence Branch 
r------------------------------t------------------------------------------: I International Liaison Unit I : 
I 
I 
~
Europol Desk 
1 police, I customs 
1 assistant 
24 hour availability 
DLO Desks Europe 
mixture ofpolicc 
and customs 
24 hour availability 
Immigration 
Liaison 
Officer 
Overseas Liaison 
Officers 
Liaison Officers posted to 
the UK by other countries 
__________ J _____________________ J _____________________________________ _ 
~7T:""~~ .,...,..,.~ 
r 1'1 '1-" r'l, I ~"f" . 'I ~ .. t.' ~ t ... j L ~ l~, ~ ~\\ .... : . 
i ! .. 'n~ 4 .... ~~r.~!!'~"~ . 
I _:_ :~r ~.L_ 
DLOsEurope 
Austria (1 police), Belgium (2 police), France (1 police! 
1 customs), Germany (1 polic:cll customs), Italy (I police), 
Netherlands (2 policc:l2 customs), Portugal (1 customs), 
Spain (I policcll customs) 
,10-05-StructureOfEuropoiNationaIUnita.doc 18 November. 1996 
APPENDIX B 
LIST OF OUESTIONS USED DURING THE COURSE OF THIS RESEARCH 
1) What is/are the function/s of the national unit? 
2) Does the national unit possess operational/executive powers? 
3) How do you define intelligence within the context of the work 
you do? 
4) Who is the national unit accountable to, and what is the 
accountability process? 
5) Has the ratification process of the Europol Convention begun 
in your state, and if so, what stage is it at? (if not, is your 
state one of the countries refusing to begin ratification until 
the issue of ECJ jurisdiction has been finalised?) 
6) What would be the parliamentary procedure for ratification in 
your state? 
7) Why does your state favour the ECJ having jurisdiction re the 
Europol Convention? 
8) When are regional police forces obliged to pass 
information/intelligence to the national unit? 
9) Is this system governed by specific rules, such as service 
level agreements as in the UK, or the filter criteria system in 
the Netherlands? 
10) When would the national unit (where such a power exists) 
become involved in an investigation or an operation? (is it on 
a request basis?) 
11) Are there certain instances when forces are obliged to pass 
on certain types of information such as drug seizures over a 
certain weight? 
12) Are the national unit's computer systems compatible with 
those of other regional forces? 
13) Is there also horizontal compatibility of computer systems 
among regional/local forces? 
14) Does the national unit have a specific department that looks 
at all information/intelligence that comes in and decides which 
channel to use (eg: Interpol, bilateral contacts, the DLO 
network, Europol etc)? 
15) Does the national unit hold an informants database? 
16) Does the national unit have any pro active intelligence 
systems? 
17) Is there a system (data collection) which allows you to 
identify the incidence of cross border crime? 
18) Is there a system for coordinating major criminal 
investigations (between forces, agencies etc), especially at a 
national/international level? 
19) Are your criminal intelligence analysts civilian and/or 
police officers? 
20) Is there a flagging system in the national unit that allows 
a police officer investigating someone to know that this 
person/group/organisation etc is already being investigated, so 
as to avoid duplication? 
21) Has the national unit a single point of reference or index 
of the skills developed by officers in forces, regional squads 
etc, to which other officers can ask, when involved in 
investigating cross border offences, for advice or assistance in 
actually undertaking the investigation (ie, a central repository 
of the experience of good practice)? 
22) Is there a void in your capacity to gather criminal 
intelligence at the inter force/regional level, and if not, is 
there a focal point at which criminal intelligence is gathered 
at this level? 
23) Is there a nationally recognised training program for 
staff/officers engaged in criminal intelligence duties? 
24) What are the criteria for the type of crime/criminal that the 
national unit deals with? Is it in your opinion too restrictive 
to encompass the type of crime/criminal that forces are dealing 
with on a daily basis? (i.e. how relevant is the national unit's 
remit to the policing priorities of the lower levels of 
policing?) 
25) Does the national unit have a system of core nominal 
criminals on which they concentrate? 
26) Do you find there is a general reluctance of senior police 
managers to commit resources to investigate crime which occurs 
outside their own areas? (ie, in terms of strategic planning, 
cross border cooperation internally, crimes committed elsewhere 
by persons living on their patch etc) 
27) Does the national unit have an index of good practice? 
28) What operational successes has the national unit/EDU had 
jointly, if any? 
29) What is your country's parliamentary position on controlled 
deliveries? 
30) Should the EDU/Europol one day have operational powers, and 
if so what powers? 
31) Does the national unit see Europol's main aim as to add 
value? 
32) What data protection provisions exist in your state? 
33) Are there any formal (data protection) provisions in your 
country's laws re passing information about one of your citizens, 
or crimes on your territory, to another state or international 
organisation, and if there are, how does it fit in with passing 
information to Interpol, Europol etc? 
34) What restrictions does your data protection law place on 
police officers sharing information? 
35) What agency is the national supervisory body, which monitors 
the permissibility of input and retrieval of data/personal data 
to/from Europol, and whether this violates the right of the data 
subject? 
36) How long has the national unit been in existence? 
37) What are the tasks, objectives, mission statements, output 
indicators etc of the national unit? 
38) Is there any customs or immigration input in the national 
unit? 
39) What is the structure of the national unit? 
40) How/by whom is the national unit financed? 
41) What are the main areas of transnational/cross border crime 
affecting your country? 
42) What has been the national unit's relationship with Interpol? 
43) What, in terms of your country's/national unit's policing 
priorities, would you like to see Europol accomplish? 
44) How useful are borders in fighting transnational/cross border 
crime? 
45) How does the national unit define in which cases Europol 
can/must be used, as opposed to Interpol, or the DLO network? 
46) Does your state have a DLO network? 
47) Is there a danger that Europol will only be concerned with 
the upper levels of crime, and will therefore be of little use 
to police officers at the lower levels of policing? 
48} Should the European Parliament have greater influence in 
third pillar issues, particularly where the Europol Convention 
is concerned? 
49) What provisions are there in your country for fighting money 
laundering (such as the requirement in the UK for companies to 
report any abnormally large or unusual transactions)? 
50) How do 
information 
large multinational companies 
(eg, on money laundering, 
know who to pass 
abnormally large 
deposits/transactions etc) re transnational crime to? 
51) In your experience/opinion, is there in your country's police 
forces generally, and the national unit specifically, a balance 
between tactical and strategic considerations, or does one 
outweigh the other? 
52) Have there been any analysis packages from the EDU? 
53) Is the time factor of any relevance when deciding who should 
deal with an investigation: eg, in the UK, operations that 
require a long time commitment in terms of investigation, 
surveillance etc, are usually handled by the ReS. 
54) What police cooperation procedures and agreements exist 
between the national unit and other countries? 
55) How does this cooperation work in practice, and what areas 
does it cover (eg: hot pursuit, cross border observations and 
surveillance etc)? 
56) Does your criminal justice system place any restrictions, or 
have any substantial impact on the passing of information to 
organisations such as Europol? 
57) Does your data protection law, or the criminal justice system 
affect the passing of information/intelligence (via the EDU), to 
states that do not have data protection legislation? 
58) What rules govern the passing of information/intelligence 
from local police forces to regional forces? 
59) What other issues in your state, (both police related or 
political) affect the exchange of information with international 
bodies such as Europol? 
60) Is there at present a duplication of work between the EDU, 
Interpol, the DLO network, and even Schengen? 
61) What prospects do you see for the future creation of a 
harmonised legal space in Europe? 
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